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Abstract
This thesis explores the different mechanisms behind the heterogeneous success and
growth rates of small and medium-sized enterprises.
In the first chapter, I investigate the impact of manager turnover on the perfor-
mance of young firms and examine how this impact varies with different ownership
and control structures. To estimate the causal impact of manager departures, I
exploit shocks to managers’ outside options induced by an area-based policy in
support of local businesses and compare firms with different ex-ante manager de-
parture likelihood and different distance to policy regions. Using a novel manager-
shareholder matched dataset of young firms in the UK, I show that manager de-
parture has a significant negative causal impact on the subsequent performance of
young firms. Moreover, manager departure leads to a substantial decline in the
assets of founder-managed firms and a significant increase in bankruptcy risks of
non-founder-managed firms.
The second chapter is co-authored with Dr. Juanita Gonza´lez-Uribe. We use the
Great Recession as a laboratory to dissect the implications of financial constraints
in small firms. We exploit firm-level eligibility requirements for a credit guarantee
scheme launched in the UK in 2009 as an exogenous determinant of financial access
during the crisis. Using a difference-in-difference methodology, and novel small-firm
data, we show that eligible firms relatively increased their borrowing, employmen-
t, sales, profits, and survival, but disinvested as much as non-eligible businesses.
The results show that employment can be more sensitive to financial constraints
than fixed assets, likely because fixed assets can be pledged as collateral whereas
employees cannot.
In the last chapter, I examine how the succession decisions in family firms are
affected by the product market competition based on a sample of UK family firms in
the manufacturing sector. Using import penetration to measure foreign competition
and implementing the import-weighted exchange rate index as an instrumental vari-
able, I find that intense foreign competition causes a significant increase in family
manager departures. Specifically, departing family managers are unlikely to be re-
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Chapter 1
Young Firm Manager Turnover
and Performance
Over the past two decades, a wide range of studies have focused on CEO successions.
However, most evidence comes from examining large and public firms. Little is
known about manager turnover in private firms, especially in young firms, where
the first successions have taken place.1 In addition to representing a predominant
proportion of the economy, private young firms differ remarkably from large mature
firms along several dimensions. These differences generate variations in hypothesized
influences of manager turnover on firm prospects and prevent us from extrapolating
existing evidence from mature firms to young firms.
Based on a novel and comprehensive dataset of young firms in the United King-
dom, this paper analyses the implications of manager turnover on the performance
of young firms to shed light on the trade-off between resolving manager-firm mis-
matches and the costly replacement frictions. In addition, by comparing founder
and non-founder-managed firms, this paper delivers insights into how this trade-off
varies when ownership and control are aligned.
For young firms, the benefits and costs associated with manager turnover are
different from those of mature firms. On the one hand, shareholders can use the
1See, for example, the family firm successions highlighted in Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006), Villalonga
and Amit (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), and Tsoutsoura (2015). Bennedsen et al. (2010, 2011)
examine the CEO’s value in private firms. Gao et al. (2017) focus on large private firms in the
United States. A few papers investigate founder replacements in venture capitalist (VC)-backed
start-ups: Wasserman (2003), Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan et al. (2009), and Ewens and
Marx (2018).
10
threat of replacement to mitigate agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
CEO turnover as a governance mechanism is more important for mature firms, where
ownership and control are typically separate (Berle and Means, 1932).2 Moreover,
the necessary managerial inputs may change as a firm grows. Turnover allows firms
to match with managers with appropriate skills. This allocative role of turnover
is likely to be more salient for young, fast-growing firms.3 On the other hand, the
friction to replace departing managers appears to be larger in young firms compared
with that in mature firms. With fewer inside candidates, small young firms are more
likely to turn to outside managers (Helmich, 1977; Dalton and Kesner, 1983). The
potentially limited access to professional managers creates more friction in assigning
new managers.4 In addition, whereas general managerial talents are more valuable in
large public firms (Custo´dio et al., 2013, 2017), young firms may require firm-specific
managerial skills that are more difficult to replace. The impact of manager turnover
on the young firm’s performance therefore depends on the benefits of resolving the
manager-firm mismatches and the cost of replacement frictions.
The comprehensive information of young firms provides a unique setting to un-
derstand how this trade-off varies across different ownership structures, that is,
between founder and non-founder-managed firms. First, replacing the founder-
manager brings more benefits to founder-managed firms. The controlling owner
has no incentive to monitor herself (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010), while enjoying
the private benefits of control in exchange for profits (Stulz, 1988). In addition,
founders are likely to be less capable of managing a fast-growing firm than pro-
fessional managers, as suggested by the fact that VCs frequently replace founders
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Second, the cost of turnover friction tends to be higher
in founder-managed firms. Founder managers may be reluctant to hire a profession-
2This benefit does not necessarily apply to young firms, especially in founder-managed firms,
where ownership and control are perfectly aligned at incorporation.
3In the competitive and frictionless model, exogenous manager departures of efficiently matched
managers can not improve firm performance. For fast-growing young firms, managerial skills of
founders are not necessary be optimal for firm growth perspectives. For example, Hellmann and
Puri (2002) show that VC firms improve firm value by replacing founder managers with professional
managers. Bennett et al. (2016) find that founder-managed firms under perform compared with
non-founder-managed firms.
4Indeed, the possible high friction of assigning new managers to young firms is supported by
my finding of a replacement likelihood of 37.74% conditional on departures using a multi-cohort
sample of young firms in the United Kingdom. However, the low replacement rate also may reflect
young firm’s dim prospects.
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al manager or, even, to make themselves replaceable (Rajan, 2012) because they
do not want to relinquish the private benefits of control.5 Moreover, the transition
from owner-manager to professional manager generates agency costs from separated
ownership and control. Overall, the differential impact of manager turnover on firm
performance between founder and non-founder-managed firms depends on the vari-
ations in both benefits and costs associated with manager turnover, and therefore
is an empirical question.
To empirically investigate the causal impact of manager departure, I construct
a novel dataset that covers the population of new firms established from 2005 to
2010 in the United Kingdom. Crucial to the purpose of this paper, I match own-
ership information with manager appointment and resignation histories from BvD
database. The unique ID provided for each manager allows me to follow the mobility
of managers over time. I also link manager-shareholder matched dataset with firm
financial information, which is usually opaque in young firms.6 The comprehensive
dataset provides an opportunity to examine manager turnover in young firms and
to explore the heterogeneity along various dimensions.
I start this paper by providing three stylised facts to fill in the knowledge gap of
manager turnover in young firms. First, as firms grow, average manager departure
gradually declines and average appointment presents a U-shaped pattern. Manager
turnover in founder-managed firms is less frequent and the dynamics over time
is more stable compared to non-founder-managed firms. The bankruptcy hazard
rate—the fraction of surviving firms going bankrupt every year—decreases with
time, and both founder and non-founder-managed firms have similar patterns of
this rate (see Figure 1.2). Second, a significant positive association exists between
the number of manager departures and the firm’s future bankruptcy risks. On
average, the number of manager appointments positively correlates with the firm’s
future asset growth. Third, average manager turnover in other firms that operate
5The process of standardization would dissipate the rents that the founders enjoy when con-
trolling the firm. Hurst and Pugsley (2011) find that almost half of the surveyed new firm owners
report non-pecuniary benefits as motivation for starting their business. Bennett and Chatterji
(2017) report similar evidence.
6Young firm balance sheet information is usually not public and hard to obtain. In the UK,
small companies are only required to report abbreviated balance sheet accounts, which include
detailed information on assets, capital and shareholder funds. Only large companies are required
to file detailed financial statements.
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in the same industry also predicts an individual firm’s prospects. This correlation
remains robust when contemporary individual firm’s manager turnover, financial
information, and industry and local economic shocks are controlled for, suggesting
that manager turnover contains aggregate industry information that also affects an
individual firm’s future performance.
As suggested from the last stylized fact, both manager departure and firm perfor-
mance could be driven by unobservable shocks, such as weakening product market
demands. Therefore, whether manager departure directly affects a firm’s perfor-
mance remains unclear. If the benefit from resolving manager-firm mismatches is
larger than the cost associated with replacement frictions 7, then manager depar-
ture should lead to better firm performance. When the incumbent manager has
(firm-specific) human capital, which is crucial for survival and growth but difficult
to replace, then we would expect a negative causal impact of manager departure on
a young firm’s performance.
To identify the causal impact of manager departures, I examine positive shocks
to managers’ outside options induced by the 2006 UK Local Enterprise Growth Ini-
tiative (LEGI). LEGI is an area-based government program that provides financial
support and mentoring advice to local businesses. Einio and Overman (2016) have
shown that LEGI had a negative local displacement effect on jobs in untreated ar-
eas close to policy regions. In this paper, I focus on firms located outside of policy
regions and with different distances to policy regions (close vs. far firms), both
before and after the policy. First, I validate that LEGI indeed generates variation
in manager departures. 8 My findings show that close firms have significantly more
manager departures and have more managers moving to policy regions compared
with far firms after the policy.9 To disentangle the causal impact from other policy
spillover effects, I divide firms into two groups—with high/low ex-ante departure
7Either because the managerial skill did not match the firm’s growth perspective or because the
incumbent manager was extracting too much private benefit from control (i.e. the value added is
less than managers’ extraction.).
8LEGI does not change the number of new appointments significantly different between firms
that are located outside but with different distances to the LEGI policy regions, this corresponds
to the baseline summary statistics shown in Table 1.1 that only 37% of firms find a replacement
of managers conditional on manager departures.
9Managers moving to policy regions are based on sub-samples for which I can identify the
subsequent managerial appointments. I match manager IDs using all the managerial information
of UK private firms to follow managers mobility.
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probabilities. I show that within low ex-ante departure probability group (counter-
factual group), manager turnover is not differentially affected by the policy in close
relative to that in far firms. Therefore, any performance differences between close
and far firms in the counter-factual group are from other policy spillovers. The triple
difference approach, which compares firms with high departure probabilities to those
with low departure probabilities, located close and far to the policy and both before
and after the policy, thus identifies the causal impact of manager departures.
Estimates from the triple difference analysis reveal a negative causal impact of
managerial departure on a young firm’s performance. Within high departure prob-
ability group, the after policy change of bankruptcy risk (assets) gap between close
and far firms is significantly more positive (negative) than that difference within the
low departure probability group. The negative causal impact of manager departure
on young firm performance is also large in economic terms: Wald estimations show
that, on average, one manager departure increases the risk of bankruptcy by six-
fold. In surviving firms, total assets decrease by £2.05M annually in the following
two years, which is 70% of the average firm size pre-policy . One interpretation of
the negative causal impact is that the friction of assigning the new best manager is
substantially costlier than the possible mismatch between the incumbent manager
and firm growth prospects. One source of friction is the possibility that young firms
have fewer inside candidates and a limited access to a large manager pool. The
friction also can be attributed to firm-specific human capital, which is difficult to
replace even when a large supply of general managerial talents is available.
The final part of this paper examines whether manager departures have a hetero-
geneous causal impact across firms with distinct ownership and control structures.
I conduct my analysis based on sub-samples of founder-managed and non-founder-
managed firms. The results show an asymmetric negative causal impact on firm
survival and growth. I find a negative causal impact of manager departure on sur-
vival in non-founder-managed firms. In contrast, though assets sharply decline in
surviving founder-managed firms, the bankruptcy risks do not change significantly.
One interpretation of these findings is that founders’ private benefits of control pro-
hibit them from closing down firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988).
The findings are also consistent with founder forming “psychological bonds” with
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their ventures so that they are reluctant to shut down inefficient business (O’Reilly
and Chatman, 1986; Wasserman, 2003).
The results in this paper stand up to a range of robustness tests. To alleviate
concerns from sample truncation and censoring, I run regressions with Cox duration
models and find qualitatively similar correlations shown in stylized facts. The identi-
fication relies on the assumption that managers in nearby firms are more likely to be
attracted to policy areas, because they share the same local product market or local
hiring networks (e.g., Topa (2001); Ioannides and Loury (2004)). I also verify the
“parallel-trends” assumption by checking the dynamic policy effects. The negative
causal impact of manager departures remains robust to alternative classifications of
close firms using randomly selected distance thresholds. Lastly, I find qualitatively
similar results when controlling for firm fixed effects.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to a
growing body of studies on founder replacements in entrepreneurial firms. Evidence
from the existing literature is largely based on small samples of venture-capital-
backed firms (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Wasserman, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2009;
Ewens and Marx, 2018).10 This paper, to my knowledge, provides the first large-
scale evidence of manager turnover using the population of multiple cohorts of newly
founded firms. My sample includes 336,000 new firms and 762,999 managers. In
addition, I extend firm performance measures from successful exit outcomes (IPO
or M&A) to bankruptcy status and asset growth rates. A recent study close to this
paper is Chen and Thompson (2015), who use a Danish registry dataset with 4,172
new firms. They find that, although firms undergoing founder replacements are
more likely to go bankrupt, the surviving ones have a greater potential for higher
growth. However, the causal impact is not examined in Chen and Thompson (2015).
Second, this paper contributes to the literature by studying the causal effects
of manager turnover on firm performance. A related set of literature exploits CEO
10Hellmann and Puri (2002) collect survey data of 170 start-ups in Silicon Valley and shows
that VC-backed firms are more likely to replace founder managers with professional managers.
Wasserman (2003) documents a “founder paradox” using a survey sample of 200 companies in the
United States. He shows that founders are more likely to be immediately replaced after the venture
achieves a particular milestone. Kaplan et al. (2009) find a positive correlation between founder
replacement and subsequent initial public offering (IPO) events by analysing 50 VC-backed start-
ups. Ewens and Marx (2018) examine the role of VCs in founder replacement using over 22,000
VC-funded start-ups in the United States.
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deaths or hospitalisations to overcome the challenge of identification (Bennedsen
et al., 2010, 2011; Jenter et al., 2016). Nevertheless, CEO deaths and hospitali-
sations are rare events and are more likely to happen among elderly managers in
mature firms.11 Another concern is that the negative performance found in previ-
ous studies may come from lower productivities of grieving employees rather than
from exogenous CEO departures. Ewens and Marx (2018) exploit the non-compete
laws that change the supply of potential managers as replacements. They show that
founder replacements have a positive causal impact on subsequent exit outcomes.
This paper looks at a new source of variation in manager departures by focusing on
changes in managers’ outside options. This source of variation is more common in
competitive labour markets and has a wider impact on managers.12
This paper also relates to the literature comparing performance and management
practices across founder CEO firms and non-founder CEO firms (Adams et al., 2009;
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Bennett et al., 2016). The stylized fact of infrequent manager
changes and stable dynamics of manager turnover in founder-managed firms is re-
lated to the discussion about the “founder’s paradox” (Wasserman, 2003)13 and the
standardization of founders’ human capital (Rajan, 2012). Furthermore, this pa-
per adds additional heterogeneous causal evidence of manager departures on firm
performance between founder and non-founder-managed firms. This result reflects
the underlying distinct ownership and control structure, which is emphasised as an
important factor to explain the remarkable differences in management styles and
philosophies (Mullins and Schoar, 2016).
Lastly, this paper provides a timely and available early predictor of the perfor-
mance of young firms. Entrepreneurial characteristics, previous experience , financial
constraints, and the geographical location at incorporation have been shown to be
important to a new venture’s performance (Gompers et al., 2010; Lafontaine and
Shaw, 2016; Kerr and Nanda, 2009). Two advantages make managerial turnover a
11The average age of a departing manager is approximately 60 years old, according to the previous
literature. In contrast, the average age of a manager is 41 years old.
12Jenter et al. (2016) examine 458 CEO deaths using U.S. public firm samples, and Bennedsen
et al. (2010) use 1,053 CEO deaths and 5,738 deaths of CEOs’ relatives. Bennedsen et al. (2011)
compare 3,167 firms with hospitalised CEOs to a comparable control group comprising 5,631 firms.
In my paper, I examine a total of 8,220 manager departures across 5,168 firms from 2004 to 2009.
13Based on a sample of 212 U.S. start-ups, Wasserman (2003) shows that, on average, 4 of 5
CEOs are forced to step down. He finds that founders are more likely to be replaced after companies
achieve “crucial milestones”.
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useful early indicator to both policy-makers and investors. First, manager turnover
provides more timely information than annually reported financial information.
Moreover, manager turnover information is more accessible than are financial ac-
counts, which are usually opaque in small young businesses.14
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3.1 describes data
and sample construction; Section 1.2 provides stylized facts; Section 1.3 investigates
the causal impact of manager turnover; Section 3.5 provides robustness tests and
further discussions; and Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
1.1 Data
The main datasets used in this study are from Orbis and Financial Analysis Made
Easy (FAME)(see Brav (2009) and Michaely and Roberts (2012); Gonza´lez-Uribe
and Paravisini (2019)). Geographical data at Lower Layer Super Output Area (L-
SOA) level is collected from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). I briefly
introduce the data in this section and more details can be found in Appendix 1.6.
Orbis is a comprehensive database covering manager and ownership information
of both private and public firms worldwide. Originally extracting annual reports
from the UK registry Companies House15, Orbis keeps track of nearly 13 million
companies in the UK. Within each company, every appointment is recorded with
details of the manager’s full name, appointment date, resignation date and type
of position, as well as the manager’s characteristics such as gender, birth date and
nationality.
Distinct from previous studies where manager turnover is usually approximately
measured, the exact dates of appointments and resignations help reduce measure-
ment errors.16 As managers can work at different companies, Orbis assign a Unique
Contact Identifier to each manager. This is particularly important for me to track
14Managerial turnover is required to be reported to the business registry within 14 days of
changes, whereas manager information must be reported to the registry for each registered firm.
Abbreviated financial accounts filing requirements vary by firm size.
15Companies House incorporates and dissolves limited companies in the UK. They register firms
and according to the 1967 Companies Act, all companies should file annual reports and financial
statements. Although the financial statements information varies with company size, the disclosure
is mandatory.
16For instance, Ewens and Marx (2018) show that 70% of the appointment dates of replacement
executives are missing from the VentureSource dataset.
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the mobility of managers when examining the causal impact of manager turnover
in section 1.3. In addition, annual recorded shareholder information includes each
shareholder’s full name, type (individual or firm), and the percentage of shares.
Matching shareholder and manager names, I classify managers who also own shares
at their incorporation as founder managers and correspondingly, firms with at least
one founder manager at incorporation are classified as founder-managed firms.17
Besides providing detailed manager and shareholder information, another advan-
tage of this database is its good coverage of UK private firms. All firms registered
in the UK are required to file annual reports with manager and shareholder infor-
mation, regardless of firm age and size. Moreover, Orbis does not delete company
information when they become inactive or liquidated. These two features not only
avoid the survival ship bias but also refrain from sample selection problems.18
The FAME database contains up to ten years of historical financial accounts of
firms reported to Companies House. For private UK firms, the standard filing of
accounting statements varies with firm size and detailed accounting reports are only
required for medium and large firms. Although profit and loss accounts and cash
flow statements are poorly covered for small and young firms, this paper focuses on
financial information from balance sheet accounts. I combine the archive disk with
the FAME web-version data to extend the historical financial accounts information
from the year 2003 to 2015. Firm registration information including incorporation
date, legal forms, postcode and their industry, as well as company status, is ob-
tained from the snapshot FAME web-version up to the end of 2017. Shareholder
information is collected for new firms established between 2005 and 2010 for better
coverage. This collection of management details for the population of UK private
firms, ownership and financial information allows me to follow manager turnover
and performance dynamics among young firms in the UK; and the richness of data
offers me an opportunity to explore heterogeneity in different dimensions.
Geographical data is used for analysis in section 1.3. The National Statistics
Postcode Lookup in the UK provides coordinates for all UK postcodes, and the full
17More details about name-matching procedures are detailed in Appendix 1.6.
18Prior research on private young firms’ financial structures mainly relies on survey data. For
example, the US Fed conducted surveys of small business finances, which included owner charac-
teristics, firm size, income and balance sheet information. The survey ran from 1987 to 2003 and
data were collected once every five years. In addition, the Kauffman Firm Survey consist of 4,928
business founded in 2004 and was studied in Robb and Robinson (2014).
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clipped boundaries shape files from ONS draw boundaries at the LSOA level.19 By
combining the firms’ postcodes, the geographic locations of the postcodes and the
LSOA boundary shape files, I use ArcMap to geocode each firm into LSOAs and
calculate the distances between LSOAs in policy regions and untreated areas.20
1.1.1 Main variable construction
My first measure of manager turnover is the change of manager numbers in year t:
4Numit. Since both manager departures and appointments may happen without
a change in the overall numbers of managers, then I decompose 4Numit into two
subcomponents: the number of departures and the number of new appointments,
denoted by Num departureit and Num newit respectively. I also look at the num-
ber of manager replacements (Num replacementit), the number of net departures
(Net departureit), and the number of net new appointments (Net newit).
21
Specifically, Num replacementit is defined as the minimum number ofNum newit
and Num departureit. The number of net departures only take positive num-
bers when there are more resignations than appointments: Net departureit =
max{Num departureit−Num newit, 0}. Similarly, net new appointments measure
the net inflow of managers: Net newit = max{Num newit −Num departureit, 0}.
By definition, the following equality holds:
4Numit = Numit −Numi,t−1
= Num newit −Num departureit
= Net newit +Num replacementit −Num departureit
= Num newit − (Num replacementit +Net departureit)
(1.1)
For firm performance, I focus on two measures: bankruptcy and asset growth.
19LSOAs have a minimum population of 1,000 and were built from groups of Output Areas
(OA). The 32,482 LSOAs in England are constrained by the boundaries of the Standard Table
wards used for the 2001 census outputs and the boundaries do not cross any LA boundaries. In
the UK, a postcode is a precise location code system. Every location can be reached using just the
house number and its postcode alone.
20Details of how to place each firm within the treated and control groups is described in Appendix
1.6. The LSOA shape files were downloaded from https://data.gov.uk/dataset/fa883558-22fb-4a1a-
8529-cffdee47d500/lower-layer-super-output-area-lsoa-boundaries.
21By definition, for replacements, the maximum gap between appointment date and resignation
date in year t is one year. In my analysis sample, the average gap between appointment date and
resignation date is 76.5 days.
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Dummy variable D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 is equal to 1 if the firm status is liqui-
dated or dissolved in year t + 2. The total asset growth rate of firm i from year t
to t + 2 is calculated using change in total assets divided by the average number
of total assets in year t and t + 2 (Asset growthi,t+2 = 2 × (Total assetsi,t+2 −
Total assetsit)/(Total assetsi,t+2 + Total assetsit)). Therefore, the growth rates
are bounded by -2 and 2 (see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)).
In order to examine manager turnover in firms with different ownership and
control structures, I separate firms into those that are founder-managed and those
that are not.22 The manager turnover measurements defined above are calculated
separately within founder and non-founder-managed firms for subsequent analysis,
and a full list of variable notations with definitions can be found in Appendix A1.1.
1.1.2 Sample and descriptive statistics
For the population of private limited firms established in the UK, firm-manager-
appointment level data is originally obtained from Orbis. For young firms established
between 2005 and 2010, I then match the manager data with shareholder information
and construct a database with manager turnover measures at the firm-year level.23
In order to observe firm performance, I then combine the manager turnover data with
financial account information from 2005 to 2015 and a snapshot of firm bankruptcy
status.
Starting with the intersection of manager, ownership and financial accounts in-
formation for the universe of private new firms in the UK incorporated between 2005
and 2010, I add additional restrictions to my sample: (1) I excluded non-trading
firms meaning that each firm in my sample has filed at least one year’s worth of
accounting information with positive gross total assets. (2) Firms belonging to
business groups (either parent companies, or controlled subsidiaries), backed by VC
investors or in M&A activities are excluded.24 (3) Firms with only one manager at
22Founders are classified as managers who also own shares at the establishment, and correspond-
ingly, founder-managed firms are firms with at least one founder manager at incorporation.
23FAME records companies incorporated as early as 1920. Manager information has good cov-
erage after 1980.
24Although the Orbis database provides an independent indicator for each firm, this variable is a
snapshot of up-to-date ownership information. Therefore, I use the earliest ownership information
available. A firm is considered to be part of a business group if at least one of its shareholders is
a corporation, or it is a shareholder of another corporation.
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incorporation are dropped out of the sample. The concern of including just one-
manager firms is that it is unusual to have the only manager departing the firm
before filing for bankruptcy.
My final sample consists of 336,000 new firms in the UK that were established
between 2005 and 2010. I follow yearly manager turnover and firm performance
dynamics until 2015. Figure 1.1 plots the industry and location distributions for both
the population of new firms and the analysis sample in each category. For brevity, in
this figure I only show industries and locations with more than 1% of the population
and analysis samples respectively. Panel A presents the industry distribution using
the UK 6-digit Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (6-digit
2007 SIC code). As the figure shows, the top three industries are administrative and
support services (17.83%), construction (11.13%), and professional, scientific and
technical activities (11.12%). In Panel B, the plot presents the location distribution
at the county level. We observe that there is the highest concentration of firms in
London (19.67%) followed by Lancashire (5.03%) and West Midlands (5.00%). The
industry and location distributions of firms in the analysis sample presents similarly
to the universal distribution of all private young firms, but with fewer firms operating
in administrative and support service activities (17.83% vs. 22.32%), personal,
scientific and technical activities (10.12% vs. 16.10%); more firms concentrated
in manufacturing (5.10% vs. 4.51%) and real estate activities (6.78% vs. 4.09%).
Geographically, a higher fraction of these firms are located in London (19.67% vs.
17.20%).
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics over the sample period from 2005 to
2010. Panel A reports the characteristics of the full sample and Panel B compares
the founder and non-founder-managed firms. The upper half of Panel A summarises
the firms’ characteristics and performance. The average total asset is £4.3M and
the median firm has £55,074 of total assets. The skewness in firm size is precisely
a reflection of the substantial divergence of young firm survival and growth. Fixed
assets, on average, account for 35.73% of total assets for firms reporting this infor-
mation; and total liabilities include current liabilities and long-term debts. Dividing
the value of total liabilities by total assets, I calculate an average leverage ratio of
0.60 with a median of 0.67, which is comparable to the leverage documented in other
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studies.25 The average profit among young firms is £66,691, with a median value
of £4,369. Bankruptcy hazard rates are calculated as the number of firms going
bankrupt every year against the total number of active firms at the beginning of the
year. Average bankruptcy hazard rate over the sample period is 8.82%. Conditional
on active firms, the average asset growth rate is 1.45%, with a standard deviation
of 59.54%. The second half of Panel A summarises manager turnover measures. By
sample restriction, each firm has at least two managers to begin with, and the aver-
age number is 2.23 over the sample periods, which is also comparable to the average
number of two founders shown in previous studies.26 In a given year, the average
number of departures is 0.10 and the mean of appointments is 0.06. Conditional on
manager departures, the number of replacements is only 0.38.
In Panel B, I compare 281,690 founder-managed and 54,310 non-founder-managed
firms. Looking across the median values, we observe that founder-managed firms
and non-founder-managed firms have similar total assets. Founder-managed firms
have slightly higher fixed assets to total assets ratio, and they are more levered rel-
ative to non-founder-managed firms. Moreover, bankruptcy rates and asset growths
are comparable between these two types of firms. However, there appears to be a
remarkable difference in manager turnovers. Founder-managed firms have much low-
er average departures and appointments compared to non-founder-managed firms
(0.09 vs. 0.20 departures; 0.05 appointments vs. 0.16 appointments). Conditional
on departures, the chance of being replaced is 0.32 in founder-managed firms while
the number is 0.75 for non-founder-managed firms.
Overall, the difference between founder and non-founder-managed firms suggests
that they are two different types of firms. The low manager turnover frequency in
founder-managed young firms is consistent with founder managers reluctance to
hire a professional manager or to make themselves to be replaceable (Rajan, 2012),
either because of “tight links” with their ventures (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005) or
25Robb and Robinson (2014) use Kauffman’s firm survey data and the average leverage is 0.64 for
a US start-up sample, which includes sole proprietorships and partnerships as well as corporations.
Gonza´lez-Uribe and Paravisini (2019) studied a sample of firms established between 2009 and 2011
in the UK without restrictions on management team size and found the equity ratio to be 0.34.
26Kaplan et al. (2009) use a sample of 48 venture-backed companies and reports an average of 1.9
founders. Beckman (2006) report 2.2 founders from a sample of 173 companies in Silicon Valley.
Wasserman (2003) found an average of 2.2 founders from a sample of 202 start-ups, including both
VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies. Details of manager characteristics in my sample, such
as gender and nationality at incorporation, are included in Appendix 1.6.
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because that the process of standardization would dissipate the private benefits
of control. Hurst and Pugsley (2011) find that almost half of the surveyed new
firm owners report nonpecuniary benefits as motivation for starting their business.
Similar evidence can be found in Bennett and Chatterji (2017), suggesting costlier
frictions of assigning a new manager to founder-managed firms.
1.2 Stylized Facts
I start my analysis by presenting three new stylised facts about manager turnover
and firm performance in young business. The stylised facts not only fill in the knowl-
edge gap of manager turnover dynamics in young firms but also provide backgrounds
for subsequent causal analysis.
1.2.1 Dynamic manager turnover and firm bankruptcy
The first stylised fact is shown in Figure 1.2: as young firms grow, the average
manager departure rate declines and average manager appointments present a U-
shape pattern (Plots (a) and (b)). In particular, compared to non-founder-managed
firms (Plots (c) and (d)), founder-managed firms have less frequent and more stable
turnover rates over time (Plot (e) shows that bankruptcy hazard rates gradually
decline with time. Moreover, founder and non-founder-managed firms have similar
bankruptcy risk dynamics in as shown in Plot (f).
There are two takeaways from the first stylised fact: first, consistent with dis-
tinctions found in the summary statistics, founder and non-founder-managed firms
also have different manager turnover over time. However, it is puzzling to observe
both high appointment numbers and high resignation numbers when the bankrupt-
cy rates are high in the first three years since incorporation. To better understand
whether manager turnover correlates with the firm’s future prospects. then I sep-
arate firms into two groups based on their second-year manager turnover decisions
and follow their bankruptcy hazard rates over time. As we can see from Plot (g),
firms with manager departures in Year 2 have consistently higher bankruptcy rates
than those without departures, until Year 10. Correspondingly, Plot (h) shows high-
er bankruptcy risks in firms without second-year new appointments. This graphical
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evidence suggests that manager departures (appointments) negatively (positively)
correlates with the firm’s future bankruptcy risk. However, the plots presented
above are not controlling for idiosyncratic firm characteristics, so I examine this
correlation in regression and find the second stylised fact as follows.
1.2.2 Manager turnover predicts performance within firms
The second stylised fact is that there exists a significant correlation between manager
turnover and future performance in the young firm, even after accounting for firm
financial information and aggregate shocks at industry and local economy levels.
Specifically, I run the following regression to examine this correlation:
yi,t+2 = α+ βxit + δzi,t−1 + γNumi,t−1 + Ind Loc Y earFE + cohortFE + it (1.2)
where i indexes the firm and t is the firm age. The dependent variable yi,t+2 in-
cludes two outcome measurements: D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 and Asset growthi,t+2.
xit represents a set of independent variables including 4Numit, Num departureit,
Num newit, Num replacementit, Net departureit and Net newit.
27 zi,t−1 is a vec-
tor of firm-level control variables including total assets, bank deposits, profits, and
leverage. Numi,t−1 is firm i’s manager number in year t − 1. Equation 1.2 also
controls for the industry-location-year and cohort level fixed effects. The standard
errors in regression 1.2 are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the
county, cohort, and the 6-digit UK industry code level. The coefficient of interest in
Equation 1.2 is β, which captures the average change in firm performance associated
with manager turnover changes.
The dependent variable in the first three columns of Table 1.2 is the dummy
indicator of year t + 2 bankruptcy status. Column (1) shows a significant negative
relationship between changes in manager numbers and future bankruptcy risks. In
27All variable definitions are listed in Appendix A1.1. 4Numit measures the change of manager
numbers from the end of year t− 1 to year t. Num departurei,t denotes the number of managers
departing from firm i in year t (and either being replaced or not). Num newit is the number of
new appointments in firm i year t. Num replacementit, Net departureit and Net newit denote
the number of replacements, the net new number of departures and the net new number of ap-
pointments, respectively. As defined in Section 3.1, Net departurei,t measures the net outflow
of managers Net departureit = max{Num departureit − Num newit, 0}. Similarly, Net newit
measures the net inflow Net newit = max{Num newit −Num departureit, 0}.
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Column (2), I decompose4Numit into the number of departures and the number of
appointments, controlling for the size of the management team in the previous year.
The number of departures (appointments) positively (negatively) correlates with fu-
ture bankruptcy risks, and the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. In order
to better characterise manager turnover, I examine the number of net departures,
net appointments and replacements in Column (3). As shown in Column (3), both
the number of net departures and the number of replacements are positively corre-
lated with future bankruptcy risks, with more significant and sizeable coefficients
for net departure number. Moreover, net new appointment number is negatively
associated with future bankruptcy risks. Regressions in Columns (4) to (6) mirror
those in the first three columns with outcome variables of asset growth rates from
t to t + 2. Looking across the coefficients, most of the signs are flipped (excep-
t for Num replacementit), which is consistent with the findings in the first three
columns that manager departures correlate with worse performances, and manager
appointments are associated with better prospects.
In addition, I repeat the above analysis based on sub-samples of founder and
non-founder-managed firms. Table 1.3 reports the results. The findings show similar
correlations for both founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms as shown in
Table 1.2.
Overall, the multivariate analysis presents significant within-firm correlations
between manager turnover and future performance. However, the correlation can be
idiosyncratic or can be confounded with unobservable shocks. For instance, industry
level demand shocks may lead to both manager departures and deteriorating firm
performance. To understand whether manager turnover also contains aggregate
information, I use average manager turnover at the same industry and cohort level
to predict individual firm performance. The stylized fact 3 summarises the findings.
1.2.3 Manager turnover predicts performance across firms
The third stylised fact is that average manager turnover in firms operating in the
same industry (excluding firm i) also predicts firm i’s performance. I run the fol-
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lowing regression to show this stylised fact:
yi,t+2 = α2 + β2X¯c,j−i,t + c2xit + δ2Bankruptcy ratec,j,t + λ2Average asset growthc,j,t
+ γ2zi,t−1 +Numi,t−1 + Ind loc FE + Loc year FE + Cohort FE + it
(1.3)
where j and c denote industry and cohort, and i is the firm index. X¯c,j−i,t
are the same cohort, industry level average number of manager departure and ap-
pointment, excluding firm i.28 xit and zi,t−1 are manager turnover and financial
controls for firm i, the same as in Equation 1.2. I further control for the same
industry-cohort bankruptcy rate Bankruptcy ratec,j,t and average asset growth
rate Average asset growthc,j,t. Furthermore, location-year, industry-location and
cohort-level fixed effects are included.
Table 1.4 presents the regression results. Column (1) shows that both the average
numbers of departure and appointment in other firms are significant predictors of
individual firm performance in the same industry. On average, one more average
manager departures in other firms predicts an increase of bankruptcy rate by 0.16,
which is economically significant compared to the baseline hazard rate of 0.17.29
Column (2) adds the firm-level financial controls zi,t−1 and the first two rows show
that estimations on average manager departures and appointments remain of similar
significance and magnitude. The regression results reported in Columns (3) and (4)
confirm that average manager turnover in other firms is significantly associated with
individual firm asset growth.
The interpretation of this finding is that manager turnover contains some ag-
gregate shock information, which therefore correlates with negative performance
in individual firms. The alternative explanation is because of the spillover effects.
Though other spillovers may exist, they are likely to suggest an opposite relation-
ship. For example, managers in other firms leave for better outside options instead
of experiencing negative shocks in the industry. Then other firms will be more likely
to go bankrupt and experience low growth, and our firm will be in better shape as
28Note that this variable is calculated using the full sample of firms including one-manager firms
at incorporation.
29Here, I compare with the benchmark of two-year hazard rates: 0.17 = 1− (1−0.0882)2). From
Table 1.1
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a result of lower competition levels.30
As shown in the first stylised fact, founder-managed and non-founder-managed
firms present different manager turnover dynamics. Do manager departures and
appointments from these two different types of firms also have different predictions
about individual firm’s performance? In order to answer this question, I calculate
the average manager turnover in founder and non-founder-managed firms separately
and test their predictions on individual firm performance in Table 1.5. In all spec-
ifications, we find that average departures in both founder and non-founder firms
strongly correlate with firm’s future bankruptcy risk and asset growth. However, re-
sults on the average new appointments from founder and non-founder-managed firms
are different. Average new appointment in founder-managed firms only significantly
negatively correlates with firm future bankruptcy risk. Average new appointment
in non-founder-managed firms positively predicts future asset growth.
To sum up these stylised facts, the strong correlation between manager turnover
and firm performance implies two non-mutually-exclusive explanations: (1) Manager
departure has a negative causal impact on firm prospects; (2) Manager departure
contains information that affects firm performance. For instance, managers may
have private some information about weakening product demand and jump ship
before the worse performance.
When there is a manager-firm mismatch, either because the managerial skill is
not optimal-fit to firm’s growth perspective or because incumbent manager pursues
private benefits of control in exchange for the profits, then turnover allows the firm
to benefit from replacing the incumbent manager if the frictions to hire a new better-
matched manager is not costlier than the surplus she creates.31 Therefore, whether
manager turnover has a causal impact on a young firm’s performance cannot be
answered by stylised facts alone. In the next section, I investigate this issue in
detail.
30The interpretation of manager turnover containing aggregate shocks can also be partially
crowded out by the lower competition levels.
31The fact that venture capitalists and private equity firms replace founders with professional
managers provides supporting evidence of mismatch of managerial skills and firm growth prospects.
See, e.g, Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan et al. (2009) and Ewens and Marx (2018).
27
1.3 Does Manager Turnover Have a Causal Im-
pact?
The challenge in identifying the causal impact of manager turnover is to find a
random assignment of manager departures that is not correlated with firms’ future
performance. In order to overcome this challenge, I exploit the Local Enterprise
Growth Initiative (LEGI) in the UK. LEGI is a government program that provides
financial support and mentoring advice to local enterprises. The identification strat-
egy is to exploit the positive shock to outside option values of managers who serve
firms located outside and near policy regions. I disentangle the causal impact from
other policy spillover effects by creating a counter-factual group of firms with ex-ante
low departure probabilities. The identification rests on that LEGI does not differen-
tially affect manager turnover between close and far firms within the counter-factual
group. Therefore, a triple-difference approach comparing performances across firms
with high and low departure probabilities; between firms located with close versus
far distance to policy areas; and after relative to before the launch of the policy
identifies the causal impact of manager departures.
I start this section by introducing the policy background. Then I verify the
validity of using policy as an exogenous shock of manager departures. Next, I
estimate the overall policy impact on close relative to far firms. In the third step, I
create the counter-factual group of firms. And finally, I estimate the causal impact
of manager departures.
1.3.1 Local Enterprise Growth Initiative
Announced in the 2005 Government Budget, the Local Enterprise Growth Initiative
(LEGI) was taken into effect in 2006 with the aim to release the productivity and
economic potential of the most deprived local areas through enterprise and invest-
ment (DCLG, 2010). There are three main national-level objectives: (1) Increase
entrepreneurial activities in deprived areas; (2) Support growth and reduce the exit
rate of locally owned businesses, and (3) Attract investment using local employers
in deprived areas.
By the time of the announcement, there were 91 local authorities eligible to bid
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for the LEGI funds. In order to be eligible to bid, a Local Area (LA) has to be
either receiving support from them at the time or should be named as eligible for
the 2006-2008 Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF). Each of the ten Round 1 and
Round 2 winning areas from the bids was announced in February and December of
2006. The LAs in England that received LEGI funds supported are shown in Figure
1.3. Following a change of government, the initiative was abandoned in 2011.
The programme provides a wide range of interventions for the local areas. The
LEGI programme offers financial support, premises, networking and communication
advice as well as investor development, enterprise education and mentoring services
for both start-ups and existing businesses. According to the LEGI final report DCLG
(2010), the total expenditure was £418 million, with the highest level of support in
2008 and 2009. 31% of the funds were spent on supporting existing business, with
another 30% on entrepreneurship, and the rest was used on advising residents and
supporting them in acquiring the skills for finding a job.32 Government evaluation
reports that LEGI had an economically sizeable impact: by the end of 2009, 13,700
new firms had been created, around 45,000 existing business and 240,000 individuals
were assisted in LEGI areas DCLG (2010).
The government evaluation DCLG (2010) also compares firms across the treated
LEGI area and the propensity-scores-matched control groups at the LA level, the
programme has a positive and significant impact on business formation in policy
areas but the impact on worklessness performance is not clear. A recent study
by Einio and Overman (2016) exploits the eligibility of the programme using the
regression discontinuity design and finds a negative local displacement effect on
jobs from 2006 to 2009 within a 1km distance of untreated areas. However, they
failed to find any significant difference between policy regions and no-policy regions
further from the boundary. Based on this fact, I use LEGI as an exogenous source
of variation of manager departures in firms located in no-policy regions, but with
different distances to the boundaries.
32Based on DCLG (2010), of the £268m spent during 2006-2009 period, approximately £84m
was spent on projects to assist existing businesses, £78m was devoted to start-ups and £51m was
spent on activities to assist residents within the area through employability support.
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1.3.2 LEGI policy sample
My analysis focuses on firms located in a no-policy Lower Layer Super Output
Areas (LSOAs) within six kilometres of the policy regions.33 I further restrict my
sample to young firms less than ten years old in 2006. I exclude firms belonging to
any business groups, those backed by venture capitalists or those involved in M&A
activities. Firms located within three kilometres of the policy LSOAs are classified as
close firms (treated groups) and those located between three and six kilometres from
the policy regions are defined as far firms (control groups).34 I also excluded firms
with less than three managers in the base year of 2003 because manager turnover
in close firms and far firms were not significantly differently affected by the policy
(see Table A1.6).
Table 1.6 displays the summary statistics. Panel A summarises firm character-
istics in the pre-sample year 2003. I control for these ex-ante firm characteristics in
subsequent regression analyses. The sample includes 5,168 firms, with 1,696 close
firms and 3,472 far firms. The average number of managers is 3.68, with a standard
deviation of 1.28. The average firm size is £3.60M and the median total assets
are £1.62M. The mean leverage ratio is around 0.48 and the average age is 4.58
years. As we can see from the last row in Panel A, the differences between close
and far firms are not significant in terms of manager number, total assets, leverage
and firm age in the pre-sample year of 2003. Panel B shows the number of firms
going bankrupt, the average number of manager departures and the average num-
ber of managers moving to the policy areas. In the last rows of Columns (6) and
(9), the differences of manager departure number and movers to policy regions are
compared between close and far firms. Before the policy, close firms have fewer
manager departures relative to far firms and this difference becomes insignificant
after the policy. Moreover, we observe a significantly higher number of managers
moving to the policy regions from close firms after the policy.35
33Following Einio and Overman (2016), the distance between the LSOA and the policy region is
calculated by the distance of population-weighted centroids between LSOAs to the nearest LSOAs
receiving LEGI policy funding.
34Estimations are robust with alternative definitions of treatment and control groups and results
are shown in section 3.5.
35The summary statistics of managers moving to policy regions are based on the sub-sample of
managers for whom I can track their subsequent managerial positions based on the universe of UK
private firm manager information.
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1.3.3 Methodology
LEGI and manager turnover
The empirical methodology rests on the assumption that LEGI policy provides
an exogenous shock to outside options of managers in firms located outside and close
to the policy regions. The supports that LEGI program provide help firms to survive
and grow, therefore generate higher profits to compensate the managers. In the first
step, I check whether the policy-induced positive shocks in managers’ outside options
do indeed change manager turnover decisions in close firms relative to far firms. I
use the difference-in-difference approach with the following specification 36:
yit = α3 + β3Closei + c3Postt + δ3Closei × Postt + Zi,2003γ3 + ζ3X¯c,j−i,t−1
+ LEGI Area FE + Industry FE + it
(1.4)
where yit is outcome variables of interest for company i in year t, including
the (net) number of departures (appointments) and number of managers moving to
the policy areas. Closei is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm
is located within a three-kilometre distance to the policy LSOAs (treated group).
Postt is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 in the years after the launch of the
LEGI program. Zi,2003 is a vector containing pre-sample period firm characteristics
including firm age, the total number of managers, total assets and leverage in 2003.
X¯c,j−i,t−1 denote average manager departure number in other firms within same
industry and cohort, excluding firm i.37 From stylized facts, we know that industry
average departures may contain unobservable aggregate shocks. So adding x¯c,j−i,t−1
further controls for time-varying shocks at industry level. Since there are a total
of 20 LAs receiving the LEGI funding, the LEGI-area fixed effects are included to
ensure the comparison within same regions around each LA receiving the LEGI
support. Industry fixed-effect controls for the industry-specific shocks are at the
6-digit UK SIC code level. The coefficient of interest in Equation 1.4 is δ3, which
measures the average change in manager turnover after the LEGI launch for close
36The alternative specification is to add firm fixed effects instead of adding firm level control
variables. Robust findings are shown in the Section 3.5
37In Section 3.5, I show that all results are robust to the alternative specification where firm
fixed effects are added.
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firms, relative to the far firms. I expect a positive δ3 of (net) number of departures
and a positive coefficient for the number of movers to policy regions.
The main assumption underlying this approach is that absent the LEGI pro-
gramme, average manager turnover in close and far firms would evolve similarly. I
test the “parallel trend” assumption by interacting the treatment with years relative
to the policy launch time based on the following specification:
yit = α4 + β4Closei +
3∑
m=−2




years to policy + Zi,2003γ4 + ζ4X¯c,j−i,t−1 + LEGI Area FE + Industry FE + it
(1.5)
Figure 1.7 plots the estimations of δm on Closei × m years to treatment in
Equation (the omitted variable is the difference three years prior to treatment).
Plots (a) and (b) show that before the launch of the LEGI policy, the differences in
number of manager departures and net departures between close and far firms are
not significant. In addition, we observe that both estimates of departure number
and net departure number increase in close firms relative to far firms after the
LEGI programme launch. Plots (c) and (d) show that there is no significant change
in new appointments and net new appointments in. Thus, the dynamic impact of
LEGI policy on manager departures validates the satisfaction of the “parallel-trend”
assumption.
Another assumption of the identification strategy is that the LA does not manip-
ulate programme eligibility. Two facts suggest the satisfaction of no manipulation
assumption. First, there is limited scope for the eligibility manipulation at the LA
level. The eligibility to bid for the LEGI funds is determined by the ranking of the
LA-level index of deprivation (DETR, 2000), which is a complex index constructed
by the government based on pre-policy local economic performance. Only the LAs
with rankings of 50 or lower are eligible to bid for LEGI founding. Second, although
the LEGI policy is discussed in the year 2005, it is difficult to predict the exact
time of the policy implementation and the thresholds. Further more, the potential
endogenously selected LEGI regions are not the major concern in this identification
framework. Because instead of comparing policy treated regions with the regions
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outside of the policy areas, I focus on only firms locate outside of the policy areas.
Construct counter-factual group
However, it is worth noting that a simple difference-in-difference comparison of
performance between close and far firms would not allow me to disentangle the
change in performance from the causal impact. As illustrated in Plot (a) of Figure
1.5, average performance difference before and after policy in close firms picks up the
impacts of exogenous departures, endogenous departures and other policy spillover
effects in close firms. Comparing performance in far firms both before and after the
policy generates impacts from the endogenous departures and other policy spillover
effects in far firms. A second difference between close and far firms would estimate
both causal impact from exogenous departures and the difference of other policy
spillover effects between close and far firms.
To disentangle the causal impact of manager departures from other policy spillover-
s, a counter-factual group of firms whose manager turnovers are not differentially
affected by the policy across close and far regions would be ideal. As shown in
Plot (b) in Figure 1.5, a performance comparison within counter-factual groups and
between close and far regions, before and after the policy only picks up the perfor-
mance differences from other spillovers. Therefore, under the assumption that the
differential impacts of other policy spillovers in close relative to far regions are the
same between the counter-factual group and the treated group, the triple-difference
approach identifies the causal impact of exogenous manager departures.
A candidate of counter-factual groups whose manager turnovers are not differ-
entially affected by the policy are firms with no manager departures; however, the
realised manager departure decisions are endogenous. I use exogenous policy shock
and ex-ante firm characteristics to predict manager departure probabilities. Firms
with low predicted departure probabilities are classified as the counter-factual group.
Manager departure probability is estimated using Logit regression in Equation 1.6
below:
Pr(Num departureit > 0) = α5 + β5Closei + c5Postt + δ5Closei × Postt + Zi,2003γ5
+ ζ5X¯c,j−i,t + LEGI Area FE + Industry FE + it
(1.6)
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where Pr(Num departureit > 0) is the probability of having a positive number of
manager departures in firm i and year t. The high probability of departure dummy
variable Pr highit is equal to 1 if the fitted value from Equation 1.6 is above the
75% threshold of the predicted value distribution (see Figure 1.6). In Section 1.3.6, I
show that indeed firms with low ex-ante departure probabilities have similar manager
turnover in close and far firms after the policy relative to before.
Triple-difference
The third difference across firms with high and low probability of departures
allows me to disentangle the impact of exogenous departures and differential impacts
from other spillovers. The triple-difference compares the change in firm performance
in response to the policy across firms with high departure probabilities and firms
with low departure probabilities, located in close to relative far from policy areas,
before and after the policy change.
Specifically, I follow Equation 1.7 to estimate the causal impact:
yi,t+2 = α6 + β6Closet + c6Postt + δ6Pr highit + γ6Closei × Postt + η6Closei
× Pr highit + θ6Postt × Pr highit + κ6Closei × Postt × Pr highit
+ LEGI Area FE + Industry FE + Zi,2003γ6 + ζ6X¯c,j−i,t + it
(1.7)
where, yi,t+2 is the outcome variable, including bankruptcy status, assets and
profit levels in year t + 2.38 Pr highit is an indicator for high departure likeli-
hoods, defined as a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the predicated probability
Pr(Num departureit > 0) is above the 75% percentile of predicted departure distri-
bution from Equation 1.6. All other variables are defined the same as in Equation
1.6. κ6 is the coefficient of interest. It measures the after the policy changes of firm
performance gap across close and far firms relative to that change in performance
gap in the counter-factual group. I expect a negative κ6 of assets and profits and a
positive κ6 of bankruptcy rate if manager departures indeed have a negative impact
on young firm’s performance.
38In this equation, firm performance is measured in year t+2 instead of year t. Because manager
departures happen in year t, I analyse the causal impact in time two years later.
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One concern with the research design that uses LEGI as an exogenous shock
to the managers’ outside options and therefore turnover is the reverse causality:
managers with inside information about the impact of LEGI policy on their firm’s
future performance endogenously choose to leave the firm. While the reverse causal-
ity concern cannot be addressed directly, two pieces of evidence help to alleviate the
concern. I find non-negative spillover effects on the performance of Close firms
(See in Section 1.3.5), which are more likely to be affected by the policy, relative
to the Far firms. In addition, firms with high ex-ante departing probabilities are
those large and low levered firms. If any negative effects from the LEGI policy are
expected from the policy, these “treated” firms, i.e. with high ex-ante departing
probabilities are less likely to be think of as vulnerable relative to the smaller and
younger firms. Similarly, this is inconsistent with the case where endogenous match
between under-performed firms and managers with low managerial skills, as large
and low leverage firms are more attractive to more qualified managers for higher
compensation and lower risks. Moreover, I found that 63% of manager departures
are left with no replacement for newly established firms (See Table 1.1), suggesting
that the main effects are driven by the departures of incumbent mangers.
1.3.4 LEGI policy and manager turnover
Table 1.7 presents the estimated impact of the LEGI policy on manager turnover.
The results displayed in this table are based on regression from Equation 1.4. Col-
umn (1) shows that the average number of manager departures increases significantly
by 0.052 after the policy in close firms, relative to the firms locating far away. The
coefficient is also economically sizeable, representing about 9.27% of the uncondi-
tional mean (9.27%=0.052/(0.2795+0.2875))39. Column (2) confirms that the policy
indeed affected the manager turnover. The outcome variable in Column (2) is the
net outflow of managers. Close firms on average lose 0.041 more managers without
replacements relative to far firms after the policy. Columns (3) and (4) correspond
to appointment numbers. As we can see, there is no significant difference between
the close and far firms both in terms of the total new appointment number and
net new appointment number. In the last column of this table, I conduct analy-
39The benchmark numbers are from Table 1.3.2
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sis conditional on firms with manager departures and restrict to a sub-sample of
firms for which I can match subsequent manager appointments.40 On average, 0.08
more managers left close firms and moved to firms in the policy region relative to
those from far firms and joined policy-supported firms (25.30% of pre-policy mean:
25.30%=0.081/(0.1606+0.1587)).
In summary, the regression results in Table 1.7 verify that LEGI policy leads
to more manager departures in close firms relative to firms located far away. More
importantly, the fact that more managers move to policy regions from close firms
to policy areas lends support to the premise that after the policy more manager
departures are induced by exogenous reasons-better outside options.
1.3.5 Overall impact of LEGI policy on firm performance
The unconditional impact of LEGI policy on firm performance is estimated by fol-
lowing Equation 1.4. Table 1.8 presents the results. Columns (1) to (5) display
estimates with outcome variables of assets, profits, and bankruptcy status measured
in year t+ 2 receptively. Positive coefficients of Closei×Postt from Columns (1) to
(3) suggest that, on average, close firms increases their assets more than far firms in
response to policy. Columns (4) and (5) show a non-significant difference in profits
between close and far firms. Moreover, a positive but insignificant coefficient in
Column (5) suggests that the policy did not significantly change bankruptcy risks
in close firms relative to that in far firms. To address the concerns of skewed firm
size distribution, I also run the regressions using logarithm transformations. The
results are shown in the lower panel of Table 1.8, and we don’t observe significant
worse performance in close relative to far regions.
Recall from the discussion in Section 1.3.3, the simple difference-in-difference
estimates the combined impact from exogenous manager departures and other policy
spillovers. In order to disentangle the causal impact, I next construct the counter-
factual group of firms.
40Each departing manager’s ID is matched to the assembled managerial data covering the pop-
ulation of UK private companies.
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1.3.6 Create the counter-factual group
The counter-factual group of firms are constructed based on the predicted manager
departure probabilities. Specifically, I use a set of ex-ante firm characteristics and
exogenous policy shock to estimate manager departure probabilities. By estimating
Equation 1.6, I calculate the fitted value as the predicted probability of experiencing
manager departures for each firm-year.
Table A1.5 in the Appendix reports the regression estimates under different
specifications. In the first two columns of Table A1.5, all the independent variables
are the same as in the previous specifications. In the last two columns, the average
departure number in other firms that operates in the same industry and in the same
cohort are included. For Columns (1) and (3), year fixed effects are not controlled
for. The results are similar across Columns (1) to (4). Larger-sized firms with
bigger management teams and lower leverage level in the base year are predicted to
have higher manager departure probabilities. For the subsequent analysis, I use the
specification in Column (3) Table A1.5. Under this specification, I control for the
lagged average departure at the same industry and cohort level. Industry, location,
as well as the year fixed effects are included. Figure 1.6 presents the distribution of
the predicted values of Pr(Num departureit > 0) from Equation 1.6. The dashed
lines in Figure 1.6 pick up the 25%, 50% and 75% thresholds, with bankruptcy
probabilities of 0.1553, 0.2135 and 0.3591 respectively. From this figure, we observe
that both the histogram distribution and kernel density distribution show a right-
skewed distribution, consistent with the fact that departure is not a frequent event.
Then, I define the dummy variable Pr highit as an indicator of high likelihoods of
manager departure and takes the value of 1 if P̂ r(Num departureit > 0) exceeds
the 75% threshold of 0.3591.41
Now I turn to verify that the construction of the counter-factual group is valid.
To satisfy the validity, the policy should not affect manager departures in close firms
and far firms significantly differently within the firms that are classified as with low
predicted departure probabilities. Table 1.9 presents the difference-in-difference es-
timates for the number of manager departures, and the number of managers moving
41In Section 3.4.4, I show that the results are more pronounced for the 25% highest departing
probability of the sample against the bottom 50% departing probability of the sample.
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to policy regions based on sub-samples with high and low departure probabilities
separately. The estimated coefficients on Closei×Postt are positive and significan-
t in Columns (1) and (3), suggesting that there is significant increase of manager
departure numbers in close relative to far firms within firms with high departure
probabilities. In contrast, insignificant coefficients in Columns (2) and (4) corre-
sponds to the definition of the counter-factual group: LEGI policy do not change
manager departures differently in close firms relative to far firms. Therefore, a with-
in counter-factual group comparison of performance between firms located close and
far to the policy regions both before and after the policy only picks up the differential
effects from other policy spillovers.
1.3.7 Triple-difference results
Table 1.10 reports the triple-difference analysis results from estimating Equation 1.7.
The same as in the previous analysis, all regressions in Table 1.10 include firm-level
control variables, as well as same industry, cohort average departure (excluding
firm i). For brevity, estimations on firm characteristics are not reported. The
coefficient of interest is on Closei × Postt × Pr highit. Column (1) shows that
for bankruptcy risks, the gap between close and far firms with high probabilities
of manager departures is 0.0347 larger relative to the bankruptcy risk difference in
firms with low departure probabilities in response to the policy. Columns (2) to
(5) correspond to the change in assets and profits. Total assets and fixed assets
both decline sharply, as shown in Columns (2) and (3) (Total assets decrease by
£0.423M and fixed assets decrease by £0.529M). There is no significant change in
current assets and profits in surviving firms. To further ensure that the results are
not purely driven by the skewed distribution of firm size, I run regressions using
logarithm transformations of asset levels. From the middle panel of Table 1.10, we
find robust negative impact on both total assets and fixed assets.
Taken together, the estimated results in Table 1.10 show that relative to the
differences gap between close and far firms with low probability of manager de-
partures, there is a higher probability of bankruptcy, and sharper decline in assets
for close firms relative to far firms within high departure probability group. This
evidence suggests a significant negative causal impact of manager departure on a
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young firm’s survival and asset growth.
Having established the causal impact of manager turnover on young firm’s per-
formance, I now quantify the causal impact of one manager departure by calculating
the Wald estimations. To obtain the treatment-on-the-treated estimates, I scale the
triple-difference estimates by the realised difference in manager departures. The
Wald estimations are presented in the bottom panel of Table 1.10. From Columns
(1) to (5), the first two rows of lower panel present results from triple-difference
regressions with 95% confidence intervals. In Column (6), I report the coefficient
on the number of manager departures following the same triple-difference approach
in Equation 1.7. Then rescaling the coefficients from Column (1) to Column (5)
by 0.0846 from Column (6), I report the Wald estimations in the next row. One
manager departure leads to an average increase in bankruptcy probability of 0.4102
(0.4102=0.0347/0.0846), more than six times of the unconditional sample average
before the policy (6.46%=((121+213)/5168, from summary statistics in Table 1.6).
The average causal impact on bankruptcy risk has a range between 0.43% and
6.50% at 95% confidence levels. On average, one more manager departure result
in a £5.01M decrease in total assets, with a range from £1.53 M to £8.48 M.
The causal impact is economically sizeable compared to the pre-sample average
of £3.60M and this corresponds to a yearly drop of almost 70% of the total asset
(0.697=5.01/2*3.59, 3.59 is the unconditional average firm size). Moreover, for fixed
assets, there is, on average, a decrease of £6.26M, with a 95% confidence interval
between £0.95 M to £11.57M.
1.3.8 Causal impact in founder and non-founder-managed
firms
From the first stylised fact, we know that there is a remarkable difference in manager
turnover dynamics between founder and non-founder-managed firms, a reflection of
underlying distinct ownership structure. In this section, I am taking the advantage of
the young firm sample, which provides a unique setting, to invest how this trade-off
varies across different ownership structures, i.e. between founder and non-founder-
managed firms.
While founder-managed firms are more likely to have mismatched-managers, they
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may also face higher frictions to assign new managers than non-founder-managed
firms. Though absent the agency problem when ownership and control are perfectly
aligned, the controlling owner has no incentive to monitor her “alter ego” (Benned-
sen and Nielsen, 2010) from enjoying private benefits of control in exchange for
profits (Stulz, 1988). In addition, founders are less likely to be the optimal-matched
managers throughout the young firm’s early life cycle because the capabilities of
managing an expanding firm could differ from those required to found a new ven-
ture.42 However, founder managers may be reluctant to hire a professional manager
or even to make themselves to be replaceable (Rajan, 2012) because of “tight links”
with their ventures (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005) or private benefits of control. The
process of standardization would dissipate the rents that the founders enjoy when
controlling the firm.43 This suggests costlier frictions of assigning a weakly better
new manager to founder-managed firms. Overall, the differential impacts of manag-
er turnover on firm performance in founder and non-founder-managed firms depend
on the relative variations of this trade-off.
In order to understand the variation in this trade-off with more or less aligned
ownership and control, I repeat the triple-difference analysis using sub-samples of
founder and non-founder-managed firms respectively. Similar to the analysis in Sec-
tion 1.2, firms are classified as founder-managed firms if managers who join the
firm at incorporation also own shares in the pre-sample period (the year 2003).
Among the 5,168 firms in total, there are 4,235 founder-managed firms and 933
non-founder-managed firms. In Table 1.11, Panel A and Panel B present the results
for the founder-managed and non-founder-managed sub-samples, respectively. From
Panel A, we observe that in founder-managed firms, there is no significant change
in bankruptcy likelihoods as a result of manager departure, even though assets de-
cline sharply, as shown in Columns (2) to (5). In contrast, Panel B shows that
in non-founder-managed firms, manager departures are more likely to cause subse-
quent failures. However, surviving non-founder-managed firms do not experience
any significant change in assets investment or profitability.
42The fact that venture capitalists replace founders with professional managers provides sup-
porting evidence. See, for example, Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan et al. (2009) and Ewens
and Marx (2018).
43In line with this argument, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) find that almost half of the surveyed
new firm owners report nonpecuniary benefits as motivation for starting their business. Similar
evidence can be found in Bennett and Chatterji (2017).
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These findings are consistent with founders’ private benefits of control, prohibit-
ing them from closing down firms. If founders are enjoying the private benefits of
control, they are less likely to shut down their firms even though their firms are
undergoing a poor performance. One typical type of private benefits of control is
non-pecuniary (Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). For in-
stance, founders tend to stick with their ventures. Based on a sample of 212 US
start-ups, Wasserman (2003) finds that, on average, four out of five CEOs are forced
to step down. In Wasserman (2003), he also proposes that founders face the “para-
dox” of higher risks of being replaced after achieving milestones. These findings can
also be attributed to variations in motivation and growth of entrepreneurial firms
(Hurst and Pugsley, 2011). Bennett et al. (2016) also show evidence suggesting that
potential heterogeneous growth and motivation also affect the managerial practices.
While other channels may also be consistent, the interpretations should be taken
with care.
1.3.9 Heterogeneity
In Section 1.3.6, high departure probability firms are classified using the 75% thresh-
old of predicted departure probabilities. The causal impact, therefore, comes from
comparing firm performance between the highest 25% manager departure likelihoods
relative to the other 75%. Which part of the bottom 75% departure probabilities is
contributing to the significant performance difference? I then compare the highest
departure probability firms with the second highest, third highest and the bottom
quartile of predicted departure likelihood firms in each panel. The first column
in Table 1.12 shows that the bankruptcy risk is positive and significant when we
compare the first quartile of departure probability firms with the third or bottom
quartile firms. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient in Column (1) almost
doubles in Panel C compared to that in Panel B, suggesting a larger difference be-
tween the top and bottom quartiles. Though the coefficients in Columns (2) to (8)
in Panel C are not statistically different from 0, the estimates are more negative
for total assets and fixed assets both in levels and logarithm transformations when
comparing the top quartile with the bottom quartile. Taken together, the results in
this table suggest that the significant decline in assets and increase in bankruptcy
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risks are likely to be driven by the differences between firms with the top quartile
of departure probabilities, and the bottom 50% of departure likelihoods, supporting
the previous findings in Table 1.10.
My sample is restricted to young firms less than ten years old when the policy
was taken into effect. But are younger firms also more vulnerable to exogenous
manager departures? I explore the differential causal impact on firms less than five
years old and older firms up to ten years old. Table 1.13 shows the estimates of
Close × Post × Pr high based on younger firm and older firm sample in Panel A
and B respectively. From Panel A, we find that the exogenous manager departure
leads to a significant increase in bankruptcy risk and a a decrease in assets in younger
firms. However, the impact on relative older firms is insignificant from 0, as shown
in Panel B. Overall, the negative causal impact appears to be more pronounced in
younger firms than in older firms.
1.4 Robustness Checks
I provide robustness checks in this section to alleviate the sample truncation and
censoring concerns and run two additional robustness checks of identification as-
sumptions in the triple-difference analysis.
The analysis sample consists of multiple cohorts of new firms, and firm per-
formance is truncated in 2015. OLS regressions bring the advantage of saturated
models with fixed effects, but may suffer from truncation and censoring bias. In
order to address this concern, I estimate the predictions in Cox duration models for
bankruptcy. Specifically, I use COX model stratified at cohort and industry-location
group. The regressions results presented in Appendix A1.3 and Appendix A1.4 show
consistency with the OLS estimations.
There are two concerns regarding the triple-difference analysis: (1) the violation
of the “parallel-trend” assumption that the treatment and control groups would
evolve similarly in the absence of the policy; and (2) the results are not robust for
the other definitions of close and far firms. To test the “parallel-trend” assumption,
I estimate the dynamic response to the policy following similar types of regression
in Equation 1.3.3 and plot coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in Figure 1.8.
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The plots show that there are no significant differential trends in bankruptcy risks,
assets and profits before the policy. And all differences come from the period after
the policy launch, supporting the “parallel trend” assumption.
In addition, I run placebo tests by randomly selecting 80 alternative distance
thresholds between 2km to 4km to classify the close and far firms. Following the
same methodology from Equation 1.2 to 1.7, I estimate the change of manager
turnover and causal impact on firm performance. Estimated coefficients with 95%
confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10. Estimations on depar-
ture numbers and the net number of departures are both positive and significantly
different from zero around a small window of the actual threshold of 3km used in
Section 1.3. As the placebo thresholds move away from three kilometres towards
two or four kilometres, not only do the confidence intervals widen but the estima-
tions also change signs. Similar patterns can be observed in Figure 1.10, where I
plot the estimations of the causal impact on firm performance. In summary, the
placebo tests with different distance thresholds show that my results are unlikely to
be spuriously driven by any particular threshold.
Moreover, because of the young firm data limitation, observable control variables
for young firms are not well populated. In all the reported estimations, I only control
for the firm size, age, leverage and bank deposits. The concern is that policy may
affect different types of firms in a different way. To address this concern, I repeat all
estimations adding firm fixed effects, industry, and location fixed effects. Regression
results within firms are presented in Table A1.7, and they reconfirm that all results
are robust.
Lastly, the results remains robust when I change the absolute changes of manager
departures/appointments to the dummy variables. Results are reported in Appendix
Table A1.8 and TableA1.9.
1.5 Conclusion
Despite the fact that young firms are crucial job creators and managers in young
firms represent a big proportion of all managers in the economy, we have little
knowledge about managers in young firms. In addition, the remarkable differences
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between mature and young firms stop us from extrapolating existing empirical ev-
idence from CEO successions in large and established corporations to small and
young firms. This paper fills this knowledge gap by examining manager turnover
and its impact on young firm’s performance with heterogeneity across founder and
non-founder-managed firms.
I compile a novel and comprehensive dataset of managerial information covering
the population of private firms in the UK, which allow me to explore the heterogene-
ity of manager turnover in various dimensions. By combining manager data with
ownership stakes and the financial accounts of new firms, I construct a multi-cohort
young firm sample. This paper documents three stylised facts of manager turnover
in young firms. The average number of manager departure declines as firms grow,
whereas average appointment number presents a U-shape pattern. In addition, I find
significant correlation between manager turnover measures and a young firm’s future
performance. Moreover, the industry average manager turnover predicts individual
firm performance, suggesting that manager turnover contains aggregate informa-
tion. To understand whether manager turnover has a causal impact on young firm’s
performance, I exploit shocks to the manager’s outside options induced by the Local
Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI) in the UK. I create a counter-factual group of
firms based on ex-ante firm characteristics and apply a triple-difference approach
to disentangle the causal impact from other policy spillover effects. My findings
show that one manager departure leads to a six-fold increase of the probability of
bankruptcy and for surviving firms, total assets shrink by £5.01M on average in the
following two years.
In addition, this paper investigates the heterogeneity of manager turnover in firm-
s with distinct ownership structures by comparing firms run by founder managers
and non-founder managers. I find that there is a remarkable difference in manag-
er turnover dynamics: non-founder-managed firms have a higher average manager
departure and appointment, while founder-managed firms have less frequent man-
agerial changes. There is also a heterogeneous causal impact of manager depar-
tures on founder and non-founder-managed firms. Exogenous manager departures
in founder-managed firms only result in a sharp decline of assets without a signifi-
cant change in bankruptcy risks. In contrast, non-founder-managed firms are more
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likely to go bankrupt as a result of manager departures.
This paper documents novel stylised facts about manager turnover in young
firms based on a large sample of entrepreneurial firms in the UK. Average manager
turnover at the industry level provides a timely and available early indicator to a
young firm’s future performance, which is important for both policy-makers and
investors. The economically large negative causal impact of manager turnover indi-
cates that the costs of assigning a new appropriate manager are substantially larger
than the benefits of resolving the potential mismatches between incumbent manager-
s and profit maximization in young firms. The frictions of replacement may come
from the possible difficulty to replace firm-specific human capital, or a young firm’s
limited access to managerial labour markets. Lastly, heterogeneity across founder
and non-founder-managed firms reflects underlying distinctions of ownership and
control structures.
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Figure 1.1: Industry and Location Distribution in UK Young Firms
This figure plots the industry and location distributions of young firms in the analysis
sample (the grey bar) and across the UK (the blue bar). For industry distribution, I used
the 2007 6-digit standard industrial classification of economic activities in the UK. The
location distribution is presented at the county level. There are a total of 609 industries
and 97 industries in the analysis sample, the plots only include industries and locations
with more than 1% of the sample firms.
(a) Industry Distribution
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Figure 1.2: Dynamic Manager Turnover and Bankruptcy in Young Firms
This figure presents the dynamics of turnover and bankruptcy in young UK firms
based on the analysis sample of UK young firms incorporated between 2005 and
2010. Plots (a) and (b) show the average number of departures/appointments with
fractions of firms losing/hiring managers respectively. Plots (c) and (d) compare
the average manager departures/appointments between founder-managed and
non-founder-managed firms. The bankruptcy hazard rate is shown in Plot (e) and
plotted separately for founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms in Plot (f).
Plots (g) and (h) present the bankruptcy risks based on the sub-sample of firms
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Figure 1.4: 1km-wide LSOA Rings (Croydon and Barking & Dagenham)
This figure depicts the one-kilometre wide control and treatment LSOA rings out-
side the Croydon and Barking & Dagenham areas. The LSOA labels indicate the
ring. For example, the one-kilometre treatment ring is labelled “T1” and the four-
kilometre control ring is labelled “C4”. LSOAs with more than a six-kilometre but
less than a ten-kilometre distance to the LEGI LSOAs are only labelled with num-
bers. Similar to Einio and Overman (2016), distances are calculated using LSOA
population-weighted centroids. For example, the population-weighted centroid of a
one-kilometre treatment ring LSOA is located in a non-LEGI area and within 0-1000
metres from the nearest LEGI LSOA population- weighted centroid. The GIS data












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.5: Triple-Difference Methodology Illustration
This figure illustrates the triple-difference methodology. Plot (a) shows that a simple
difference-in-difference analysis is misleading. The difference between close firms
after the policy relative to before, includes policy impact from exogenous departures,
endogenous departures and other spillover effects on close firms. The difference
between far firms after the policy relative to before includes policy impacts from
endogenous departures, endogenous departures and other spillover effects on close
firms. The difference between (1) and (2) is a combined impact from both exogenous
manager departures and differences from other spillover effects. Plot (b) displays the
triple-difference framework. By splitting firms in both close and far regions into two
groups: firms with high/low departure probabilities, and assume that the counter-
factual group of firms does not have different manager turnovers , then (3)−(4) only
pick up the relative differential impact from other spillovers. Under the assumption
that these differential impacts from other spillovers are the same in low and high
probability departure firms, a triple difference of [(1) − (2)] − [(3) − (4)] identifies
the exogenous departure’s causal impact.
(a)
(1)-(2): Exogenous departure+Other spill overs Close-Other spill overs Far
(b)
(1)− (2): Exogenous departure+Other spill overs Close-Other spill overs Far
(3)− (4): Other spillovers Close-Other spill overs Far
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of Predicted Probability of Departure
This figure plots the density distribution of the predicted probability of departure
based on the Logit regression in Equation 1.6 Pr(Num departureit > 0) = α5 +
β5Closei + c5Postt + δ5Closei × Postt + Zi,2003γ5 + ζ5X¯c,j−i,t + LEGI Area FE +
Industry FE+ it. The X axis is the predicated probability of manager departures,
and the y axis is the density. The yellow bars show the histogram distributions,
with the solid line plotting the kernel density. The dashed lines pick up the 25%,
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Figure 1.7: Difference in Manager Turnover by Years to LEGI Launch
This figure presents the estimations of δm from the equation yit = α4 + β4Closei +∑3
m=−2 cmm years to policy +
∑3
m=−2 δmClosei × m years to policy + Zi,2003γ4 +
ζ4Xc,j−i,t−1 + LEGI Area FE + Industry FE + it, where m denotes the relative years
to the LEGI policy launch time. Dependent variables yit include Num departureit,
Net departureit, Num newit, and Net newit. δm estimate the difference in manager
turnover between the close and far firms to the policy area, after the enforcement of the
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Figure 1.8: Difference in Firm Performance by Years to LEGI Launch
This figure presents the estimations of δm from the equation yit = α4 + β4Closei +∑3
m=−2 cmm years to policy +
∑3
m=−2 δmClosei × m years to policy + Zi,2003γ4 +
ζ4Xc,j−i,t−1 + LEGI Area FE + Industry FE + it, where m denotes the relative
years to the LEGI policy launch time. Dependent variables yit are total assets, fixed
assets, current assets and profit-and-loss account. δm estimates the difference in firm
performance between the close and far firms to the policy area both before and after the
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Figure 1.9: Placebo Tests: Different Distance Thresholds
This figure plots the coefficients with 95% confidence intervals from the placebo tests of
the LEGI impact on manager turnover from Equation 1.4: yit = α3+β3Closei+c3Postt+
δ3Closei × Postt + Zi,2003γ3 + ζ3Xc,j−i,t−1 + LEGI Area FE + Industry FE + it. 80
distance thresholds are randomly selected between two and four kilometres to define the
close firms. The solid lines represent the coefficient estimations, and the dashed lines are
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Figure 1.10: Placebo Tests on Firm Performance: Different Distance Thresholds
This figure plots the coefficients with 95% confidence intervals from placebo tests of the
LEGI impact on firm performance from Equation 1.7: yi,t+2 = α6 + β6Closet + c6Postt +
δ6Pr highit + γ6Closei × Postt + η6Closei × Postt + θ6Postt × Pr highit + κ6Closei ×
Postt × Pr highit + LEGI Area FE + Industry FE + Zi,2003γ6 + ζ6X¯c,j−i,t + it. 80
distance thresholds are randomly selected between two and four kilometres to define the
close firms. The solid lines represent the coefficient estimations and the dashed lines are
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table summarises firms in the analysis sample with the full sample in Panel A and the
sub-sample of founder/non-founder-managed firms in Panel B respectively. Founders are classified
as managers with shares at the establishment of the firm. Firms with at least one founder are
defined as founder-managed firms. All financial variables are reported in £ unit. The analysis
sample includes 336,000 private limited new firms incorporated from 2005 to 2010 with at least
two managers at incorporation. The sample excludes firms with one manager at incorporation,
firms belonging to business groups, in M&A activities or backed by VC firms; non-trading
businesses are also excluded.
Panel A: Full Sample
Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Obs.
Total assets 4,307,727 7,178,035 15,472 55,047 193,138 1,723,280
Fixed assets/Total Assets 0.3573 0.3350 0.0565 0.2378 0.6293 1,353,090
Current Assets/Total Assets 0.7288 0.3229 0.5192 0.8891 0.9955 1,701,267
Bank deposits/Current Assets 0.3667 0.3405 0.0571 0.2558 0.6416 1,505,067
Total Liabilities 394,630 1,693,170 14556 43751 147795 1,621,010
Leverage 0.5969 0.3378 0.3269 0.6736 0.9101 1,723,280
Shareholder funds 3,939,335 7,396,873 152 4,638 39,083 1,722,021
Profits 66,691 1,866,079 -505 4,369 36,118 1,578,741
Bankruptcy hazard ratio 0.0882
Asset growth rate 0.0145 0.5954 -0.2378 0.0101 0.3541 1,129,257
Num. of managers 2.2336 0.6171 2 2 2 2,404,364
Num. of departures 0.0993 0.3757 0 0 0 2,226,366
Num. of appointments 0.0646 0.3389 0 0 0 2,226,366
Num. of replacements|departure 0.3774 0.6289 0 0 1 177,560
Panel B: Founder and non-founder-managed firms
Founder Managed Nonfounder Managed
Median SD Obs. Median SD Obs.
Total assets 56,082 5,148,220 1,394,090 54,983 3,403,497 149,190
Fixed assets/Total Assets 0.3300 0.3326 1,057,509 0.2322 0.3581 115,581
Current Assets/Total Assets 0.8845 0.3205 1,374,337 0.8894 0.3504 146,930
Bank deposits/Current Assets 0.2102 0.3402 1,195,199 0.2596 0.3439 129,868
Total Liabilities 41,650 1,374,989 1,302,695 43,883 1,796,860 138,315
Leverage 0.6879 0.3244 1,039,654 0.6077 0.3614 149,190
Shareholder funds 4,620 5,045,864 1,392,959 4,639 3,851,943 149,062
Profits 2,124 4,773,555 1,263,604 4,587 36,459,571 120,093
Bankruptcy hazard ratio 0.0874 0.0969
Asset growth rate 0.0161 0.5958 844,219 -0.0051 0.5900 87,038
Mean SD Obs. Mean SD Obs.
Number of managers 2.2355 0.6209 2,014,509 2.204 0.5697 387,825
Number of departures 0.0909 0.3539 1,854,204 0.1992 0.5661 192,162
Number of appointments 0.0564 0.31 51,84,204 0.1625 0.5728 192,162
D( replacements>0|departure>0) 0.3194 0.5734 153,854 0.7542 0.8153 23,706
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Table 1.2: Correlation Between Manager Turnover and Firm Performance
This table shows the analysis to access the correlation between manager turnover
and firm performance in the two subsequent years based on Equation 1.2. The
outcome variables are D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2, an indicator of whether firm status
is liquidated or dissolved; and Asset growthi,t+2, the asset growth rate from year
t to t + 2. 4Numit is the change in manager numbers from year t − 1 to year t.
Num departureit and Num newit denotes the number of manager departures and
the number of appointments. Net departureit, Num replacementit and Net newit
are the number of net departures, the number of replaced managers and the number
of net new appointments respectively. In all regressions, firm-level controls include
total assets, bank deposits, profits (from the balance sheet) and the leverage ratio.
Location-Industry-year and cohort-fixed effects are included. Standard errors shown
in parentheses are clustered at the industry, location and cohort levels. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 Asset growthi,t+2
4Numit -0.0459*** 0.0488***
(0.0029) (0.0079)
Num departureit 0.0619*** -0.0361***
(0.0040) (0.0074)
Num newit -0.0387*** 0.0719***
(0.0030) (0.0106)
Net departureit 0.0667*** -0.0301**
(0.0040) (0.0080)
Num replacementit 0.0133** 0.0244
(0.0035) (0.0910)
Net newit -0.0311*** 0.0801***
(0.0036) (0.0109)
Numi,t−1 -0.0206*** -0.0207*** 0.0026 0.0024
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Total assetsi,t−1 -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0004 -0.2766 -0.2990 -0.2980
(0.0580) (0.0376) (0.0369) (0.1609) (0.1811) (0.1815)
Bank depositsi,t−1 -1.8001** -1.0727** -1.0612** 0.5260 0.1335 0.1496
(0.5336) (0.3277) (0.3174) (0.8771) (1.0202) (0.9909)
Profitsi,t−1 -0.0349 -0.0335 -0.0312 0.8556* 0.8824* 0.8909*
(0.0592) (0.0501) (0.0505) (0.4079) (0.4362) (0.4346)
Leveragei,t−1 0.0306*** 0.0297*** 0.0297*** 0.0461*** 0.0461*** 0.0460***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Observations 1,217,158 1,217,158 1,217,158 758,474 758,474 758,474
R-squared 0.122 0.125 0.125 0.106 0.106 0.106
Loc× Ind× Y ear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.3: Correlation Between Manager Turnover and Firm Performance
This table shows the analysis showing the correlation between manager turnover
and firm performance in the subsequent two years based on 1.2, and based on
founder and non-founder-managed firm samples in Panel A and B respectively.
Dependent and independent variables are the same as described in Table . In all
regressions, the firm-level controls include total assets, bank deposits, profitloss
account(from the balance sheet) and the leverage ratio. For brevity, estimations on
firm-level control variables are not included in this table. Location-Industry-year
and cohort-fixed effects are included, however. Standard errors shown in parenthe-
ses are clustered at the industry, location and cohort levels. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Founder-managed firms
D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 Asset growthi,t+2
4Numit -0.0465*** 0.0449***
(0.0028) (0.0044)
Num departureit 0.0615*** -0.0284***
(0.0034) (0.0062)
Num newit -0.0393*** 0.0743***
(0.0031) (0.0078)
Net departureit 0.0660*** -0.0254***
(0.0032) (0.0049)
Num replacementit 0.0113*** 0.0388*
(0.0024) (0.0240)
Net newit -0.0320*** 0.0786***
(0.0035) (0.0080)
Numi,t−1 -0.0197*** -0.0198*** 0.0029 0.0029
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Observations 1,125,639 1,125,639 1,125,639 700,424 700,424 700,424
R-squared 0.124 0.127 0.127 0.108 0.108 0.108
Panel B: Non-founder-managed firms
4Numit -0.0444*** 0.0753**
(0.0085) (0.0238)
Num departureit 0.0671*** -0.0810**
(0.0133) (0.0245)
Num newit -0.0384*** 0.0804**
(0.0083) (0.0236)
Net departureit 0.0781*** -0.0831*
(0.0157) (0.0336)
Num replacementit 0.0196* 0.0008
(0.0081) (0.0151)
Net newit -0.0227** 0.0779**
(0.0062) (0.0281)
Numi,t−1 -0.0270** -0.0275** 0.0088 0.0089
(0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0087) (0.0068)
Observations 63,126 63,126 63,126 37,904 37,904 37,904
R-squared 0.258 0.264 0.265 0.260 0.261 0.261
Loc× Ind× Y ear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.4: Industry Average Manager Turnover and Individual Firm Performance
This table shows the analysis of the industry average manager turnover and
individual firm performance. The outcome variables are D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 in
the first two columns and Asset growthi,t+2 in the last two columns. The average
manager departures and appointments in firms (excluding firm i) operating in the
same industry and within the same cohort are the main dependent variables of
interest. In all regressions, manager turnover in firm i is controlled. Location-
Industry, location-year and cohort-level fixed effects are also included. Firm-level
accounting information is not controlled for in columns (1) and (3) regressions.
Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at the industry, location and
cohort levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 Asset growthi,t+2
Average departurec.j−i,t 0.1575*** 0.1573*** -0.1000** -0.0971**
(0.0286) (0.0289) (0.0291) (0.0299)
Average newc,j−i,t -0.0560* -0.0558* 0.0584** 0.0569**
(0.0232) (0.0230) (0.0197) (0.0189)
Num departureit 0.0436*** 0.0413*** -0.0311*** -0.0341***
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.0028)
Num newit -0.0241*** -0.0227*** 0.0461*** 0.0481***
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Numi,t−1 -0.0138*** -0.0127*** 0.0034** 0.0051***
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Bankruptcy ratec,j,t 0.1643* 0.1608* 0.0170 0.0147
(0.0654) (0.0649) (0.0195) (0.0203)
Average asset growthc,j,t -0.0828*** -0.0773** -0.0373 -0.0297
(0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0297) (0.0312)
Observations 1,349,446 1,349,446 955,032 955,032
R-squared 0.031 0.039 0.020 0.031
Firm level control No Yes No Yes
Location× Y ear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location× Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.5: Average Manager Turnover in (Non)Founder-Managed Firms and Firm
Performances
This table shows the analysis of the industry average manager turnover in
founder/non-founder-managed firms and individual firm performance. The out-
come variables are D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 and Asset growthi,t+2 in Columns
(1)-(2) and (3)-(4) respectively. The average manager departures and appoint-
ments in firms (excluding firm i) operating in same industry and within the same
cohort are calculated based on founder and non-founder-managed firms separately.
Average departureFc,j−i,t and Average departure
NF
c,j−i,t denote the average number of
departures from founder and non-founder-managed firms. In all regressions, firm i’s
manager turnover is controlled for; location-industry, location-year and cohort-level
fixed effects are also included. Firm level accounting information is not controlled
for in Columns (1) and (3). Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at
the industry, location and cohort level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 Asset growthi,t+2
Average departureFc.j−i,t 0.1346*** 0.1347*** -0.0810** -0.0756*
(0.0328) (0.0329) (0.0208) (0.0315)
Average departureNFc.j−i,t 0.0159** 0.0160** -0.0144** -0.0142**
(0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0048)
Average newFc,j−i,t -0.0483* -0.0478* -0.0123 -0.0108
(0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0392) (0.0372)
Average newNFc,j−i,t -0.0061 -0.0061 0.0211** 0.0204*
(0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0094)
Num departureit 0.0441*** 0.0419*** -0.0342*** -0.0395***
(0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0058) (0.0066)
Num newit -0.0244*** -0.0229*** 0.0729*** 0.0765***
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0080) (0.0092)
Numi,t−1 -0.0138*** -0.0127*** 0.0000 0.0030
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Bankruptcy ratec,j,t 0.1897** 0.1860** 0.0818 0.0795
(0.0680) (0.0673) (0.0458) (0.0452)
Average asset growthc,j,t -0.2334*** -0.2208*** -0.2958* -0.2668
(0.0326) (0.0323) (0.1331) (0.1344)
Observations 1,285,463 1,285,463 912,362 912,362
R-squared 0.030 0.038 0.018 0.029
Firm level control No Yes No Yes
Location× Y ear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location× Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: LEGI Effect on Manager Turnover: Close vs Far to Policy Firms
This table shows the estimations of the LEGI impact on manager turnover. The
analysis is based on a sample of firms locate within a six-kilometre distance to
the policy area, incorporated after 1995 and managed by at least two managers in
2003. Closei is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is located within 3 km
distance to the policy-supported area. Postt is an indicator equal to 1 if the year
is after the LEGI launch. The dependent variables are concurrent counts of (net)
departures and appointments shown in Columns (1) to (4). In Column (5), the
dependent variable is the number of managers moving to the policy region, which
is measured base on a sub-sample of managers for whom I can find subsequent
managerial position appointments using universal management data from Orbis.
All regressions are controlled for location and local authority fixed effects. Standard
errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry and location level. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Num. of departures Net departures Num. of new Net new Num. moving to policy
Closei -0.0274* -0.0267** 0.0003 0.0010 0.0293
(0.0143) (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0096) (0.0205)
Postt -0.0820*** -0.0628*** -0.0297** -0.0106** 0.0032
(0.0161) (0.0095) (0.0110) (0.0049) (0.0180)
Closei × Postt 0.0519** 0.0411*** 0.0137 0.0028 0.0808**
(0.0199) (0.0126) (0.0109) (0.0088) (0.0319)
Age -0.0020 -0.0021 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0046
(0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0032)
Num of managers2003 0.0890*** 0.0545*** 0.0441*** 0.0096*** 0.0100*
(0.0081) (0.0064) (0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0052)
Total assets2003 0.0269*** 0.0093** 0.0351*** 0.0175*** -0.0000
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0032) (0.0000)
Leverage2003 -0.0132 -0.0093 -0.0034 0.0005 -0.0000
(0.0130) (0.0077) (0.0155) (0.0094) (0.0000)
Average departurec,j−i,t−1 0.0030 0.0233 -0.0287 -0.0084 -0.0203
(0.0426) (0.0470) (0.0315) (0.0268) (0.0419)
Observations 19,972 19,972 19,972 19,972 3,035
R-squared 0.079 0.046 0.088 0.048 0.139
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.8: LEGI Effect on Firm Performance: Close vs Far to Policy
This table reports the unconditional estimations of LEGI impact on firm perfor-
mances. The analysis is based on the same set of samples as in Table 1.7. Closei is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located within a three-kilometre distance
to the policy-supported area. Postt is an indicator equal to 1 if the year is after
the LEGI launch, and 0 if before. All dependent variables are firm performance
measurements in year t + 2. All the regressions are controlled for industry and
LA-fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the
industry and location level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D(Bankruptcy=1) Total Assets Fixed Assets Current Assets Profits
Closei -0.0064 -0.0965 -0.1562 0.0754 0.1024*
(0.0115) (0.2209) (0.1363) (0.1150) (0.0512)
Postt 0.0701*** 0.1701 0.0742 0.1207** 0.0321
(0.0088) (0.1054) (0.0816) (0.0442) (0.0627)
Closei × Postt 0.0026 0.3587* 0.1487* 0.2384 0.2340
(0.0109) (0.1959) (0.0752) (0.1678) (0.1375)
Age -0.0088*** -0.0905 -0.0695 -0.0360 0.0087
(0.0018) (0.0653) (0.0599) (0.0249) (0.0107)
Num of managers2003 -0.0042 0.0334 -0.0498 0.0633 0.0190
(0.0027) (0.0818) (0.0940) (0.0405) (0.0187)
Total assets2003 -0.0188*** 2.0512*** 0.9518*** 1.2160*** 0.4208***
(0.0029) (0.5071) (0.2659) (0.2705) (0.1145)
Leverage2003 -0.0190 -0.8614 -0.8247 -0.3518 -0.0997
(0.0143) (0.7044) (0.7235) (0.2299) (0.1369)
Average departurec,j−i,t−1 0.0245* 0.1828 0.2505** 0.0199 0.0599
(0.0121) (0.1249) (0.1047) (0.0872) (0.0453)
Logarithm transformation
Closei × Postt -0.0970 0.0579 -0.0963
(0.0667) (0.0524) (0.0674)
Observations 19,972 14,863 12,177 14,508 13,889
R-squared 0.149 0.256 0.184 0.330 0.182
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.9: Policy Impact on Manager Turnover: Different Sub-sample Groups
This table shows the estimations of LEGI impact on manager turnover following
regression 1.4 Closei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located within a
three-kilometre distance to the policy-supported area. Postt is an indicator equal
to 1 if the year is after the LEGI launch and 0 if before. Columns (1) and (3)
are based on sub-samples of firms with high departure probabilities and Columns
(2) and (4) are based on sub-samples of firms with low departure probabilities.
Classification of high and low probabilities are based on predicted values from
Equation 1.6. All dependent variables are firm performance measurements in year
t+ 2. All the regressions are controlled for industry and LA-fixed effects. Standard
errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry and location level. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of departures Managers moving to policy
Sample High dep. prob. Low dep. prob. High dep. prob. Low dep. prob.
Closei -0.1008 0.0493** 0.0057 0.0541*
(0.0551) (0.0228) (0.0307) (0.0308)
Postt 0.0253 -0.0287 -0.0452* 0.0408
(0.0800) (0.0184) (0.0261) (0.0269)
Closei × Postt 0.0887** -0.0169 0.1745*** -0.0091
(0.0304) (0.0321) (0.0454) (0.0462)
Age -0.0073 -0.0012 -0.0047 -0.0021
(0.0073) (0.0021) (0.0052) (0.0044)
Num2003 0.0757** 0.0303*** -0.0019 0.0107
(0.0214) (0.0065) (0.0114) (0.0067)
Total assets2003 0.0113 0.0044 -0.0007 -0.0000
(0.0193) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0000)
Leverage2003 0.0181 -0.0027 0.0172 -0.0000
(0.0533) (0.0163) (0.0186) (0.0000)
Average departurec,j−i,t−1 -0.1144*** 0.0311 -0.0203 -0.0542
(0.0137) (0.0687) (0.0419) (0.0595)
Observations 3,062 9,147 1,406 1,481
R-squared 0.099 0.016 0.179 0.159
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.10: Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Regression Results
This table reports the estimations from Equation 1.7. The analysis is based on
the same sample set as in Table 1.7. Closei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the firm is locate within a three-kilometre distance to the policy-supported area.
Postt is an indicator equal to 1 if the year is after the LEGI launch and 0 if before.
Pr high is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the predicted probability
from Equation 1.6 is above the 75% threshold value of 0.3591. All dependent
variables are measured in year t + 2. The Wald estimations are calculated using
point estimates and 95% confidence interval ranges divided by the point estimates
in Column (6). All the regressions are controlled for industry and LA-fixed effects.
Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry and location
levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: DDD Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D(Bankruptcy=1)
Total Fixed Current Profits
assets assets assets
Closei -0.0069 0.0369 -0.0056 0.0438 0.0146
(0.0084) (0.1188) (0.0437) (0.0619) (0.0260)
Postt 0.0495*** 0.2615*** 0.0881* 0.1681*** 0.0724***
(0.0068) (0.0543) (0.0468) (0.0414) (0.0219)
Closei × Postt 0.0015 0.0247 0.0210 0.0010 0.0506
(0.0110) (0.0733) (0.0636) (0.0377) (0.0300)
Pr highi,t 0.0185** 0.0971 0.0571 -0.0476 -0.0768
(0.0086) (0.1110) (0.0655) (0.0796) (0.0736)
Closei × Pr highit -0.0234* -0.1300 -0.0978 -0.0297 0.0132
(0.0124) (0.1386) (0.1249) (0.1005) (0.0549)
Postt × Pr highit -0.0197* 0.7143** 0.7080** 0.2438 0.032
(0.0114) (0.3217) (0.2782) (0.1428) (0.0544)
Closei × Postt × Pr highit 0.0347** -0.4233*** -0.5294** 0.0607 -0.1078
(0.0155) (0.1424) (0.2177) (0.1733) (0.1244)
Log transformation
Closei × Postt × Pr highit -0.1423*** -0.1394** -0.0837
(0.0459) (0.0515) (0.0694)
Observations 19,067 14,609 11,986 14,267 13,672
R-squared 0.165 0.219 0.161 0.312 0.258
Control variables Age,Total assets2003, Leverage2003 , Num2003
FE Industry Location
Cluster Industry Location
Panel B: Wald estimations: Causal impact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bankruptcy Total Fixed Current Profits Num
assets assets assets departure
Close× Post× Pr High 0.0347** -0.4233*** -0.5294** 0.0607 -0.1078 0.0846**
95% confidence interval [0.0043, [-0.7173, [-0.9787, [-0.2970, [-0.3646,
0.0650] -0.1294] -0.0800] 0.4185] 0.1490]
Wald estimation 0.4102** -5.0059*** -6.2607** 0.7178 -1.2748
95% confidence interval [0.0504, [-8.4824, [-11.5737, [-3.5124, [-4.3116,



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.12: Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Regression Results: by Different
Predicted Probability
This table shows estimations of Equation 1.7 using different control groups. For all
the regressions, I include the observations with the highest 25% predicted departure
probability in the treated group. Panel A shows the results comparing the top
and second quartiles (between the top 25% and the median). Panel B shows the
comparison between the top and third quartiles of the predicted manager departure
probability. In Panel C, the regressions are based on observations of the bottom
25% and top 25% quartiles. For brevity, this table only reports the estimations of
γ for each regression. Log ta, Log fa and Log ca denote logarithms of total assets,
fixed assets and current assets. All the regressions include firm-level controls and
account for industry and LA-fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses
are clustered at the industry and location levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Top quartile vs second quartile of predicted departure probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D(Bankruptcy=1) Total Assets Fixed Assets Current Assets Profits Log ta Log fa Log ca
Close× Post× Pr high 0.0180 0.5247 -0.1832 0.0132 0.4068 0.4383* 0.0730 -0.2229
(0.0672) (0.8143) (1.1103) (0.4640) (0.2474) (0.2252) (0.4111) (0.3199)
Observations 6,367 4,973 3,786 4,818 4,429 4,973 3,786 4,818
R-squared 0.143 0.431 0.438 0.487 0.354 0.523 0.517 0.528
Panel B: Top quartile vs third quartile of predicted departure probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D(Bankruptcy=1) Total Assets Fixed Assets Current Assets Profits Log ta Log fa Log ca
Close× Post× Pr high 0.0406*** -0.7972 -0.2911 -0.7319 -0.9739 -0.0555 -0.2897 -0.1111
(0.0048) (0.8762) (0.9113) (1.2191) (0.8215) (0.2520) (0.3471) (0.1995)
Observations 6,359 4,867 3,748 4,842 4,465 4,867 3,748 4,842
R-squared 0.239 0.392 0.401 0.437 0.267 0.500 0.495 0.511
Panel C: Top quartile vs bottom quartile of predicted departure probability
(1) (2) (4) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D(Bankruptcy=1) Total Assets Fixed Assets Current Assets Profits Log ta Log fa Log ca
Close× Post× Pr high 0.0971** -0.5171 -0.5554 -0.3373 0.0541 -0.01519 -0.1315 0.0468
(0.0369) (0.5425) (1.1107) (0.4092) (0.3296) (0.1898) (0.2998) (0.3530)
Observations 6,292 4,643 3,607 4,461 4,245 4,643 3,607 4,461
R-squared 0.156 0.375 0.455 0.444 0.197 0.557 0.530 0.574
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The main data sources used in this study are Orbis and Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME)
databases provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). I augment the manager and shareholder information
with geographical data at Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) levels from the UK Office for
National Statistics (ONS) in the analysis in Section 1.3.
Orbis is a comprehensive database covering manager and ownership information for both pri-
vate and public firms worldwide. UK manager information is originally extracted from Companies
House. Companies House is the business registry sponsored by the UK Department for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy. Companies House provides services to establish and dissolve limited
companies, register and store company information and make it available to the public.44
According to the Companies Act (1985), all companies in UK should file annual reports and
annual financial statements to Companies House. Directors of private companies are responsible
for ensuring that accounts are delivered within nine months from the end of the accounting ref-
erence period. Late filings are subject to penalty fees and failure to file is considered a criminal
offence.45 The directors are also required to update information to Companies House within two
weeks whenever they make changes to directors46 or their personal details and they must inform
Companies House within a month of new shares being issued. My original extract of managerial
information from Orbis encompasses 7,916,404 firms. The earliest date of incorporation is 1856,
the earliest managerial information begins from 1942 and becomes more readily available from the
1990s onwards.
The Orbis dataset keeps managers’ detailed information from annual report filings. Within
each company, every appointment is recorded, along with details of the manager’s full name,
appointment date, resignation date and type of position, as well as characteristics such as gender,
birth date and nationality. As managers can work at different companies, Orbis also provides a
Unique Contact Identifier for each individual, following a complex algorithm with both company
and personal information. This added value of the database is especially important for examining
the causal impact of manager turnover in Section 1.3. Using the manager’s ID, I can now not
only link managers to their previous positions before new appointments, but also follow which new
firms they join after they resign from their previous firm.
In addition, Orbis covers information from annual reports including each shareholder’s name,
44For more information about Companies House, see https://www.gov.uk/government/
organisations/\companies-house.
45See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/late-filing-penalties/late-filing-penalties.
46In annual reports, details of directors and secretaries are both included, although this paper
only focuses on directors. According to the Companies Act, a director is “legally responsible for
running the company and making sure company accounts and reports are properly prepared. In
Orbis, the type of position for directors is classified as senior managers. Considering that the
analysis sample in this paper mainly covers newly established private small firms, I will refer to
directors as managers from this point.
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type (individual or firm), percentage of shares and the date of ownership information on a yearly
basis. Historical shareholder information is available for the past ten years on a web-version
database. For the scope of this study, I obtained shareholder information of every newly established
firm since 2005.
Besides the firm-level detailed information, another advantage of this database is its good
overall coverage of private firms in the UK. Specifically, Orbis does not delete firms when they
become inactive or liquidated. In addition, UK firms are required to file annual reports containing
the same quality of information about managers and shareholders, regardless of firm age and
size, to Companies House. These two features avoid not only the survival ship bias but also the
sample-selection problems associated with other private firm datasets47.
The FAME database contains up to ten years of historical financial information for each firm
that files annual accounts to Companies House. The accounting standards vary with firm sizes
according to the Companies Act, and detailed accounts are only required for medium and large-
sized firms. Although profit-and-loss accounts and cash flow statements are poorly covered in small
and young firms, this paper focuses on assets and profit-and-loss from balance sheet accounts. In
order to avoid the truncation of ten years’ worth of data provided by FAME, I combined the achieve
disks with the web-version data to extend the historical financial information from 2003 to 2016.
FAME also provides firm registration information such as incorporation date, legal forms,
the postcode, and its industry as well as the company’s status. Firm status information with
exact information dates are important to define bankruptcy status as one main measure of firm
performance. The company statuses are classified into four main categories: active inactive in
liquidation, and dissolved. The information date associated with the company status is the date
when the filing is accepted at Companies House. Also, a company will be struck off the register
after two months of notice sent to Companies House. After this, a second notice will be published
in the Gazette this will mean that the company will no longer legally exist (it will have been
dissolved). In the FAME data, the dissolution date is recorded as the second-notice date. The
firm registry information is kept up to date in the web-version and I use the snapshot of 2017
information for the main analysis in this paper.
A postcode is assigned with geographic shape data for analysis in Section 1.3. I classify each
LSOA into LEGI policy LSOAs and no-policy LSOAs. Policy LSOAs are considered to be within
a policy region if it is located within the boundaries of a LA receiving LEGI funding. The exact
geocoding comes from the fact that the LSOA boundaries do not cross the LA boundaries. In this
paper, I focus on firms in no-policy LSOAs with differential distances to LEGI policy regions. I
calculate the distance between LSOA centroids using the population-weighted centroid at LSOA
level data from ONS. An LSOA is considered to be close to the policy region if it is located within
47In the US, the Fed conducted surveys of small business finances, which included owner charac-
teristics, firm size, income and balance sheet information. The survey was ran from 1987 to 2003
and took place once every five years. Another type survey data with similar information used in
this paper is the Kauffman Firm Survey, which details 4,928 business and was founded in 2004.
The Kauffman Firm Survey data was used in Robb and Robinson (2014).
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a three-kilometre distance to the nearest policy LSOA; and those located within a three to six-
kilometre distance to the nearest policy LSOA are in the control group. Thus, following the above
steps of assigning firms to LSOAs and then separating LSOAs into treated and control areas, I am
able to classify my firms into close (treated) and far (control) groups.
Matching shareholder and manager names
To identify managers as founder managers, I need to combine the manager data with ownership in-
formation. Although manager details and ownership information are both obtained from the Orbis
dataset, the same individual can be contained within two parts of the dataset with slightly differ-
ent names. This may be because of data input errors or because of the different standardisation
algorithms.
Considering the size of the dataset and the relatively low diversity of name origins, I simplified
the rules stipulated in Bena and Xu (2017) into the following steps:
1. I kept all the individual shareholder data and transformed it to firm-person panel
2. I standardised the names in shareholder data and ownership datasets. I eliminated the prefix
and titles in front of names, eliminated all the spaces between the names, and transformed all the
letters to lower case.
3. Within each firm, I matched shareholder names and manager names, including direct match, or
using initials with their last names as well as swapping the first and last names.
This simplified algorithm worked well in my dataset both in terms of accuracy and the speed
of calculation. Remember that almost 90% of managers have British nationality so the names
are already standardised. One drawback to this method is that I did not specifically correct any
spelling errors, which are relatively rare in my sample.
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Table A1.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Numit Number of managers in firm i at the end of year t
4Numit Change in number of managers from t to t+ 1
Num departureit Number of managers departing firm i in year t
Num newit Number of managers appointed to firm i in year t
Net replacementit Number of managers being replaced in firm i in year t
Net departureit Number of managers departing the firm without replacement
in firm i in year t
Net newit Number of net new managers joining firm i in year t
Num of founder departureit Number of founder manager departures in firm i year t;
founder managers are those who joined the firm and own shares
at incorporation date (within three months of incorporation date).
Num of nonfounder departureit Number of nonfounder manager departures in firm i year t
Num of founder managersit Number of founder managers in firm i at the end of year t
Num of nonfounder managersit Number of nonfounder managers at the end of year t
Average departurec,j−i,t Average number of departing managers within the same
cohort c, and industry j excluding firm i in year t
Average no replacementc,j−i,t Average number of net departing managers within the same
cohort c, and industry j excluding firm i in year t
Average replacementc,j−i,t Average number of replaced managers within the same
cohort c, and industry j excluding firm i in year t
Average new managerc,j−i,t Average number of new managers within the same
cohort c, and industry j excluding firm i in year t
Average net new managerc,j−i,t Average number of net new managers within the same
cohort c, and industry j excluding firm i in year t
Bankruptcy ratejt Total number of firms going bankrupt in year t divided by
the total number of firms in industry j at the beginning of year t
Total assetsit Total assets in firm i year t
Bank depositsit Bank deposits in firm i year t
Profit loss accountit Profits-and-loss account (from balance sheet) in firm i year t
Leverageit Leverageit =
(Current liabilitiesit+long term liabilitiesit)
Total assetsit
Fixed assetsit Fixed assets in firm i year t
Current assetsit Current assets in firm i year t
D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 The Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the firm i status is
liquidated or dissolved in year t+2
Asset growthi,t+2 Total assets growth rate in firm i in year tand t+ 2.
2×(Total assetsi,t+2−Total assetsi,t)
(Total assetsi,t+2+Total assetsi,t)
Closei The Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the firm is
outside but within three kilometres of the nearest LEGI policy area
Postt The Dummy variable takes the value of 1 in years 2006/2007
2009 for firms close to the first/second round of LEGI program.
Pr highi,t The Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the predicted
departure probability in firm i year t is above the 75% threshold
Age The age of the firm is defined as the firm’s age in 2003.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1.3: Manager Turnover and Firm Bankruptcy: Estimations from Duration
Regression
This table shows the duration regression estimations following Regression Equation
1.2 based on a proportional hazards model. All regressions are stratified at the

















Observations 1,237,315 1,237,315 1,237,315
Strata level Cohort, Location-Industry
Cluster Location-Industry, Cohort
Model-pvalue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table A1.4: Industry Average Manager Turnover and Firm Bankruptcy: Estima-
tions from Duration Regressions
This table shows the duration regression estimations following Equation 1.3 based
on a proportional hazards model. All regressions are stratified at the Location ×
Industry, Location× Y ear and Cohort groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(Bankrutpcy = 1)i,t+2
Average departurec.j−i,t 0.1984*** 0.1911***
(0.0373) (0.0337)
Average newc,j−i,t 0.0492*** 0.0569***
(0.0163) (0.0167)
Average departureFc.j−i,t 0.1390*** 0.1324***
(0.0316) (0.0358)
Average departureNFc.j−i,t 0.0141** 0.0143**
(0.0053) (0.0049)
Average newFc,j−i,t -0.9684* -0.3619
(0.4846) (0.3062)
Average newNFc,j−i,t -1.4635 -1.1391
(2.4258) (1.8399)
Num departureit 0.3814*** 0.3836*** 0.3787*** 0.3813***
(0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0131)
Num newit -0.3135*** -0.3349*** -0.3213*** -0.3409***
(0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0213) (0.0210)
Industry level controls Bankruptcy ratec,j,t, Average asset growthc,j,t
Firm character controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,236,621 1,236,621 1,225,553 1,225,553
Strata level Cohort, Location-Industry, Location-Year
Cluster Location, Industry, Cohort
Model-pvalue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table A1.5: Estimating the Departure Probability—Logit Regression
This table shows the Logit regression results from Estimating Equation 1.6. Column-
s (1) and (2) show the number of managers, total assets and leverage ratios in 2003
as control variables; and in Columns (3) and (4) lagged average departure numbers
at the same industry and cohort levels are also included. For the analysis in Section
1.3, I use the specification in Column (3) to estimate the probability of a departure.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(Num departure > 0)
Closei -0.1076* -0.1100* -0.1035 -0.1059
-0.0639 -0.0639 -0.0644 -0.0644
Postt -0.4026*** 0.0616 -0.3845*** 0.0746
-0.0481 -0.1109 -0.0487 -0.1123
Closei × Postt 0.2249*** 0.2310*** 0.2120** 0.2182***
-0.0823 -0.0825 -0.0832 -0.0834
Age -0.0049* -0.0045* -0.0052* -0.0047*
-0.0028 -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0024
Num2003 0.1988*** 0.1997*** 0.1963*** 0.1971***
-0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152
Total assets2003 0.1115*** 0.1126*** 0.1141*** 0.1152***
-0.0158 -0.0159 -0.0159 -0.016
Leverage2003 -0.1221* -0.1212* -0.1267* -0.1257*
-0.0653 -0.0654 -0.0657 -0.0658
Average departurec,j−i,t−1 0.0189 -0.0227
-0.1518 -0.1532
Constant -1.8447*** -1.8570*** -1.9767*** -1.9754***
-0.4928 -0.4949 -0.5926 -0.5941
Observations 19,444 19,444 19,031 19,031
Location Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Pseudo R-square 0.0807 0.0828 0.0784 0.0807
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Table A1.6: LEGI Policy and Manager Departures: Firms with Less Than Three
Managers
This table shows the estimations of the LEGI impact on manager turnover based on an
alternative sample of firms with less than three managers in the pre-sampling year (2003).
Other sample restrictions are similar to before: firms located within a six-kilometre
distance of the policy area, those incorporated after 1995. Closei is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm is located within a three-kilometre distance to the policy-supported
areas. Postt is an indicator equal to 1 if the year is after the LEGI launch. The dependent
variables are concurrent counts of (net) departures and appointments in Columns (1)
to (4). In Column(5), the dependent variable is the number of managers that move
to a policy region, which is measured based on a sub-sample of managers for whom
I can find subsequent managerial position appointments using the universal manage-
ment data from Orbis. All regressions are controlled for location and LA-fixed effects.
Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry and location level-
s. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Num. of departures Net departures Num. of new Net new Num. moving to policy areas
Closei -0.0011 0.0004 0.0019 0.0034* 0.0422
(0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0285)
Postt -0.0032* 0.0010 -0.0103*** -0.0061*** 0.0129*
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0069)
Closei × Postt 0.0052 0.0013 0.0015 -0.0024 0.0617
(0.0069) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0757)
Age -0.0005 -0.0004** -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0020
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0028)
Num2003 0.0369*** 0.0319*** -0.0063** -0.0113*** 0.0115
(0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0157)
Total assets2003 0.0255*** 0.0099*** 0.0416*** 0.0260*** -0.0000***
(0.0062) (0.0029) (0.0091) (0.0058) (0.0000)
Leverage2003 -0.0031 0.0018 -0.0057 -0.0008 -0.0000***
(0.0040) (0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0023) (0.0000)
Average departurec,j−i,t−1 0.0090 0.0110 -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0917
(0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0072) (0.0888)
Observations 139,030 139,030 139,030 139,030 1,304
R-squared 0.026 0.019 0.025 0.016 0.156
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A1.7: LEGI Policy, Manager Departures, Firm Performance—Robustness
Check
This table shows the estimations of the LEGI impact on manager turnover, firm perfor-
mance in close and far firms in Panel A and B respectively. The DDD estimations is
displayed in Panel C. All regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects, industry fixed
effects and location fixed effects. Variable definitions are the same as previous tables.
Panel A: LEGI policy and manager turnover: close vs far
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Num. of departures Net departures Num. of new Net new Num. moving to policy
Closei × Postt 0.0546** 0.0404* 0.0219 0.0077 0.0823**
(0.0208) (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0100) (0.0438)
Observations 19,978 19,978 19,978 19,978 3,045
R-squared 0.237 0.167 0.294 0.212 0.209
FE Firm, Industry, Location
Panel B: LEGI policy and unconditional firm performance: close vs far
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Assets Fixed Assets Current Assets Profits
Closei × Postt 0.3614** 0.1905* 0.2369 0.2300*
(0.1710) (0.0967) (0.1452) (0.1276)
Log transformation
Closei × Postt 0.0473 -0.0254 -0.0947
(0.0438) (0.0487) (0.0625)
Observations 14,889 12,919 14,683 13,394
R-squared 0.724 0.715 0.841 0.628
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: DDD regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Assets Fixed Assets Current Assets Profits
Close× Post× Pr high -0.3136*** -0.3616** -0.1223 0.0881
(0.0880) (0.1586) (0.2143) (0.1252)
Log transformation
Close× Post× Pr high -0.0259** -0.0363** -0.0238
(0.0118) (0.0143) (0.1020)
Observations 14,631 11,993 14,293 13,690
R-squared 0.779 0.749 0.785 0.723
FE Firm, Industry, Location
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Table A1.8: LEGI Policy and Manager Departures—Robustness Check
This table is a robust test of the correlation between manager turnover and fir-
m performance. This table corresponds to the Table 1.2. Instead of us-
ing absolute numbers of manager departure and manager appointments, I use
dummy variables Dum Departureit and Dum Newit. They take the val-
ue of one if there is a positive number of departure or new appointment.
(1) (2)
D(Bankruptcy = 1)i,t+2 Asset Growthi,t+2
Dum Departureit 0.0777*** -0.0429**
(0.0036) (0.0116)




Total Assetsi,t−1 0.0185 -0.3008
(0.0359) (0.1762)








Loc× Ind× Y ear FE Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes
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Table A1.9: LEGI Policy and Manager Departures—Robustness Check
This table is a robust test of the estimations of the LEGI impact on manager turnover.
This table corresponds to the Table 1.7, with dummy variables as outcome variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D(Num. of departures>0) D(Net departures>0) D(Num. of new>0) D(Net new>0) D(Num. move to policy>0)
Closei -0.0154* -0.0182*** -0.0025 0.0007 0.0211
(0.0085) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0052) (0.0176)
Postt -0.0532*** -0.0456*** -0.0192** -0.0060* -0.0019
(0.0091) (0.0055) (0.0075) (0.0029) (0.0157)
Closei × Postt 0.0300** 0.0285** 0.0099* 0.0016 0.0749***
(0.0118) (0.0103) (0.0055) (0.0046) (0.0273)
Age -0.0009 -0.0013 0.0013 0.0008 -0.0044
(0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0028)
Num of managers2003 0.0343*** 0.0219*** 0.0210*** 0.0056** 0.0102**
(0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0046)
Total Assets2003 0.0175*** 0.0082*** 0.0227*** 0.0125*** -0.0000
(0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0000)
Leverage2003 -0.0179** -0.0127* -0.0069 -0.0014 -0.0000
(0.0081) (0.0063) (0.0099) (0.0070) (0.0000)
Average departurec,j−i,t−1 0.0039 0.0089 -0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0149
(0.0184) (0.0214) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0399)
Observations 19,972 19,972 19,972 19,972 3,035
R-squared 0.067 0.033 0.094 0.046 0.132
Location FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
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Chapter 2
Dissecting the Effect of Financial
Constraints on Small Firms
Managers of small firms often complain that they are unable to grow because they
have difficulties raising finance and lack the collateral that lenders require as secu-
rity for loans. For example, in a survey of small firms in UK, only 18% of those
that sought finance said they obtained all they needed, and 20% cited insufficient
security as the reason why their financial provider rejected their application for more
funds (BIS, 2012). Consistent with managers’ contentions, an extensive theoretical
and empirical literature suggests that small firms are constrained in their access to
finance (see: Whited (1992); Rajan and Zingales (1998); Beck et al. (2005); Liberti
and Sturgess (2014)). How do small firms adapt to financing constraints? And what
are the costs of these adjustments? In this paper, we answer these relatively unex-
plored questions, using as laboratory the Great Recession. We exploit differential
access to a Credit Guarantee Scheme as exogenous firm-level determinant of financial
access, and take advantage of novel administrative small-firm data in the UK. We
show compelling evidence that financial constraints during the crisis prolonged the
real effects of negative demand shocks, particularly by affecting small firms’ ability
to finance employment rather than fixed assets.1 Our results provide prima facie
evidence of small firm’s direct need to finance labor (cf., Benmelech et al. (2015);
Bakke and Whited (2012); Pica and Pagano (2014)); and highlight how financial
1This evidence is supported by the result found in Campello et al. (2010) that firms planned to
cut employment during the crisis.
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constraints can be more binding for employment than fixed assets, likely because
fixed assets can be pledged as collateral whereas employees cannot (e.g., Almeida
et al. (2011)).
Our empirical strategy exploits the revenue-based eligibility requirements of a
Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS) launched in the UK during 2009. CGSs were preva-
lent policy tools used during the Great Recession that provided credit guarantees for
small firms by promising to pay lenders a fraction of firms’ outstanding balances in
case of default (OECD, 2018; World Bank, 2015).2 We use a rich and novel dataset
for small UK firms reporting revenues in 2008. Our sample includes businesses that
were within a small window around the CGS eligibility threshold. We analyze the
data using a difference-in-difference methodology that compares trends between eli-
gible and non-eligible firms during 2005-2011 and provides an Intent-to-Treat (ITT)
estimate of the effect of the CGS on corporate outcomes (cf., Angrist and Pischke
(2008)). Our main identification assumptions are that the CGS increased access to
external finance for eligible firms, and that, absent this scheme, investment oppor-
tunities and cost of capital would have evolved similarly for eligible and non-eligible
businesses.
Our results show that after the scheme’s launch, eligible firms increased their ex-
ternal debt and did not substitute for (or attract) other sources of finance, such as
debt and equity from owners or trade credit. Eligible firms fired relatively fewer em-
ployees and started rehiring faster, although they disinvested as much as non-eligible
businesses in 2009 and showed no relative investment recovery during 2010-2011. El-
igible firms also performed better on several dimensions: they had relatively higher
revenues, costs of goods sold, profits, and survival rates. We validate our approach
by performing placebo tests using firms that did not qualify for the CGS because
they were active in non-qualifying industries. We also show evidence against several
methodological concerns, such as potential biases from sorting of firms, spurious
trends, window selection, and serial correlation of outcomes.
Our interpretation of these results is that employment rather than capital in-
vestments was the main margin of adjustment to the financial constraints that small
2More than half of all countries in the world have a CGS for small firms, and the number is grow-
ing. The need for these studies has been widely recognized, including as part of the G20/OECD
High Level Principles on SME Financing (see: G20/OECD (2015)) and in public guarantee ar-
rangements (World Bank, 2015).
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firms faced during the crisis. The insensitivity of capital is not a mechanical conse-
quence of scheme requirements, because the CGS imposes no restriction on uses of
funds, dedicated loan lines for fixed assets exist in the scheme, and the maximum
loan size (£1M) exceeds both the average unconditional investment in the sample
(£0.3M) and the average disinvestment during 2009 (£0.9M). In addition, while
the irreversible nature of capital investments may induce companies to avoid such
investments during the slump, this explanation is less convincing during the recov-
ery years in the later part of our sample. Instead, a more plausible explanation is
that the “collateral pledgeability value” of plants, property, and equipment makes
investment in fixed assets less sensitive to financial constraints than investment in
employment (cf., Benmelech and Bergman (2009); Almeida et al. (2011)). We re-
main agnostic about the underlying cause of financial constraints during the crisis.
However, additional results suggest that these constraints were induced partly by
the well-documented tightening of banks’ lending requirements (cf., Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010), rather than exclusively by potential decreases in the value of
firms’ pre-existing redeployable collateral during the crisis. In particular, we find
that the results are invariant to the tangibility of firms’ assets pre-crisis, which is
used as a proxy of firms’ redeployable collateral values (cf., Benmelech and Bergman
(2009)).
Other alternative interpretations are less consistent with the findings. The main
alternative explanation is that the CGS did not relax firms’ financial constraints,
but rather set incentives for firms or banks to make inefficient investment and em-
ployment decisions (i.e., negative net present value projects). For example, several
theories show that collateral pledges by firms to lenders helps discipline managers
and set monitoring incentives for banks (e.g., Chan and Thakor (1987); Rajan and
Winton (1995); Park (2000); Liberti and Sturgess (2014)). In addition, CGS critics
contend that public guarantees can deteriorate incentives of banks and borrowers
(cf., Lelarge et al. (2010); D’Acunto et al. (2017)). A related alternative interpreta-
tion is that layoffs during the crisis were corrections for the negative present value
projects pursued before it, and that access to guaranteed loans allowed eligible firms
to avoid these efficient but privately costly corrections. For example, several papers
show that the boom period preceding the crisis led to market distortions (Adelino
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et al., 2015; Gopinath et al., 2017; Borio et al., 2016; Charles et al., 2016). Evidence
also exists for lay-offs being personally costly to managers and/or generating repu-
tational concerns for firms (Agarwal and Kolev, 2017; Folger and Skarlicki, 1998).
The difficulties of empirically measuring investment opportunities are well known,
and like previous papers in the literature, we are unable to fully ascertain whether
the projects that eligible firms pursue were value maximizing. However, we exploit
the richness of the UK data to present suggestive evidence against these alternative
narratives. Chiefly, the increased relative performance and survival of eligible firms
are the main pieces of evidence supporting our preferred interpretation, as negative
net present value projects would instead likely lead to decreases in profitability and
survival.
Under the exclusion restriction that the CGS affected firm outcomes by increas-
ing external debt and not through any other channel, we estimate the sensitivity of
employment to external finance using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. We
argue that this exclusion restriction is plausible in our empirical setting for several
reasons. For example, the small size of the scheme (relative to the UK financial sys-
tem) implies that its launch is unlikely to have changed the aggregate cost of capital
in the market (and thus non-borrowers’ cost of finance). The pressing macroeco-
nomic conditions at the time also make it unlikely that firms cut their firing in
anticipation of borrowing through the EFG in the future. However, we note that
the exclusion restriction is fundamentally untestable, and our sensitivity estimates
should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
The IV estimates imply that a £100,000 increase in external finance leads to 1.3
additional employees. This sensitivity suggests that the types of workers retained
during the crisis by EFG borrowers were high-skill employees (the average annual
salary in UK is £28,677). This type of employees can be very costly to retain by
constrained firms in recessions (particularly in the short term), but can presumably
generate large returns for firms, for example by increasing firm productivity during
the recovery (otherwise firms would not retain and rehire these employees). Con-
sistent with this notion, we estimate large returns to external finance, measured
as additional gross profits per unit of external debt. The IV estimates show that
returns average 53% per year in the “complier” businesses that respond to the re-
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lief. These estimates point to sizeable efficiency costs of financial constraints in
small firms, as the annual marginal profitability is more than six times the average
scheme interest rates (7.8%) and more than nine times the average UK loan rates
(5.8%) for small businesses. They are however comparable to the return to capital
estimates for constrained businesses in developing economies (de Mel et al., 2008;
Banerjee and Duflo, 2014; Udry and Anagol, 2006).
Our results are of interest along several dimensions. First, we contribute to
the extensive literature on the real effects of financial constraints (e.g., Kaplan and
Zingales (1997); Blanchard et al. (1994); Lamont (1997); Rauh (2006)), by showing
that these constraints can lead small firms to make inefficient employment decisions.
Moreover, we provide novel empirical evidence that financial constraints can be more
binding for employment than collaterizable assets (e.g., Almeida et al. (2011) ). The
results are especially consistent with theoretical and empirical work suggesting that
firms face collateral constraints (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1987; Besanko and Thakor, 1987;
Whited, 1992; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Hennessy et al., 2005; Liberti and Sturgess,
2014). Relative to the parallel literature on the collateral channel that shows how
shocks to real estate assets have investment and employment effects, we focus on a
set of firms that are not included in these empirical exercises by design—i.e., the
majority of small businesses that do not own real estate and are not owned by real
estate owners.3
Second, we contribute to the finance and labor literature by providing compelling
evidence of firms’ intrinsic need to finance labor, as evidenced by the robust employ-
ment reactions and the simultaneous imperceptible investment adjustments to the
CGS (cf., Bakke and Whited (2012)). Previous studies have looked for this evidence
by measuring employment sensitivities to financial shocks (e.g., Chodorow-Reich
(2013); Burcu et al. (2015); Benmelech et al. (2019)).4 However, the link between
these sensitivities and firms’ intrinsic need to finance labor is not straightforward,
as these sensitivities may be driven instead by the mechanical employment adjust-
3Some of the papers in the collateral channel literature include: Chaney et al. (2012); Schmalz
et al. (2017); Jensen et al. (2014); Corradin and Popov (2015); Adelino et al. (2015); Kerr et al.
(2015); and Bahaj et al. (2018).
4Several papers provide evidence that financing frictions affect labor during non-recessionary
periods: Agrawal and Matsa (2013); Cantor (1990); Sharpe (1994); Matsa (2010); Bakke and
Whited (2012); Efraim Benmelech (2012); and Michaels et al. (2018). Other papers in the literature
include Almeida et al. (2011) and Pica and Pagano (2014).
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ments that would follow capital investment reactions to external finance because
of the labor-capital complementarities in the production process (e.g., Benmelech
et al. (2015)). Theoretically, the availability of external finance can directly affect
employment decisions for a number of reasons; for example, if a mismatch between
payments to labor and the ultimate generation of cash flow exists (see, for example,
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993)), or if labor market frictions make it costly for firms
to adjust their labor force (e.g., Oi (1962); Sharpe (1994); Michaels et al. (2018)).
These theories are not mutually exclusive, and we find suggestive support for both
in our data. The results hold for both firms with large and small mismatches be-
tween the payment of inputs and the ultimate generation of cash flow as measured
by accounts receivables over revenues pre-crisis. The point estimates are also similar
(although not statistically significant given statistical powers issues) in the subsam-
ple of manufacturing firms where labor typically needs to be financed throughout
the production process (in contrast to, say, service industries; cf., Benmelech et al.
(2015)).
We also contribute to the literature on the employment effects of the Great
Recession.5 An important challenge in this literature has been to distinguish the
effects of banking sector disruptions on small firm employment, given data limita-
tions and other concomitant factors during the crisis such as demand effects (see,
US: Mian and Sufi (2010); UK: Bunn and Rostom (2015)).6 Under plausible identi-
fication assumptions, our results estimate the causal impacts of financial constraints
on the employment decisions of representative small firms during the crisis, hold-
ing constant firms’ investment opportunities and cost of capital. Previous studies
have looked instead for larger sensitivities of employment among firms that were
more likely to be financially constrained according to observable firm characteristic-
s, such as firm leverage in public US firms (Giroud and Mueller, 2016) and “lenders’
health” for US firms with syndicated loans (Chodorow-Reich, 2013). However, the
employment sensitivities in these studies are hard to generalize—e.g., public firms,
and particularly firms with syndicated loans, could substitute bank debt with bonds
5The literature has focused on the role of household balance sheets (Sufi et al., 2013; Mian
and Sufi, 2014), lenders’ balance sheets (Chodorow-Reich, 2013), and borrowers’ balance sheets
(Giroud and Mueller, 2016; Gilchrist et al., 2017).
6See Mian and Sufi (2018) and the papers cited there. The focus on small firms in this literature
is motivated by the fact that, in contrast to other recessions, the Great Recession was characterized
by declines in employment that were disproportionately concentrated among small firms.
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during the crisis, whereas the majority of small firms have no access to public debt
(Adrian et al., 2013; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Chodorow-Reich, 2013). The
relationship between such sensitivities and financial constraints is also not straight-
forward, as variables measuring firms’ (or banks’) financial health may also correlate
with firms’ investment opportunities (cf., Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Alti (2003);
Moyen (2004)).
Finally, our work also relates to the literature exploiting policy interventions to
explore the prevalence of financial constraints (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo (2014); Bach
(2013); Paravisini (2008); Zia (2008)). We contribute by focusing on a recessionary
period, and on an indirect policy, which is important because indirect policies are
much more popular policy tools than direct lending programs (c.f., OECD (2018)).
Our analysis contributes to the specific policy literature exploring CGSs in other
settings, which has produced mixed results on these programs’ effect on employment
and efficiency (e.g., France: Lelarge et al. (2010); Italy: De Blasio et al. (2015); US:
Brown and Earle (2017); D’Acunto et al. (2017); Chile: William and Toro (2018)).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.1, we describe the data
in detail. In Section 2.2, we characterize the institutional setting of the UK CGS.
We explain the empirical strategy in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the results.
In Section 2.5, we summarize a battery of robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes
the paper.
2.1 Data
In this section, we summarize our data and variable construction. The data source
used in this study is the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. FAME
is provided by Bureau Van Dijk (BVD) and contains financial information for in-
corporated companies in the United Kingdom that was originally extracted from
Companies House (CH), the admistrative business register in the UK (see Brav
(2009) and Michaely and Roberts (2012); Gonza´lez-Uribe and Paravisini (2019)).
Our original extract from FAME encompasses a 7-year period from 2005 to 2011.
We exclude firm-year observations with missing or negative values of total assets and
restrict the sample to firms in eligible sectors that have more than 50 employees and
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total assets above £3.26M in 2008 (one year prior to the EFG launch). Smaller
firms with fewer employees and smaller asset sizes can file abbreviated accounts
that exclude information on revenues, our sorting variable in the empirical strategy,
as we explain in detail below.
There is no survivorship bias in our sample, as FAME reports historical infor-
mation for up to 10 years, even if a firm stops reporting financial data. To mitigate
the potential impact of outliers, we winsorize variables at the most extreme 2% in
both tails of the distribution.
The filings have detailed and audited information for a number of financial vari-
ables.7 We list the main regression variables we use here and present a detailed
discussion of their construction.
We measure year-to-year changes in four broad types of capital sources: ∆external
debt, ∆inside debt, ∆trade credit and ∆issued equity. External debt refers to bank
loans, overdrafts, and other long- or short-term loans, and includes guaranteed loan-
s. Inside debt includes short- and long-term group and director loans, where group
loans correspond to loans from parent companies, loans from subsidiaries, or loans
from non-director owners. Trade credit corresponds to loans from suppliers. Final-
ly, issued equity corresponds to the sum of the called-up share capital and share
premium account (see Gonza´lez-Uribe and Paravisini (2019)). We also report firms’
∆total equity, which corresponds to the FAME account shareholders’ funds, and
equals the sum of issued capital, share premium account, and retained earnings over
time.
The filings do not distinguish between government guaranteed loans and other
sources of external loans.8 Hence, we use changes in external debt to trace the usage
of guaranteed debt. While this measure may introduce some bias, the direction of
this bias is not clear. Changes in external debt will underestimate the real usage of
CGS debt if the guaranteed loans are used to replace other external debt sources.
However, the CGS usage can also be overestimated if guaranteed loans help compa-
nies attract alternative external debt sources (e.g., William and Toro (2018)).9 The
7By law, financial filings are audited for firms with revenues above £1M. The financial informa-
tion in the effective analysis sample is audited by design, as all analysis firms meet this auditing
revenue threshold (see Section 3.3).
8In addition, reporting on account components is sparserfor example, we have several missing
observations for long-term debt (see Table 2.1). While they cannot be fully ruled.
9While they cannot be fully ruled out, there is little support for side effects in survey evidence
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filings do not include information on loans’ interest or default rates either. Hence,
similar to other papers in the literature (e.g., Lelarge et al. (2010)), we use the sur-
vival probability of companies—which we can track in the dataas the main measure
of default.
We measure the year-to-year in employees: ∆number of employees. Data on
employee wages is not available in FAME, and data on managerial compensation is
not well populated for small firms. We measure capital investment with the year-
to-year changes in fixed assets: ∆fixed assets. However, we also measure investment
more broadly with year-to-year changes in total assets, as in practice firms need not
buy fixed assets when they may make capital investments, and many small firms are
in low-tangibility industries (e.g., services; see Section 2.4.1). By keeping track of
changes in total assets, we thus keep count of investments in working capital, such as
cash for operations. We also keep track of changes in cash and accounts receivables
(cf., Bakke and Whited (2012)). We note that FAME does not have information on
research and development expenses.
We measure year-to-year changes in revenue, cost of sales, and profits: ∆revenue,
∆cost of sales and ∆profits, respectively. We focus on gross measures of profits in
order to measure profitability impacts stemming from production rather than from
other non-operational sources such as lower financial costs.
Finally, we present our main results using logarithmic transformations of our
outcome variables (e.g., ∆ln(external debt + 1)) in order to mitigate the potential
impact of outliers (which we show below can significantly affect results: see Section
2.4.2). However, we also present results using the untransformed variables in order
to best interpret the magnitudes of results.
2.2 Institutional Context: UK SMEs and the En-
terprise Finance Guarantee
The Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) is the largest UK government program
aimed at alleviating potential financial constraints faced by small firms.10 The EFG
(IFF, 2016; London Economics, 2017; BIS, 2013)
10EFG is managed by the British Business Financial Services, a wholly owned subsidiary of
British Business Bank that remains on the balance sheet of the Department for Business, Innova-
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is a CGS introduced in 2009 as a replacement of the Small Firms Loan Guarantee
created in 1981. Its launch was part of a wider trend worldwide in the expansion
of CGSs as countercyclical policy tools during the aftermath of the financial crisis
(see Gozzi and Schmukler (2016)). Between 2009 and 2014, over £2B worth of
loans were guaranteed by the EFG, peaking at £536M in 2009 after the onset of the
financial crisis (BBB, 2017a). The EFG covers a small part of the financial system;
EFG loans approved between January and March of 2018 represented 0.4% of the
loan volume to small- and medium-sized enterprises during the same period.11
The EFG provides lenders with a government-backed guarantee for 75% of the
value of each individual loan given out through the scheme (i.e., the EFG repays
75% of the outstanding balance in case of default).12 In contrast to the SBA pro-
gram in the US, EFG lenders have full decision-making control. They perform all
the credit screening and monitoring functions and decide upon all commercial mat-
ters, including type of facility (e.g., new loans, conversion of overdrafts into loans),
interest rates, and other fees.13 In case of default, lenders follow standard commer-
cial recovery functions before they make a claim against the government guarantee,
including calling upon any personal guarantees.14
The EFG has three additional unique features designed to curtail potential risk-
taking incentives for banks and borrowers. First, individual loan guarantees are
subject to a cap on the total exposure across a lender’s annual portfolio of EFG-
backed lending, which means that banks are exposed to all of the remaining bad
debts after this limit.15 Second, borrowers are required to pay a 2% annual premium
over the costs and fees charged by the lender.16 The premium is collected quarterly
tion, and Skills.
11The value of new EFG loans issued in the first trimester of 2018 was £57.3 M. The value of new
loans to small (medium) companies in the UK during the same period was £4,875M (£11,419M).
Source: BBB (2017b).
12Currently, there are over 40 participating lenders. For more details on the application process
and the list of lenders see: BBB (2014).
13Term limits are also imposed: between 3 months and 10 years for term lending and between 3
months and 3 years for overdrafts.
14The extent of any security or guarantee taken is a commercial matter for the lender, but any
security taken applies to the debt as a whole and may not be attributed solely or preferentially to
cover the 25% of the EFG loan not covered by the government guarantee.
15The cap was originally set at 9.75% but was revised in 2012 to 15% per lender.
16The percentage and the way fees are applied vary among CGSs worldwide. There are schemes
where a registration fee for processing the application is required. In Europe, as well as in devel-
oping countries, the fee is typically about 1 percent of the loan amount. Others schemes usually
impose an annual or per-loan fee that ranges from 1 to 2 percent. The premium ranges between
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in advance throughout the life of the loan, and is assessed based on the loan’s
outstanding capital balance. The premium is unlikely to screen out high-quality
borrowers, as it is low relative to the cost of unsecured loans. For example, the
premium in a £200,000 loan increases the average cost to 8.5% (from a gross cost
of 6.5% including fees). However, this cost is one order of magnitude smaller than
that of an unsecured loan (the outside option for the scheme’s target of eligible
companies with no collateral) for the same amount, which fluctuates between 22.8%
(subject to revenue conditions) and 49% (subject to no restrictions) outside of the
scheme.17 Third, and in contrast to other CGSs (e.g., France) banks are allowed to
take additional personal guarantees. The only exception from normal commercial
practice is that lenders are prohibited from taking a charge (collateral pledge) over a
principal private residence of a borrower or guarantor as security for an EFG facility.
Eligible borrowers in 2009 consisted of small firms operating in the UK that
had revenues of no more than £25M and operated in a business sector that was
eligible for the EFG.18 Eligible businesses must use the funds for an eligible pur-
pose (most purposes are eligible and the most significant exclusion is the financing
of specific export orders).19 Almost all sectors are eligible, and where exclusions
apply they arise from EU State Aid rules. Sectors where partial or full restrictions
exist include agriculture (including horticulture); banking, finance, and associated
services; membership organizations (including professional, religious, and political)
and trade unions; coal; education; fisheries, and aquaculture; insurance and associat-
ed services; public administration; national defense and compulsory social security;
and transport.
The EFG is by no means unique to the UK. CGSs are the most widespread
instrument to support SME access to finance (OECD, 2018), and cover sizeable
volumes of credit (e.g., 5.7% in Japan, 0.4% in France, 0.1% in the US; see OECD
(2018)). While most schemes have not been rigorously evaluated, the common
folklore among policy-makers is that these schemes are the most effective tool for
increasing small firms’ access to finance (Beck et al., 2008; OECD, 2018).
50 and 150 basis points in France, ranges between 0% and 3.75% in the US, and is between 1 to 2
percent depending on the borrower’s default history in Chile.
17See, for example, https://www.money.co.uk/business-loans.htm
18In 2012, eligibility was further extended to businesses with revenues of no more than £41M.
19Alternative forms of assistance for exports are provided by UK Export Finance.
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Eligible businesses (as measured by the revenue threshold, location, and business
sector of the firm) at the launch of the program in 2009 roughly corresponded to 60%
of UK firms during the 2004-2012 period. By June 2017, more than 28,000 loans
had been drawn down under the EFG, to a value of over £3B (see Figure A2.1 in
the Appendix). For the average EFG-backed loan in 2009, the size was £100K, the
interest rate was 5.8%, the fee as a percentage of loan value was 2%, and the loan
term was 76 months (See Figure A2.1 in the Appendix). The total cost of defaults
for 2011-2012 EFG borrowers was £6.5M by 2014, which corresponds to less than
1% of the total value of the loans (£965M).20
2.3 Empirical Strategy
We exploit exogenous firm-level requirements for accessing the EFG to dissect the
implications of financial constraints in small firms. We validate the approach by
using firms that are ineligible for the EFG due to their industry to run placebo tests.
In this section, we describe the analysis sample and the empirical methodology. The
results are presented in Section 3.4.
2.3.1 Sample
We classify firms into two groups, eligible and non-eligible, according to their rev-
enues reported in 2008 (below or above £25M, respectively). For the classification,
we use the value of revenues the year before the launch of the EFG to minimize
concerns of firms manipulating their revenues to become eligible (we examine below
the extent to which such manipulation occurs). We restrict the analysis sample to
firms that report revenues in 2008 ranging between £12M and £38M to ensure that
we are comparing eligible and non-eligible firms of similar size (a £13M bandwidth
around the revenue-based eligibility threshold; we verify the results are robust to
alternate sample definitions in Section 2.5.2). We also exclude firms in sectors that
are not eligible for the EFG (see Section 2.2 for more details), as well as those with





make sure that firms report detailed financial statements the year pre-launch (see
Section 2.1). There are 5,044 eligible firms (38,341 firm-year observations) and 2,679
non-eligible firms (20,172 firm-year observations) in our final sample (7,723 firms in
total and 58,513 firm-year observations).
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the main firm-year sample used in
the analysis. The table reports firm level characteristics. The average firm in the
sample has an average of £22.33M in revenue for 2008. The firm’s book value of total
assets, total equity, and total non-equity liabilities amount to £19.31M, £6.31M,
and 13.02M, respectively. The average firm has £6.57M annual profits, and 200
employees. The main source of capital is non-equity liabilities. The mean leverage
ratio—calculated as non-equity liabilities over total assets—is 68%, which compares
to the mean historical ratio for public firms of 60% reported by Graham, Leary, and
Roberts (2015). External debt is an important source of capital, corresponding to
21% of non-equity liabilities and 17% of total assets.
Panel A in Figure 2.1 shows that the industry distribution (at the SIC 2007
2-digit level) is comparable to that of the universe of reporting UK firms in 2008
(those with more than 50 employees in 2008 and total assets above £3.26 M in
2008; see Section 2.2). Relative to the universe of reporting UK firms, the sample
is slightly more concentrated in manufacturing (28.9% vs. 19.3%) and information
and communication (9.2% vs. 8.5%), and slightly less concentrated in wholesale and
retail trade (15.7% vs. 18.0%), construction (9.4% vs. 10.3%), and administrative
activities (9.7% vs. 12.6%).21
2.3.2 Methodology
We compare external debt issuances and trends in investment, revenue, and prof-
itability across eligible and non-eligible firms by estimating the following type of
21Relative to prior work on CGS, our sample is more concentrated in the manufacturing sector
and is composed of larger firms. For example, the sample of US companies used by Brown and
Earle (2017) in their study of SBA is concentrated in the services sector (circa 40%) and composed
of companies that have fewer than 20 employees on average. By design, the sample of Lelarge et al.
(2010) is also composed of smaller firms (i.e., 1.82 employees), as they focus on start-ups. Finally,
the sample of William and Toro (2018) also includes smaller firms in terms of employees (fewer
than 25 employees on average), reflecting the eligibility restrictions of the CGS in Chile they study,
as well as the average size differences between UK and Chilean firms.
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difference-in-difference equation:
∆kit = αi + γt × Industry FE + βEligiblei × Postt + it (2.1)
where Eligiblei is an indicator variable of eligible firms and Postt is a dummy
equal to one in the years 2009-2011. All regressions use year-to-year changes in firm
outcomes (see Section 2.1) as dependent variables to account for the trends in these
variables. The remaining potential serial correlation is accounted for estimating
errors clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009). We also present results using
year-to-year changes in logs, which has the advantage of dampening the effect of
any remaining outliers after winsorizing. We control for varying macroeconomic
conditions and industry shocks with year dummies for each industry using the 5-digit
2007 SIC classification. Industry controls are important given the heterogeneity in
external debt issuance across industries (see Panel B, Figure 1; cf., Gonza´lez-Uribe
and Paravisini (2019)). Finally, firm fixed effects account for differential firm-specific
trends in all variables.
The coefficient of interest in 2.1 is β, which measures the average change in the
dependent variable (∆kit) after the EFG launch for eligible firms, relative to firms
that did not qualify for the credit guarantee scheme in 2008 because their revenues
were £25M or above. A positive β would imply that the average of the dependent
variable increased for eligible firms after the EFG launch.
This difference-in-difference methodology provides an Intent-to-Treat (ITT) es-
timate of the effect of the CGS on corporate outcomes (cf., Angrist and Pischke
(2008)), which has a casual interpretation as long as two assumptions are satis-
fied. First, that firms did not manipulate their EFG eligibility status during the
program’s launch in 2008. Second, that, absent the credit guarantee scheme, the
average outcomes of eligible and non-eligible firms would have evolved in parallel.
Three facts suggest that the first assumption is likely satisfied.
First, firms have limited scope for eligibility manipulation. In our analysis, eligi-
bility is measured against the value of revenues one year before the program launch,
which mitigates manipulation concerns. In addition, while there was an active dis-
cussion about the launch of the program prior to 2008, there was uncertainty about
its final approval, and the exact level of the qualifying threshold was not known by
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the public beforehand.
Second, the EFG eligibility threshold was difficult to predict. Small firms have
not been uniquely defined across government programs or over time in the UK. For
the purpose of Research and Development Tax Relief, the tax authority in the UK
(HMRC) defines a small firm as a business with no more than 500 employees and an
annual turnover not exceeding £100M. For the purposes of collecting statistics, the
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) defines small firms
as companies with fewer than 250 employees. For accounting purposes, CH defined
a small firm in 2008 as a company with revenues of no more than £29.5M, total
assets of no more than £12.9M, and no more than 250 employees. For the purpose
of government procurement contracts, the UK government uses the European Com-
mission’s definition of a small firm (EU recommendation 2003/361), which defines
it as an entity engaged in economic activity that employs fewer than 250 people,
and has either turnover revenue below e50M or total assets below e43M.
Third, the distribution of revenues in 2008 appears continuous at the eligibility
threshold of £25M as shown in Figure 2.2. The McCrary test gives a discontinuity
estimate (log difference in density height at the eligibility threshold) of -0.05 with
a standard error of 0.09, which is insignificantly different from zero. In Section
2.5.1 on robustness, we present further evidence in support of the first and second
assumptions.
Other potential methodological concerns include bandwidth choice and spurious
trends. In Section 3.5, we discuss these issues in more detail and show suggestive
evidence from several robustness checks against their empirical relevance.
2.4 Results
Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 summarize results from estimating different versions of
equation 2.1. Panels C and D in Table 2, and Panel B in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present
results after collapsing the data to two observations per firm (one before and one
after the EFG launch) in order to mitigate further any inconsistency in standard
errors from potential serial correlation in outcomes (cf., Bertrand et al. (2004)).
Table 2.5 presents results from estimating a more flexible version of equation 2.1,
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where we include a full set of interactions between year dummies and the variable
Eligiblei.
2.4.1 External debt
Table 2.2 shows that the EFG launch had economically significant effects on external
debt issuance. After the launch and relative to non-eligible firms, eligible firms in-
creased their average external debt issuance by £502,560 (Panel A, Column 1). This
estimate corresponds to a 280% increase over the unconditional issuance (179,669;
see Panel A, Column 1), and to a 32% increase over non-eligible firms (Panel B,
Column 1). The external debt response was quick and persisted for one additional
year after the launch (see Table 2.5, Panel B, Column 1). Results point to increases
in both long- (Column 2) and short-term (Column 3) debt. However, the dataset
has some missing information on long-term debt (see Section 2.2 and Table 2.1),
and short-term debt results are less robust (see Table 2.2, Panel D, Column 3).
The increase in external debt issuance that we estimate is roughly four times
the average loan size reported in official EFG statistics for the universe of EFG bor-
rowers (see BBB (2016)). However, it is not immediately clear how to interpret the
differences in magnitudes between the estimate and the average loan size for a num-
ber of reasons. First, our sample firms are larger than most EFG users by design.22
Because smaller EFG users tend to borrow smaller amounts, our estimates will thus
tend to be larger than the average loan size of the scheme (cf., London Economic-
s, 2017). Second, EFG loans can “crowd-in” other sources of external debt. For
example, EFG loans can help companies build credit records and new banking rela-
tionships, thus potentially amplifying the direct financing effect of the program (cf.,
William and Toro (2018)). Third, the difference-in-difference methodology provides
an ITT estimate, which will differ from the Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT)—i.e.,
the amount borrowed through the scheme by “EFG-takers”—because eligible firms
can decline to participate.
Because UK firms only report consolidated external debt statements to CH (see
Section 2.1), we cannot assess the practical relevance of these explanations em-
22For identification purposes we restrict attention to eligible firms close in size to the £25M
eligibility threshold; see Section 2.1.
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pirically. By the same token, we cannot measure take-up rates and adjust ITT
estimates to obtain TOT estimates (cf.,Angrist and Pischke (2008)). Under our i-
dentification assumptions, however, the economically significant increase in external
debt reported in Table 2.2 allows us to rule out the possibility that EFG loans are
used exclusively to replace or crowd out non-EFG external loans (in that case the
estimate on external debt issuance would be non-positive). We explore potential
substitution/complementarity between EFG loans and other capital sources (differ-
ent from external debt) in the remaining columns of Table 2.2. This exercise is
made possible by the detailed UK data: firms distinguish between different funding
sources, although they do not detail the components of each source. Across both
panels, we find no evidence suggestive of replacement or amplification effects. There
are no robust, significant changes in internal debt (Column 4), trade credit (Column
5), or issued equity (Columns 6).
2.4.2 Employment and investment
Table 2.3 shows that the EFG elicited significant relative increases in employment.
Column 2 in Panel A shows that the number of employees increased by an average of
5.35, an increase that is roughly 1.7% larger than the increase for non-eligible firms
(Column 4, Panel A, Table 2.3). This relative increase is economically significant, as
it corresponds to a 78% increase in employment over the unconditional mean (3; see
Column 2, Panel A, Table 2.3). The employment response to the EFG was quick.
Figure 2.5 shows that eligible firms fired relatively fewer employees during 2009
and started rehiring during 2011, whereas non-eligible businesses had no significant
increases in employment that year. The significant employment effects are consistent
with results found in policy evaluations of the EFG using data from EFG borrowers
and matched samples of control firms (e.g., London Economics, 2017).23
In contrast to the robust employment adjustments, Table 2.3 shows no com-
pelling evidence of significant adjustment in capital investments to the EFG. While
a positive effect on fixed-assets investment is shown in Column 1, Column 3 shows
23A policy report in 2013 found no differences in self-reported employment for 2009 borrowers
and matched companies. However, it is hard to make tight inferences from this evidence: 2009
borrowers and matched companies can have different investment opportunities, and well-known
issues exist with survey-based evidence (e.g., reporting biases). For more details on issues with
this policy report see: London Economics (2017).
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that the increase is likely driven by outliers, as in the specification with logs the es-
timate is very close to zero (0.001; see Column 3 in Panel A) and is not statistically
significant. Total and current assets show similar imperceptible adjustments. We
find only weak evidence of any relative adjustments in these variables for eligible
firms following the EFG launch (see Table A2.2 in the Appendix). Further, Figure
2.5 shows no evidence of different patterns in investment across eligible and non-
eligible businesses after the EFG launch. Both types of firms saw similar decreases
in fixed assets during 2009 and no significant evidence of subsequent recovery during
the final years of the sample (i.e., no positive changes in investment). In unreported
analysis, we also looked at evidence of changes in two specific working capital ac-
counts, cash and accounts receivables, given prior work on how managers manage
accounts receivables to respond to cash shortfalls (cf., Bakke and Whited (2012)).
However, we find no evidence of significant changes in either type of account. Over-
all, the results point to robust and large adjustments on employment following the
EFG launch, and no robust pattern for investments in fixed assets (or total assets
more generally).
2.4.3 Interpretation of results
Our preferred interpretation of these results is that the average small firm was fi-
nancially constrained during the crisis, and that its main margin of adjustment was
employment rather than fixed assets. One plausible explanation for why employment
decisions appear more sensitive than investment to financial constraints regards the
differences in the degree of “collateral pledgeability value” between plants, property,
and equipment, on the one hand, and employment, on the other (cf., Benmelech and
Bergman (2009)). Simply put, fixed assets have intrinsic collateral value whereas
employees do not. Note that the relative insensitivity of investment is not “mechan-
ical” because the EFG imposes no restrictions on the uses of funds, has products
dedicated to fixed-asset investments, and has a maximum loan amount (£1M) that
both comfortably exceeds the unconditional average investment in fixed assets for
sample firms (£0.3M) and offsets the average disinvestment in 2009 (£0.9M). While
it cannot fully be ruled out, the alternative explanation that irreversible capital in-
vestments were avoided by risk-averse managers during the crisis, is less persuasive
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in the later years of the sample that span the start of the recovery.
The combined robust effects on employment and the weak evidence on invest-
ment, add to previous work that finds similar asymmetries in firms’ reactions to
financial shocks (cf., Bakke and Whited (2012)). These results also constitute novel
direct evidence of small firms’ dependence on external finance to fund labor. Pri-
or work looking for this evidence estimates employment sensitivities to financial
shocks (e.g., Chodorow-Reich (2013); Burcu et al. (2015); Benmelech et al. (2019)).
However, linking these sensitivities to firms’ intrinsic need to finance labor is not
straightforward as the former may instead reflect mechanical labor changes following
capital adjustments, given the complementarity of labor and capital in production
(cf., e.g.,Benmelech et al. (2015)).
Two broad types of theories on the interaction between finance and labor exist:
those that assume a mismatch between input payments and the ultimate generation
of cash flow (e.g., Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993)) and those that instead assume
labor market frictions that make it costly to fire, hire, or replace workers (e.g.,
Oi (1962); Sharpe (1994); Michaels et al. (2018). These theories are not mutually
exclusive, and we find suggestive support for both in our data. In support of the
theories on cash flow mismatches, we show in Panel E of Table 2.6 that the point
estimates are similar (although not statistically significant given reduced statistical
power) when we restrict the sample to manufacturing firms where labor typically
needs to be financed throughout the production process in contrast to, say, service
industries (cf, Benmelech et al. (2015)). In support of labor market frictions theories,
we show in Panel C of Table 2.6 that the results are not entirely driven by firms
with large mismatches between the payment of inputs and the ultimate generation of
cash flow (as measured by accounts receivables over revenues before the crisis). Also
in support of these theories are the relatively fewer lay-offs in eligible firms during
2009, which could be consistent with the practice of “labor hoarding” whereby firms
optimally retain workers that may be unnecessary to meet shot-term demand given
their high replacement costs (Oi, 1962; Giroud and Mueller, 2016). The increase
in long-term debt shown in Table 2.2 is also consistent with labor market frictions
theories, as presumably firms will need longer repayment schedules to repay fixed
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costs than to address temporal mismatches.24
Finally, we note that we remain agnostic about the main drivers behind the finan-
cial constraints during the crisis. While the tightening of lending standards by banks
during the Great Recession is well-documented (see Adrian et al. (2013); Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010)), the concomitant decreases in the values of pre-existing re-
deployable assets could also make latent collateral constraints more binding. While
the latter cannot be fully ruled out, complementary results provide suggestive ev-
idence for the former explanation. In particular, we find that results do not vary
with the tangibility of firms’ pre-crisis assets (Panel A, Table 2.6), which we use as
a proxy for the value of firms’ redeployable assets before the Great Recession.
2.4.4 Alternative explanations
In this section, we discuss alternative interpretations of our findings. While these
alternative interpretations cannot be fully ruled out (e.g., as econometricians we only
have partial information), we present evidence against their empirical relevance.
The main alternative interpretation of our findings is that the CGS did not
relax financial constraints for eligible firms but rather set incentives for firm and
banks to overinvest and pursue negative net present value projects. The CGS could
potentially deteriorate firms’ and banks’ incentives for a number of reasons. For
example, the financial literature has a long history of arguing that pledging assets
as collateral allows banks to attract high-quality firms and discipline managers, and
sets incentives for banks to monitor firms (e.g., Smith and Warner (1979); Stulz
and Johnson (1985); Boot et al. (1991); Rajan and Winton (1995); Park (2000);
Liberti and Sturgess (2014)). In addition, CGS critics contend that these schemes
can distort banks’ incentives to properly screen loan applications and monitor firms
(cf., Lelarge et al. (2010); Kerr et al. (2015); Acs et al. (2016); D’Acunto et al.
(2017)).
A similar alternative interpretation is that employment cuts during the crisis were
24The findings are different from the Gonza´lez-Uribe and Paravisini (2019), who studies angle
investors investment in response to the change of tax relief for two reasons: 1) we look at different
types of firms (Gonza´lez-Uribe and Paravisini (2019) look at micro firms with average size of
£167,902, in our sample, the average SME firm has an asset level of £19M); 2) we analysis
different sample period: Gonza´lez-Uribe and Paravisini (2019) focus on a period around 2012, this
paper looks at pre and post crisis period of 2009).
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corrections for the negative present value projects pursued before the crisis, and that
access to guaranteed loans allowed eligible firms to avoid these efficient but privately
costly corrections. For example, several papers show that the pre-Great Recession
boom period led to market distortions Adelino et al. (2015); Gopinath et al. (2017);
Borio et al. (2016); Charles et al. (2018). Evidence also exists about how layoffs can
be personally costly to managers and/or generate reputational concerns for firms
(Agarwal and Kolev, 2017; Folger and Skarlicki, 1998).
The difficulties of empirically discerning the quality of investment opportunities
are well known, and, like previous papers in the literature, we are unable to fully
ascertain whether firm behaviour is value-maximizing. Nonetheless, we use the
rich and novel dataset for small firms in the UK to provide compelling evidence in
support of our preferred interpretation. The distinguishing prediction between the
interpretations is the net present value (NPV) of the marginal projects. Under the
hypothesis that the CGS relaxed financial constraints, the marginal projects have
a positive NPV, while the opposite is true if the CGS distorted incentives. We use
several measures of accounting-based performance and survival indicators, which
combined provide a proxy of the NPV of firms’ projects. Our approach is made
possible by the rich UK dataset, which includes information on several accounting
variables that are not typically available for the private firms that make up the
majority of our sample, and of small firms more generally (cf., Brown and Earle
(2017)). The accounting measures we use include changes in revenues, gross profits,
and costs of goods sold. Our focus on survival rates follows the standard approach
in other CGS-related work to measure changes in the underlying risk of projects
(e.g., Brown and Earle (2017); Lelarge et al. (2010)). Ideally, we would also look at
default rates. However, as is common in CGS studies, we have no information on
loan performance (see Section 2.2; for an exception, see William and Toro (2018) on
the Chilean CGS).
Three additional results support the hypothesis that the CGS relaxed financial
constraints and provide evidence against the alternative interpretation that firms
and banks incentives deteriorated.
First, Table 2.4 shows that eligible firms performed better than non-eligible firms.
Column 2 shows that gross profits for eligible firms increased by £208,711—a 65%
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increase over the sample mean (Column 2, Panel A). This increase in profits is not
associated with any financial effects (e.g., CGS loans are cheaper than non-CGS
external debt sources), because gross profits are measured based on pre-interest
expense (i.e., revenues minus costs). This increase in profits instead reflects real
increases in sales: average revenues increased by 111% over the unconditional mean
(£997,142 over £910,517; see Column 3 Panel A). This increase in sales is unlikely
to be driven exclusively by potential output price changes (e.g., Gilchrist et al.,
2017), but rather reflects increased production scale. Column 4 shows that the cost
of goods sold increased by 107% over the sample mean (665,426 over 623,737; see
Column 4, Panel A). The performance results are not driven by outliers. Columns
5-7 in Panel A show that results are similar when we consider log transformations
(the point estimate of log profits is large, albeit not statistically significant given
reduced statistical power). We report the results for log profits in Column 5 for the
sake of completeness, but highlight the difficulty in interpreting these results, as by
definition these results can only be estimated for firms with positive profits before
and after 2009, which are likely to be a selected sample.
Second, the results in Table 2.4 show that the survival probability of eligible firms
positively responds to the CGS. Column 1 in the table shows a small but significant
survival increase for eligible firms (0.004; 0.47% over the sample mean). We estimate
the effect of the EFG launch on firms’ survival by running equation (1) using as
dependent variable a dummy equal to one if a firm does not file financial accounts
with CH in a given year, and excluding firm fixed effects from the estimation.25 The
positive result on survival implies that the relative increase in profits and earnings
for eligible firms is unlikely to be a reflection of riskier strategies pursued by these
companies in response to the CGS.
The final result that counters the alternative explanation that the CGS distorted
incentives is the invariance of results in subsamples where moral hazard and adverse
selection problems (as measured pre-CGS) are likely to be more pronounced, such as
in young businesses (cf., Berger and Udell (1998); Oliner and Rudebusch (1992)) and
highly levered firms (cf., Myers (1977)). While the over-investment hypothesis would
predict a stronger reaction from firms where information frictions are potentially
25The results are similar if we refine the survival variable to indicate only firms that stop filing
accounts altogether for the rest of the sample.
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more pronounced, results in Panels B and D of Table 2.6 show that results do
not vary with firms’ leverage pre-CGS or firms’ age. We note that this additional
evidence is mostly suggestive because observable characteristics are endogenous to
firms’ innovation opportunities.
Outside of our estimates, the modest EFG take-up rate reported in official statis-
tics (and hotly debated in the policy arena; e.g., IFF (2016)), provides compelling
evidence against the hypothesis that the employment results reflect the distorted
incentives of agents. A government investigation on the EFG reports that fewer
than 5% of eligible firms issue any loans through the scheme.26 Taken to its logical
conclusion, the hypothesis on distorted incentives predicts instead excessive take-up
(as firms and banks turn to invest in negative NPV projects).
Overall, we argue that the results are most supportive of the hypothesis that
the EFG relaxed financial constraints in small firms during the crisis. This evidence
adds to other studies documenting positive CGS effects on firm outcomes in the US
and Chile (e.g., USA: Brown and Earle (2017); Chile: William and Toro (2018)),
but contrasts with evidence found in other settings, most prominently France. The
contrasting results for France can be traced (at least in part) to variations in pol-
icy design. For example, Lelarge et al. (2010) argue that the CGS in France sets
incentives for borrowers to pursue risky projects by explicitly forbidding lenders
to require additional private guarantees for scheme loans. By contrast, the EFG
explicitly allows lenders to require additional private guarantees (except the bor-
rower’s main residences), which helps curtail borrowers’ risk-taking incentives (see
Section 2.1). This allowance was one of the major innovations in policy design for
EFG when compared to its predecessor, The Small Firms Loan Guarantee (SFLG).
Another innovation in the EFG was the cap on default payments, which was aimed
at curtailing banks’ risk taking. The cap was set at 9.75% of the scheme’s value
per bank, whereas under the SFLG the government covered 75% of the outstanding
balance of all the loans that defaulted. Other factors explaining the difference in
the results between the two settings include the macroeconomic conditions, types
of firms, and regulatory regime surrounding the empirical analysis. Lelarge et al.
(2010) study the mid-1990s, a decade of high economic growth, and focus on new
26The low take-up rate has also been the subject of policy debate (see, for example, IFF (2016)).
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ventures, where information asymmetries and the scope of risk-shifting is likely larg-
er than for older firms (cf., Berger and Udell (1998)). In addition, Davydenko and
Franks (2008) document large differences in creditor rights between France and the
UK, which lead French banks to require more collateral than UK banks, and also
to rely more on collateral forms that minimize the statutory dilution of their claims
in bankruptcy.
2.4.5 Estimating the costs of collateral constraints
In this section, we estimate the implied employment and profit sensitivities to the
external debt issuance induced by the CGS using an instrumental variables (IV)
strategy. Our main identification assumption is the exclusion restriction that the
CGS affected firms’ outcomes only by increasing external financing and not through
any other mechanism.
There are strong reasons to believe that the exclusion restriction holds in our
empirical setting, even though we cannot link employment changes specifically to
EFG borrowers (recall that firms do not distinguish between EFG loans and other
types of debt in their reports to CH; see Sections 2.2 and 2.4.1). For example, the
small size of the scheme relative to the financial system implies that its launch is
unlikely to have changed the aggregate cost of capital in the market (and thus non-
borrowers’ cost of finance). In addition, the pressing macroeconomic conditions at
the time makes it unlikely that firms cut their firing in anticipation of borrowing
through the EFG in the future. Finally, we show in the Appendix that the relative
differences between the outcomes of eligible and non-eligible firms are not signifi-
cant if we restrict the data to observations with negative changes in external debt
(see Table A2.4, Panel A). However, we note that the identification assumption is
fundamentally untestable, and our sensitivity estimates should be interpreted with
this caveat in mind.
To estimate the sensitivities of firm outcomes to external financing, we use the
system of equations comprised of equation 2.1 using ∆External Debtit (and logs)
as dependent variable, and the following equation:
∆kit = αi + γt × Industry FE + β∆External Debtit + it (2.2)
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where we instrument ∆External Debtit using. Eligiblei×Postt, and all variables
are as defined in Section 3.3. The identification assumption is precisely that that
EFG access affects firm outcomes only by increasing external financing and not
through any other channel. Table 2.6 summarizes our results. By definition, the IV
estimates are Local Average Treatment Effects (LATEs) for complier firms, or firms
that are induced to issue external debt by the instrumental variable.
The IV estimates are shown in Table 2.7, together with the corresponding Ordi-
nary Least Squares (OLS) and first stage estimates in both levels and logs. We note
that the first stage varies across columns, as the number of observations varies across
dependent variables (see Table 2.1. The point estimates of the IV specification in
levels imply that a £100,000 increase in external debt leads to an additional 1.3
employees (Panel B, Column 1). The results from the specification in logs indicates
that the implied elasticity of employment to external borrowing is 0.053 (Panel A,
Column 2).
In contrast to the robust results for employment, the IV results in Table 2.7 for
fixed assets are significant for changes in levels (Panel B), but not for logs (Panel
A). Further, the point estimate in Column 4 of Panel A is very small (0.0012),
suggesting that the significant point estimate in Panel B is driven by outliers, just
as with the difference-in-differences estimates in Table 2.3.
A comparison between columns 1 and 2 in both panels of Table 2.7 shows that
the OLS estimates are an order of magnitude smaller that the IV estimates. The
higher magnitudes for the IV estimates can be explained by a number of factors,
but a plausible explanation is that complier firms that issue debt in response to
the scheme have particularly large sensitivities of employment to external finance
relative to the population of small companies. In support of this interpretation is
the low-take up rate of the scheme (IFF, 2016). Note that the higher IV magnitudes
are instead unlikely to be explained by a weak instrumental variables problem, as
indicated by the healthy first-stage F-statistics reported in the last rows of Panels
A and B.
The sensitivity of 1.3 additional employees for an increase in £100,000 sug-
gests that the types of workers retained during the crisis by EFG borrowers were
“high-skill” employees (the average annual salary in UK is £28,677). This type
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of employees can be very costly to hire and retain for constrained firms, especial-
ly during recessions. However, the counterargument would highlight the potential
high returns associated to retaining/rehiring this type of employees: optimal wages
should reflect employee’s value added to the firm. Said differently, we would expect
firms to incur in costly labor hoarding only if the expected returns of doing so are
large enough to compensate such costs. Consistent with this notion, we estimate
large returns to the external finance induced by the CGS, measured as additional
gross profits per unit of external debt. This measure of returns is common in the
development literature (see de Mel et al. (2008)), although it is clear that it con-
stitutes only a rough approximation of true capital returns—i.e., all risk-adjusted,
discounted, expected future cash flows from firms’ investments are not captured.
Note that any changes in profits stemming from changes in financing costs are not
included in our calculation; gross profits are calculated before any adjustment of
interest payments.
The IV estimates for marginal profitability suggest that returns to capital av-
erage 53% per year in the “complier” businesses that respond to the relief. The
estimates are similar when we use logs—point estimate is large, albeit not statisti-
cally significant given reduced statistical power. Again we report the results for log
profits for the sake of completeness, but highlight the aforementioned difficulty in
interpreting these results (see Section 2.4.4). Overall, these estimates point to size-
able efficiency costs of financial constraints in small firms, as the annual marginal
profitability is more than six times the average scheme interest rates (7.8%) and
more than nine times the average UK loan rates (5.8%) for small businesses.
Our estimates of capital returns are, however, within the range of prior return to
capital estimates in the economics literature, which are mostly based on microen-
terprises in developing countries. de Mel et al. (2008) find annual average returns
to capital of 55-65% for microenterprises in Sri Lanka that were randomly allocated
small (200 USD) capital grants. Using a similar experiment than the one in Sri Lan-
ka, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) find returns to capital in the range of 250-360%
per year among microenterprises in Mexico. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) estimate
that returns to capital average 74-100% per year among large enterprises in India
that are eligible for earmarked credit from Indian banks. Udry and Anagol (2006)
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estimate that annual returns to capital in Ghana average 50%-250% among small
scale agricultural producers and 60% among purchasers of used auto parts in Accra.
Our estimates can be in the lower range of the estimates from prior work for
several reasons. For example, our firms are substantially larger than in most pri-
or work (the average total asset size in our sample is £19M), and McKenzie and
Woodruff (2008) show a negative relation between firm size (as measured by capital
stock) and returns to capital. Other potential explanations include differences in
access to skilled labor, growth opportunities, as well as the degree of financial fric-
tions among others, between the UK companies in our sample and the businesses in
underdeveloped economies.
2.5 Identification Tests and Robustness
In this section, we provide a battery of tests using different controls, sub samples,
and specifications. We divide the tests into two groups: potential identification
issues and potential sample selection concerns.
2.5.1 Identification tests
The main identification concerns in our empirical strategy are: (1) the potential
manipulation of EFG eligibility in 2009, and (2) the violation of the parallel trends
assumption—i.e., that treatment and control firms would have evolved similarly
absent the EFG. We discussed the evidence against the first concern in Section
2.3.2. We now turn to the second concern.
Table 2.5 presents results from the standard test for parallel trends, where we
compare trends in outcomes across treatment and control firms during the pre-
treatment period (see also Table A2.3 in the Appendix). The table presents the
results found when estimating a more flexible version of equation 2.1, where we
include a full set of interactions between year dummies and the variable Eligiblei.
The table shows no significant differences across treatment and control groups before
2009 (with the exception of marginally significant differences in costs and profits in
the year 2005).
We use complementary placebo and falsification exercises to provide further ev-
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idence that our estimates are unlikely to be spuriously driven by differential trends
across firms of different revenue size. First, we estimate 200 placebo regressions
using randomly selected (fake) eligibility thresholds between £30M and £37M (so
as not to include any data from the actual analysis). We define treatment and con-
trol firms as we do in the main analysis but use the placebo threshold instead of
the actual one. Specifically, we restrict the sample to firms whose 2008 revenues fit
within a £13M window on either side of the placebo threshold and classify firms into
eligible and non-eligible if their revenues in 2009 are below or above this threshold,
respectively. A summary of the results is presented in Table 2.8. As expected with
randomly picked thresholds, we cannot reject the null of no effect in more than 95%
of the cases (except for log changes in external debt, where we cannot reject the null
in 92% of the cases).
Second, we run falsification tests using firms in non-eligible industries in our
data. In particular, we replicate the analysis for companies with revenues in 2008
that were close to the £25M threshold but are in industries that do not qualify
for the EFG program (see Section 2.2). Figure 2.3 shows there is no significant
change in firm outcomes across the smaller and larger of these companies in non-
eligible industries (see also Figure A2.2 in the Appendix). In the figure, we present
results using several revenue bandwidths, including the £13M bandwidth of our
main specifications.
2.5.2 Potential sample concerns
The central concern with the main analysis sample is that results may be sample
specific—i.e., they hold only for the £13M bandwidth. To address this concern, in
Figure 2.4 we show that the results are similar in twelve alternative sub-samples
of companies with revenue within a bandwidth of £7.5M to £18.5M, around the
£25M eligibility threshold (see also Figure A2.3 in the Appendix). Figure 2.6 shows
that our estimates of the returns to capital in constrained small firms are not sample
specific, as they are similar in the twelve alternative sub-samples.
A second concern is the potential bias from dynamic misclassification of firms
that were non-eligible in 2008 but decreased their revenues in later years in order
to qualify for the program. As evidence against this concern, in the Appendix we
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show that the results are robust to excluding from the sample all companies that
reported revenues in 2008 between £22.5M and £27.5M—that is, within a £5M
window around the threshold (see Table A2.4, Panel B). Firms that had reported
revenues in 2008 closely above the £25M threshold are more likely to be able to
manipulate assets in order to qualify for the scheme after the EFG launch. This
test also presents evidence against concerns that potential spillovers from eligible to
non-eligible firms drive the results. Concerns about the substitution of funds away
from non-eligible firms and towards small firms are more pronounced the closer that
firms are to the eligibility threshold.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we use the Great Recession as a laboratory to dissect the implication
of financial constraints for small firms. We exploit firm-level eligibility requirements
for a credit guarantee scheme launched in the UK during 2009 as an exogenous
determinant of external finance during the crisis. Using a difference-in-difference
methodology, we show that eligible firms relatively increased their borrowing, em-
ployment, sales, profits, and survival, but disinvested as much as non-eligible busi-
nesses. The low take-up rate of the government guarantee programs has been the
subject of policy debate (see for example, IFF (2016)). Though the analysis in this
paper uses the universe of firms close to the threshold, findings in this paper may
be context specific. Moreover, the results should be carefully interpreted under the
financial crisis time. It is difficult to extrapolate our results beyond SME firms
and non-crisis period. For example, in the non-crisis period, firms may have better
investment opportunities and more available positive NPV projects, thus marginal
adjustment could be different. Our results show compelling evidence that financial
constraints during the crisis prolonged the real effects of negative demand shocks,
chiefly by affecting small firms’ ability to finance employment rather than capital
investments. They provide evidence of small firms’ direct need to finance labor and
provide new insights about how firms adapt to financial constraints. In particular,
they highlight how employment, and more generally intangible assets, can be more
sensitive than investment to financial constraints in small firms, likely because fixed
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assets have collateral value whereas employees do not.
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Figure 2.1: Industry Distribution of UK SMEs
Panel A shows the distribution of firms across industries as determined by their
SIC 2007 2 digit code. Panel B shows the distribution of firms across the top 40
industries as determined by their SIC 2007 5 digit code. The Reporting Firms
sample includes all firms with more than 50 employees in 2008 and total assets
above £3.26M in 2008 (see Section 2.1 for an explanation on the filing requirements
for UK firms of different sizes). The analysis sample includes reporting UK firms
with revenues in 2008 between £12M and £38M (i.e. +/ − £13M window around
the revenue threshold of £25M) that survive at least until 2009.We exclude firms
in sectors that are not eligible to EFG program.
Panel A: Industry Distribution(2-digit SIC 2007)
Activities of households asemployers
Public administration and defence
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Water supply and waste management
Mining and Quarrying
Other service activities
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Human health and social work
Real estate activities
Transportation and storage
Accommodation and food service activities
Information and communication
Construction
Administrative and support service
Professional, scientific and technical activities
Wholesale and retail trade
Manufacturing
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
Reporting firms Analysis sample of reporting firms
Panel B: Mean Leverage Ratio
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Firms by Revenue Values in 2008
The figure plots the distribution of revenues in 2008 for the firms in the sample.
The sample includes UK firms with revenues in 2008 between £12M and £38M
(i.e. +/ − £13M window around the revenue threshold of £25M) that survive at
least until 2009, and with more than 50 employees in 2008 and total assets above
£3.26M in 2008—so as to make sure that firms report detailed financial statements
the year pre-launch (see Section 2.1 for an explanation on the filing requirements for
UK firms of different sizes). Results from the McCrary test for discontinuity in the
distribution of firm revenues at the revenue threshold of £25M are summarized in
the x-axis title of the plot. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of
firms is continuous at the £25M threshold: the discontinuity estimate (log difference
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Figure 2.3: Placebo Test with Firms in Non-eligible Industries
The plot presents results from estimating equation 2.1 using different sub-samples
of companies with revenue levels within a bandwidth of £7.5M to £18.5M of £25M
in 2008, but in non-EFG-eligible industries. The dependent variable is specified in
the top of each plot. The solid black line plots the estimated coefficients and the red
dashed line the 90th percent confidence interval. The standard errors are presented
in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm
level. The solid vertical line represents results using our preferred bandwidth of
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Figure 2.4: Robustness checks with different revenue (2008) bandwidths
The plot presents results from estimating equation (1) using different sub-samples
of companies with revenue levels within a bandwidth of £7.5M to £18.5M of £25M
in 2008. The dependent variable is specified in the top of each plot. The solid
black line plots the estimated coefficients and the red dashed line the 90th percent
confidence interval. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The solid vertical
line represents results using our preferred bandwidth of £13M (i.e., an estimation
window of +/ − £13M around the revenue threshold of £25M). There are 2,472
(1,717) and 3,480 (8,204) control (treatment) firms in the windows with £7.5M and
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Figure 2.5: Dynamic Change: Eligible vs Non-eligible Firms
This figure plot the dynamic change of levels for eligible firms (Treatment) and non-
eligible firms (Control) firms. Panel A shows the issuance of external debt and other
sources of finance. Panel B presents the investment, labor and profitability changes.
All estimates are based on regressions with change in levels as outcome variables.
The point estimates are plotted with the 95% confidence intervals. There are 5,044
eligible firms with revenues below the £25M SME threshold in 2008. The control
groups of firms whose eligibility status did not change in 2008 is made up of 2,679
firms with revenues in 2008 above the £25M threshold. All variables are winsorized




























































































































































































































Figure 2.6: Estimation Returns to Capital for Different Revenue (2008) Band-
widths
The plot presents results from estimating the system of equations 2.1-2.2 using
different subsamples of companies with revenue levels within a bandwidth of £7.5M
to £18.5M of £25M in 2008. The dependent variable is changes in gross profits.
The solid black line plots the estimated coefficients and the red dashed line the 90th
percent confidence interval. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The standard errors
are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the firm level. The solid vertical line represents results using our preferred bandwidth
of £13M (i.e., an estimation window of +/−£13M around the revenue threshold of
£25M). There are 2,472 (1,717) and 3,480 (8,204) control (treatment) firms in the
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
The table presents summary statistics for the main variables in the analysis sample.
The sample includes UK firms with revenues in 2008 between £12M and £38M (i.e.
+/-£13M window around the revenue threshold of £25M) that survived until at
least 2009, and with more than 50 employees in 2008 and total assets above £3.26
M in 2008, so as to make sure that firms report detailed financial statements the
year pre-launch (see Section 2.1 for an explanation on the filing requirements for UK
firms of different sizes). We also exclude firms in sectors that are not eligible for the
EFG (see Section 2.1 for more details). There are 5,044 eligible firms with revenues
below the £25M SME threshold in 2008. The control groups of firms whose eligi-
bility status did not change in 2008 is made up of 2,679 firms with revenues in 2008
above the £25M threshold. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 2%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median
Revenue 2008 7,723 22,327,815 7,296,620 21,052,000
Receivables 2008 7,723 2,916,232 2,555,813 2,522,000
Long Term Debt 2008 7,723 0.15 0.47 0.02
Receivables/revenue 2008 7,723 0.13 0.11 0.13
Number of Employees 2008 7,723 208.34 218.91 147
Number of Employees/Total Asset 2008 7,723 0.00 0.00 0.00
Leverage Ratio 2008
7,723 0.68 0.27 0.69
(Total Non-equity Liabilities) /Total Assets
Tangibility 2008 (Fixed Assets/Total Assets) 7,723 0.31 0.25 0.24
Issued Equity 48,516 1,504,981 2,813,451 129,000
Total Equity 58,345 6,308,472 8,398,987 3,425,000
Total Non-equity Liabilities
58,513 13,015,830 17,981,735 6,976,000
(Total Assets–Total Equity)
External Debt 52,864 4,509,596 14,914,647 370,000
Internal Debt 52,839 3,977,377 9,191,606 377,000
Trade debts (Receivables) 52,836 3,076,979 2,820,666 2,519,000
Trade creditors (Operational Liabilities) 55,057 1,889,222 1,987,877 1,360,000
Profits (Revenue – Cost of Sales) 47,233 6,568,658 5,792,620 5,201,000
Revenue 55,294 21,517,343 11,770,288 19,351,000
Cost of Sales 47,252 15,065,214 10,171,767 13,164,000
Survival 58,513 0.86 0.34 1.00
Total Assets 58,513 19,306,189 22,376,226 11,916,000
Fixed Assets 56,784 7,902,125 14,607,939 2,639,500
Current Assets 58,367 10,993,692 11,145,551 7,548,000
Number of Employees 56,289 199.79 229.46 137.00
∆External Debt 50,560 179,769 6,120,164 0.00
∆Internal Debt 50,560 296,836 4,408,833 0.00
∆Total Assets 50,560 1,071,223 7,330,854 533,000
∆Fixed Assets 48,861 331,775 4,271,874 -25,000
∆Current Assets 50,396 726,446 4,928,536 471,000
∆Number of Employees 48,120 2.86 83.45 1.00
∆Operational Liabilities 46,868 77,716 1,153,591 40,000
∆Issued Equity 41,396 68,732 751,682 0.00
∆Profits 39,928 320,726 2,890,538 216,000
∆Revenue 47,154 962,042 7,091,248 882,000









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: EFG and Investment in Labor and Assets
The table presents results from estimating equation 2.1. Eligiblei is a dummy indi-
cating whether the firm had revenue below £25M in year 2008 and Postt is a dummy
equal to one in the years 2009-2011. The dependent variable is specified in the top
of each column. All columns include firm fixed effects and separate year effects for
each 5-digit 2007 SIC industry. The standard errors are presented in parentheses
and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Panel Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ∆Fixed Assets ∆Employees ∆ln(Fixed Assets) ∆ln(Employees)
Eligiblei × Postt 228,814** 5.354*** 0.001 0.017**
(97,065) (1.743) (0.015) (0.008)
Obs. 48,239 47,482 48,239 47,482
R-squared 0.242 0.244 0.211 0.269
Mean Dep. Var. 434,209 3 0.03 0.01
Panel B: Collapsed Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ∆Fixed Assets ∆Employees ∆ln(Fixed Assets) ∆ln(Employees)
Eligiblei × Postt 248,769** 5.988*** 0.007 0.018*
(105,524) (1.944) (0.018) (0.010)
Obs. 14,398 14,448 14,398 14,448
R-squared 0.151 0.168 0.148 0.188
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Table 2.4: EFG and Performance
The table presents results from estimating equation 2.1. Eligiblei is a dummy
indicating whether the firm had revenue below £25M in year 2008 and Postt is a
dummy equal to one in the years 2009-2011. The dependent variable is specified
in the top of each column. All columns include firm fixed effects and separate year
effects for each 5-digit 2007 SIC industry. The standard errors are presented in
parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
Column 10 in Panel A estimates equation 2.1 excluding the firm fixed effect. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Panel Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var. Survival ∆Profits ∆Revenue ∆Costs ∆ln(Profits) ∆ln(Revenue) ∆ln(Costs)
Eligiblei × Postt 0.004* 208,711*** 997,142*** 665,426*** 0.016 0.019** 0.022**
(0.002) (66,307) (151,931) (127,218) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Obs. 57,833 39,180 46,499 39,196 38,273 46,499 39,196
R-squared 0.913 0.261 0.265 0.249 0.243 0.28 0.283
Mean Dep. Var. 0.86 321,110 910,517 623,737 0.04 0.05 0.05
Panel B: Collapsed Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var. Survival ∆Profits ∆Revenue ∆Costs ∆ln(Profits) ∆ln(Revenue) ∆ln(Costs)
Eligiblei × Postt 0.005 292,409*** 1,255,431*** 827,299*** 0.02 0.021* 0.031**
(0.003) (78,624) (171,645) (145,144) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Obs. 15,282 11,858 14,090 11,858 11,640 14,090 11,858
R-squared 0.904 0.59 0.65 0.557 0.213 0.233 0.212
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Table 2.5: Dynamic Effects of EFG
The table presents results from estimating equation 2.1. Eligiblei is a dummy indi-
cating whether the firm had revenue below £25M in year 2008 and Postt is a dummy
equal to one in the years 2009-2011. The dependent variable is specified in the top
of each column. All columns include firm fixed effects and separate year effects for
each 5-digit 2007 SIC industry. The standard errors are presented in parentheses
and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Change in Logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. ∆ln(External Debt) ∆ln(Fixed Assets) ∆ln(Employee) ∆ln(Profits) ∆ln(Revenue) ∆ln(Costs)
Eligiblei × 2005 -0.15 -0.00028 -0.0024 0.030 0.024 0.051***
(0.20) (0.036) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016)
Eligiblei × 2006 0.18 -0.022 -0.0100 0.0077 0.00091 0.022
(0.20) (0.033) (0.012) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
Eligiblei × 2007 -0.055 -0.055* -0.014 -0.017 -0.022 0.0079
(0.22) (0.032) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017)
Eligiblei × 2009 0.46** 0.0039 0.01 0.033* 0.022 0.038***
(0.21) (0.023) (0.012) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014)
Eligiblei × 2010 0.19 0.0016 0.009 0.018 0.018 0.047***
(0.18) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016)
Eligiblei × 2011 0.30 0.029 0.012 0.0064 0.015 0.034**
(0.18) (0.029) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
Obs. 48,853 49,957 47,482 38,273 46,499 39,196
R-squared 0.119 0.242 0.269 0.243 0.281 0.283
Panel B: Change in Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. ∆External Debt ∆Fixed Assets ∆Employee ∆Profits ∆Revenue ∆Costs
Eligiblei × 2005 335,982 29,274 -2.90 165,329 305,780 456,663*
(229,421) (279,946) (3.48) (122,825) (288,385) (247,666)
Eligiblei × 2006 194,156 -298,149 -0.20 -127,431 -104,210 136,193
(240,768) (288,270) (3.61) (132,326) (293,393) (262,730)
Eligiblei × 2007 23,101 -447,543 -3.91 -160,565 -530,727* 58,351
(259,269) (283,725) (3.15) (126,788) (280,117) (256,184)
Eligiblei × 2009 560,491** 1.07e+06*** 7.48*** 448,765*** 1.77e+06*** 1.44e+06***
(284,483) (289,661) (2.84) (129,277) (264,766) (243,592)
Eligiblei × 2010 915,149*** 224,472 0.78 -7,117 547,011** 632,438**
(285,400) (281,625) (3.33) (135,247) (269,921) (246,589)
Eligiblei × 2011 415,242 466,013 2.33 44,997 279,778 255,686
(281,652) (305,200) (3.45) (138,219) (302,367) (265,027)
Obs. 49,957 49,957 47,482 39,180 46,499 39,196
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Sensitivities of Employment, Fixed Assets and Profit to External Debt
The table presents results from estimating the system of equations 2.1-2.2. Eligiblei
is a dummy indicating whether the firm had revenue below £25M in year 2008 and
Postt is a dummy equal to one in the years 2009-2011. The dependent variable is
gross profits. All columns include firm fixed effects and separate year effects for
each 5-digit 2007 SIC industry. The standard errors are presented in parentheses
and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Change in Logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS
Dep. Var. ∆ln(Employment) ∆ln(Employment) ∆ln(Fixed Assets) ∆ln(Fixed Assets) ∆ln(Profit) ∆ln(Profit)
Eligiblei × Postt 0.0043*** 0.053* 0.015*** 0.0012 0.00005 0.048
-0.00048 -0.029 -0.001 -0.055 -0.00068 -0.04
Obs. 47,378 47,378 48,135 48,135 38,175 38,175
R-squared 0.272 -0.131 0.221 0.213 0.243 0.048
∆ln(External Debt) 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.33***
-0.092 -0.091 -0.1
F-stat 10.56 10.56 10.79
Panel B: Change in Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS
Dep. Var. ∆Employment ∆Employment ∆Fixed Assets ∆Fixed Assets ∆Profit ∆Profit
Eligiblei × Postt 7.5e-07*** 0.000013** 0.12*** 0.54** 0.0098 0.47**
-1.80E-07 -5.60E-06 -0.017 -0.24 -0.013 -0.19
Obs. 47,482 47,482 48,239 48,239 39,180 39,180
R-squared 0.247 -0.421 0.267 -0.053 0.261 0.206
∆External Debt 410,980*** 421,515*** 440,898***
-126,476 -129,720 -118,221
F-stat 10.56 15.8 13.91
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Table 2.8: Placebo Tests-Random Revenue Thresholds
This table presents summary results from 200 placebo tests, were we ran-
domly select 200 thresholds in the interval £30M-37M of revenues in 2008.
We restrict the sample to firms with revenues in 2008 within a window
of £13M to the right and £13M, to the left of the random threshold.
We classify firms into “placebo small” and “placebo non-eligible” if their
revenues in 2008 are below or above the random threshold, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable
Average Non-rejection Non-rejection rate at 5% level
coefficient rate at 5% level for positive coefficients
∆ln(External debt) 0.103 7.30% 7.30%
∆ln(Internal Debt) -0.089 0.00% 0.00%
∆ln(Operational Liabilities) -0.023 0.00% 0.00%
∆ln(Issued Equity) -0.022 19.90% 0.00%
∆ln(Fixed Assets) -0.003 0.00% 0.00%
∆ln(Employees) 0.014 0.70% 0.70%
∆ln(Total Assets) -0.035 24.50% 0.00%
∆ln(Current Assets) -0.004 0.00% 0.00%
∆ln(Profits) -0.017 2.00% 0.00%
∆ln(Revenue) 0.008 0.00% 0.00%
∆ln(Costs) 0.004 0.00% 0.00%
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2.7 Appendix
Figure A2.1: Official EFG Statistics
This plot shows quarterly EFG statistics loans from January 2009 until
June 2017. Panel A shows the total number of loans offered (blue bar)
and drawn (red line). Panel B displays the total value of loans offered
(blue bar) and drawn (red line). Panel C shows the average loan size of-
fered (blue bar) and drawn (red line). For more official EFG statistics




Figure A2.2: Placebo Test with Firms in Non-eligible Industries
The plot presents results from estimating equation 2.1 using different sub-samples
of companies with revenue levels within a bandwidth of £7.5M to £18.5M of £25M
in 2008, but in non-EFG-eligible industries. The dependent variable is specified in
the top of each plot. The solid black line plots the estimated coefficients and the red
dashed line the 90th percent confidence interval. The standard errors are presented
in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm
level. The solid vertical line represents results using our preferred bandwidth of
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Figure A2.3: Robustness Checks with Different Revenue (2008) Bandwidths
The plot presents results from estimating equation 2.1 using different sub-samples
of companies with revenue levels within a bandwidth of £7.5M to £18.5M of £25M
in 2008. The dependent variable is specified in the top of each plot. The solid
black line plots the estimated coefficients and the red dashed line the 90th percent
confidence interval. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The solid vertical
line represents results using our preferred bandwidth of £13M (i.e., an estimation
window of +/ − £13M around the revenue threshold of £25M). There are 2,472
(1,717) and 3,480 (8,204) control (treatment) firms in the windows with £7.5M and
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Table A2.1: Terms of Borrowing by Amount Borrowed for EFG-backed Loans in
2009
The table presents average conditions on EFG-backed loans issued in 2009. The





Fees as % of loan Average loan terms
Rates value (months)
£1K-£25K 8.10% £560 3.30% 65
£25K-£50K 6.20% £880 2.40% 76
£50K-£100K 5.30% £1,650 2.30% 83
£100K-£250K 4.70% £2,770 1.80% 79
> £250K 4.10% £8,290 1.70% 76
Average 5.80% £1,980 2.00% 76
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Table A2.2: Assets and Receivables: Eligible vs Non-eligible Firms
The table presents results from estimating equation 2.1. Eligiblei is a dummy
indicating whether the firm had revenue below £25M in year 2008 and Postt is a
dummy equal to one in the years 2009-2011. The dependent variable is specified
in the top of each column. All columns include firm fixed effects and separate year
effects for each 5-digit 2007 SIC industry. The standard errors are presented in
parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
Column 10 in Panel A estimates equation 2.1 excluding the firm fixed effect. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Panel Data






Assets Assets Assets) Assets)
Eligiblei × Postt 777,447*** 212,424* 100,062 0.031* 0.024 -0.009
(168,646) (109,594) (35,770) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014)
Obs. 49,957 49,789 44,031 49,957 49,789 44,031
R-squared 0.231 0.193 0.206 0.242 0.233 0.189
Mean Dep. Var. 1,177,457 754,343 234,991 0.09 0.1 0.04
Panel B: Collapsed Data






Assets Assets Assets) Assets)
Eligiblei × Postt 812,834*** 229,613** -0.01 0.032 0.033 19,249
(177,240) (111,899) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) (38,088)
Obs. 14,922 14,886 13,360 14,922 14,886 13,360
R-squared 0.147 0.135 0.198 0.192 0.188 0.295
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Table A2.3: Dynamic Effects of EFG
The table presents results from estimating equation 2.1. Eligiblei is a dummy
indicating whether the firm had revenue below £25M in year 2008 and Postt is a
dummy equal to one in the years 2009-2011. The dependent variable is specified
in the top of each column. The dependent variable is specified in the top of each
column. All columns include firm fixed effects and separate year effects for each
5-digit 2007 SIC industry. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Change in Logs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ∆ln(Internal Debt) ∆ln(Trade Credit) ∆ln(Issued Equity) ∆ln(Total Assets)
Eligiblei × 2005 -0.22 0.014 -0.072* -0.00028
(0.16) (0.026) (0.037) (0.036)
Eligiblei × 2006 -0.22 0.013 0.028 -0.022
(0.16) (0.025) (0.036) (0.033)
Eligiblei × 2007 -0.22 0.0053 -0.061* -0.055*
(0.18) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032)
Eligiblei × 2009 -0.23 0.018 -0.045* 0.0039
(0.17) (0.029) (0.026) (0.023)
Eligiblei × 2010 -0.054 0.043 -0.036 0.0016
(0.16) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024)
Eligiblei × 2011 -0.084 0.036 -0.070** 0.029
(0.15) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Obs. 43,307 46,219 40,582 49,957
R-squared 0.14 0.178 0.227 0.242
Panel B:Change in Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ∆Internal Debt ∆Trade Credit ∆Issued Equity ∆Total Assets
Eligiblei × 2005 -79,188 -37,351 -38,065 29,274
(180,259) (44,741) (32,837) (279,946)
Eligiblei × 2006 -34,411 -68,079 -59,310** -298,149
(159,125) (47,773) (29,526) (288,270)
Eligiblei × 2007 45,997 -88,871* -27,572 -447,543
(174,698) (52,989) (26,236) (283,725)
Eligiblei × 2009 -202,609 102,864* -105,361*** 1.07e+06***
(193,478) (53,439) (30,308) (289,661)
Eligiblei × 2010 -120,873 -103,699** -46,972 224,472
(188,175) (48,527) (30,065) (281,625)
Eligiblei × 2011 -288,395 -55,950 -115,109*** 466,013
(225,180) (55,427) (32,887) (305,200)
Obs. 43,307 46,219 40,582 49,957















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Manager Turnover and Product
Market Competition: Evidence
from UK Family Firms
Family firms are important players in the economy around the world, especially in
Europe and Asia (Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002).
In the UK, family business made a 26% contribution to GDP in 2017, providing 35%
of total employment(Oxford Economics, 2018). From the Santander bank’s succes-
sion gap to the Samsung group’s “soft succession”, family control has drawn much
attention from the public. Despite the prevalence of family firms, the corporate
governance, especially the succession decisions in family firms remain understud-
ied.1 This paper empirically investigates how family firms balance the benefits and
costs of the promotion of family members to key corporate management positions.
Specifically, I examine the change of the structure of top executive management
teams of family firms in response to the intense product market competition from
foreign markets.
1Recent literature focuses on comparing performances of firms managed by family CEOs relative
to those managed by non-family CEOs, and find ambiguous results. For instance, Anderson and
Reeb (2003) find that the valuation of family firms listed in S&P 500 is higher than non-family
firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006) study the Fourturn 500 companies and show that the higher
valuation of family firms is only restricted to firms that are under management of founders. Morck
et al. (2000); Adams et al. (2009) find similar worse performance of family firms. Moreover, Pe´rez-
Gonza´lez (2006) compares the family succession with the unrelated replacement of family CEOs
and finds that interited control perform worse, and Bennedsen et al. (2007) show causal evidence
that family succession destroys firm value. Bandiera et al. (2017) provide evidence that family
CEOs work less hours than professional CEOs and that explains 18% of the performance gap.
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Deciding upon the succession of a senior executive manager is a critical chal-
lenge in determining a firm’s survival in difficult times and growth prospective in
the long run. It is a particularly topical issue for family companies. The choice
of either appointing a connected family member or an unrelated person to a key
managerial position can affect a firm’s corporate policy, such as its investment de-
cision, and hence influence a firm’s performance (Bennedsen et al., 2007). Family
firms are found to have lower debt financing costs: Lagaras and Tsoutsoura (2015)
show that creditors value family ownership and control by explicitly requiring family
members to stay in such firms. Family control brings several advantages to family
firms according to theoretical models. Firstly, family management mitigates the
agency problem between owner and mangers in family firms, where the ownership
and control are more likely to be aligned (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Bolton and
Von Thadden, 1998). Secondly, compared with unrelated professional managers,
family managers have more incentives to make long-term investments (Cadbury,
2000). Lastly, family managers facilitates the firm-specific investments by using
the firm-specific knowledge which is difficult to obtain(Donnelley, 1988; Barnes and
Hershon, 1994). However, family managers may distort the objective of maximizing
a firm’s value and have incentives to search for private benefits at the cost of minor-
ity shareholders (Morck et al., 1988). Furthermore, family managers are generally
inferior to professional managers, provided that talented managers are more likely
to be selected from the outside labor pool than from within family kinships (Burkart
et al., 2003; Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006).
This paper aims to investigate the economic factors that would change the family
succession decisions. Previous studies show that several factors can affect such
transition decisions. Bennedsen et al. (2007) show that the gender of first born child
is strongly correlated with family CEO succession decisions. Policy shifts can also
affect family firm succession decisions, as Tsoutsoura (2015) finds that inheritance
tax changes have influence on family succession decisions and investment strategies.
In this paper, I examine how pressures from product markets affect top executive
manager transitions. Specifically, I focus on the product market competition from
foreign markets.
Product market competition has long been viewed as a vehicle to mitigate man-
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agerial slack in corporations (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997). While G-index (Gompers
et al., 2003) is widely used as a proxi for good corporate governance, it is not easily
appliable to the private firm sample. Bloom et al. (2015b) use survey measure of
management practices and find that private equity firms are better managed than
family firms and private firms. Private family firm provides a unique setting to
study how product market competition influences the corporate governance. One
advantage of studying family firms is that succession plan decision, as one of the
most important aspect of the corporate governance, is one of the most observable
corporate governance decisions. It also provides evidence of how product market
competition works for private firms. Different from public firms, private firms have
illiquid shares and more aligned separation of ownership and control, shareholders
have relatively more incentive to monitor managers. Therefore, we should expect
less pronounced effect in private firms if competition mitigates managerial slacks.
In theory, product market competition changes the benefits and costs of appoint-
ing a family manager. On the one hand, as product market competition intensifies,
the good reputation and business relationships built up by the founder or previous
family managers add to the advantages of passing the firm on into family hands.
However, the advantage of family managers having less myopic investment strategies
(Cadbury, 2000) becomes less important. When the competition increases, the pri-
ority is more likely be driven by the short-term survival as incumbent firms are more
likely to be liquidated. On the other hand, the higher level of competition causes
a decreased mark-up thus reduce the managerial slack, discipline the manger’s be-
haviour. However, at the mean time, less rents also leave less rewards for managers
and lowers the provision of managerial effort.2 Together, the product market com-
petition changes the mapping between manager’s effort (skill) and firm’s profit, and
the overall effect is ambiguous. Moreover, unrelated managers with better skills
selected from a larger talent pool are more likely to be capable to manage the fir-
m (Burkart et al., 2003; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013), which is precisely important
when the competition is intensive, thus favouring the choice of an unrelated man-
ager. Therefore, the variation in product market competition changes the relative
benefits and costs of both forcing a current manager to leave a firm and appoint-
2Raith (2003) finds mixed results once allowing for the free entry of firms and changes the
elasticity of substitution with larger size of the market.
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ing a family member to a key managerial position. The net effect is ultimately an
empirical question.
The UK is the fifth largest import country in the world, especially in manufac-
tured goods. This makes foreign competition a crucial channel through which the
product market competition changes the rewards for exerting effort or for hiring more
talented managers. Furthermore, foreign competition is an important force that can
have a substantial impact on firm level outcomes. It has been shown in the empirical
literature that competition from foreign markets spurs innovation, improves produc-
tivity, changes ownership structures, and improves management quality (Cun˜at and
Guadalupe, 2009; Bloom et al., 2015a, 2016; Bena and Xu, 2017). As recognized
by previous research, measurements of product competition, such as concentration
ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) or price-cost margins are difficult to com-
pute or interpret, and also raise the concern of endogeneity (Schmalensee, 1989;
Cun˜at and Guadalupe, 2009). To avoid the flaws of these measurements, I compute
the import penetration at industry level to measure the product market competition
from foreign markets. To address potential endogeneity concerns because of either
measurement error or family firms’ anticipation of import penetration movements,
I follow the literature and use import weighted average exchange rates at industry
level as an instrumental variable for the import penetration (see Bertrand (2004);
Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2009)).
This study draws on historical managerial data from the Orbis database provided
by the Bureau van Dijk (BvD). I define family firms by matching the family names
of senior executive managers. Using the appointment and resignation dates of se-
nior executive managers, I am able to track changes in senior executive managerial
positions for each firm over time. In addition, the comprehensive database includes
financial information on most of the private family firms in the sample, allowing me
to control for firm characteristics. Trade data and domestic production information
at the industry level is collected from the Eurostat database. I focus on a sample of
UK manufacturing family firms because of the availability of domestic production
data. The analysis sample covers the period from 2004 to 2014, including a period
of Pounds depreciation in 2009 and appreciation in 2006 and 2012 3, generating the
3See: Effective exchange rate index of Sterling from the Bank of England. https:
//www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/fromshowcolumns.asp?Travel=NIxAZxSUx&
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time varying exchange rates at the industry level.
My findings show that, jointly with firm characteristics such as firm size and age,
product market competition from foreign markets plays an important role in senior
executive managerial position changes. Foreign competition substantially increases
the frequency of senior managers’ resignations (with or without replacements), and,
specifically, the number of family-manager departures. My results also show that
family firms fire more family managers without any replacements and that they
change current unrelated managers for new unrelated ones. In addition, I find that
the results are more pronounced in the family firm sample run by founder family
members. However, family firms without the family founder as a current manager
are quieter when faced with high levels of foreign competition.
This paper adds to two strands of literature. Firstly, this paper contributes to
the literature studying family firms. Instead of looking at family control on firm
performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Ellul et al.,
2010; Bennett et al., 2016), this paper seeks to answer the question of what factors
drive managerial position changes. This paper complements the existing research
by showing that apart from the gender of first born child (Bennedsen et al., 2007)
and the heritage tax rate (Tsoutsoura, 2015), the product market competition is an
important economic factor that has a significant impact on succession decisions.
Secondly, this paper adds to the literature of examining the product market
competition and corporate governance. Several papers show that product market
competition can substitute for internal governance: Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2005,
2009) find that product market competition changes the pay structure of U.S. ex-
ecutives. Bloom et al. (2010) show that the product market competition leads to a
decentralized decision making to employees. Similarly, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010)
provide evidence that trade liveralization reduces the corporate hieracchies. Giroud
and Mueller (2010) find that comepeittion lowers the mangerial slack by presenting
that BC law passage only causes signifiant decline of performance in firms operating
in the non-competitive industry. Guadalupe and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2010) show that





ysis of 16 countries. In addition, Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that companies in
more competitive industries benefit less from corporate governance. Chhaochharia
et al. (2017) analyse the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in US and show that corporate
governance is more important when the product market competition is less. This
paper extends the literature in evaluating the economic impacts of competition on
corporate governance from public firms to private firms by focusing on a sample
of private family firms in the UK, which represents an important part the econo-
my.4My findings are consistent with the notion that product market competition
from foreign markets plays an disciplinary role in corporate governance.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 3.1 describes the data; Section 3.2
develops the hypothesis; Section 3.3 outlines empirical strategy; Section 3.4 presents
the results. In Section 3.5, I conduct robustness checks and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1 Data
In this section, I briefly introduce the data collected from Bureau van Dijk (BvD)
and Eurostats. Then, I put forward the definitions of family firms and successions.
A summary of the sample is given at the end of this section. The details of variable
names and definitions are available in Appendix A3.1.
3.1.1 Management and financial data
The Orbis database of the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) provides comprehensive histor-
ical management information on public and private firms from all over the world,
and covers the population of private firms in the UK.5 For each senior executive
manager in the database, I collect information on age, gender, full name, and level
of responsibility, as well as on the appointment and resignation dates.6 Firm level
4In 2018, there were 5.7 million private sector businesses in the UK, and over 96% of businesses
are (private) Micro Sized businesses with less than 10 employees. The Micro Sized businesses,
however, represent about 33% of employment and 22% of turnover(Rhodes, 2018)
5The UK government requires that every private firm incorporated in the UK
report the director’s information, to the registry—Companies House (see: https:
//www.gov.uk/government/publications/life-of-a-company-annual-requirements/
life-of-a-company-part-1-accounts). Bena and Xu (2017) also report that the majori-
ty of their firms from UK in an international analysis.
6In this paper, I focus on the change in senior executive managerial positions. One advantage
of the database is its good coverage. I have detailed information on recorded senior executive
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financials from 2004 to 2014 are obtained from the Fame database (see Brav (2009);
Michaely and Roberts (2012); Gonza´lez-Uribe and Paravisini (2019)). The financial
data is then matched with management data using the unique identifier generated
by BvD. Based on the individual senior executive manager information collected
from Orbis, I next construct the family firm sample and measure senior manager
departures and successions.
3.1.2 Definition of family firms
The literature on family firm research uses a broad definition of family firms.7 Con-
sidering the nature of the research and the availability of management information,
I classify a company as a family firm if at least one family member is in the senior
executive management team. A senior executive manager is defined as a family
member if at the appointment date, at least one current or previous senior execu-
tive manager has the same family name. A founder-manager is defined as a senior
executive manager who is appointed when the firm is incorporated.8 And finally, a
family manager is defined as a family founder if at least two founders have the same
family names.
Two concerns arise with this “founder” definition: one is that two “founders”
may have the same family name coincidently, and the other is that managers are
not necessarily shareholders of a firm. However, considering that most firms in
the sample are small, private and young firms in the manufacturing sector, then it
reduces the probability that two senior managers have the same family name by
chance, as compared to large and complicated conglomerates. Moreover, I combine
the manager’s information with shareholders details from the Orbis database, family
firm managers own the majority of their shares.
managers for the population of private firms in the UK. However, firms do not have report the
exact titles of managers, for example, “Chief Executive Officer” and “Chief Technology Officer” are
not distinguishable and they both enter the database under the category of senior executives. For
the majority of firms in sample, there is usually no specification that one person is at the highest
level, and decisions are made collectively. I keep information on all senior executive managers if
several managers are at the same level of position.
7For instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) use founding family’s ownership and (or) the presence
of family members on the board of directors to identify family firms. Bennedsen et al. (2007) rely
on the personal and family information. Villalonga and Amit (2006), Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006) use
both personal and the ownership information.
8The management record does not necessarily date back to the incorporation date. In this case,
a founder is defined as a manager who is the first to join the firm when the earliest data is available.
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3.1.3 Definition of successions
Before I define succession events, an accurate specification of resignation or de-
parture is required. A senior executive manager leaves a firm if he or she is not
reappointed to the same position within one year. Starting with the firm manager
level data, I match each departure date with all other appointment dates, and the
family names of departing and new managers in the same firm. A “succession” is
classified whenever the following three criteria are met: (1) the departing manager
must have stayed in his or her position for at least one year; (2) the departing man-
ager cannot be matched to him- or herself; and (3) the new manager is appointed
around one year of time of the departure date. When there are several appointments
matched with one departure, I chose the one with the minimal gap in between the
appointment and departure dates.
Two different outcomes could happen following the departures. If there is no
match of new managers within one year window of the departing manager, then it is
classified as departures without replacement; otherwise there is a replacement. For
replacements, I also distinguish in between the replacements by other family man-
agers and those by unrelated managers. I count the number of both scenarios as two
measures of outcome variables following the departure. Matching the family names
of departing and appointed managers, I separate family replacements from unrelated
replacements. For the subsequent analysis, I include measures of managerial changes
in the following different dimensions: the number of senior executive manager de-
partures, the number of family/unrelated senior executive manager departures, and
the number of departures replaced by family managers/unrelated managers/without
replacements.
3.1.4 Competition measurement
This paper focuses on product market competition from foreign competitors. Fol-
lowing Bertrand (2004) and Bloom et al. (2010), I use the import penetration as
a proxy for product market competition from foreign markets. Import penetration
is defined as the ratio of import value over the total value of import and domestic
production. A time series of domestic production data at industry level for the
manufacturing sector is obtained from the Eurostats Structural Business Statistic-
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s database (SBS). International bilateral trade data between the UK and its 200
major trading-partner countries from 2004 to 2012 is from the Comext database in
Eurostat.
3.1.5 Sample statistics
Starting with all UK firms in the manufacturing sector from the Orbis dataset, I
exclude firms incorporated before 2004. I further restricted my interest to family
firms with available financial data and in industries for which industry-country level
trade data is avaialble. The sample includes a time period from 2004 to 2014.9
Overall, these restrictions bring the number of the sample down to 13,478 companies.
10,788 of these family firms have family founder managers and 2,690 are not run by
any family founder manager.
The characteristics of the family companies in the sample are summarized in
Table 3.1. The first two columns are based on the full sample, and the next four
columns present the summary of founder managed and non-founder managed fam-
ily firms. The average age of family firms in my sample is 18, and the average size
(Total Assets) is £0.72M. On average, family firms have 2.92 managers, 2.21 family
managers and 1.60 family founder managers. The yearly average manager departure
is 0.06 (0.04 family manager departures and 0.02 unrelated manager departures).
Then I decompose the three different outcomes after departures: number of manager
departure with no replacement, with family succession and with unrelated succes-
sion. For both family manager departures and unrelated managers, no replacement
is most frequent compare to the cases with successions. On average, 0.021 (0.006)
family manager departures are followed by no replacement (family succession) on
average. Compared with family successions after the family manager departures,
the number of unrelated replacements is slightly higher, with an average of 0.008.
Relative to the founder-family firms, non-founder family firms are slightly larger
(£0.76M v.s £0.71M) and more mature (19.24 v.s 17.73). By definition, founder
manager family firms also have more family senior managers (2.50 v.s. 2.74).
9The industry code changed from NACE Rev1.1 to NACE Rev2 in 2007, so I follow Bena and
Xu (2017) to link these two versions of the code. To construct instrumental variable, I then match
the SIC industry code with the Prodcom industry code. The first 4 digits of the Prodcom code is
the same as the NACE code throughout the sample.
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Figure 3.1 includes the plots of industry distribution in Panel A, the average
import penetration, and the average industry level exchange rates in Panel B and
C respectively. In the first panel of Figure 3.1, we see that industries are evenly
distributed, with no single industry in the manufacture sector has a portion of
more than 0.4%. The second plot shows that there is an increasing trend in the
industry average import penetration, with a high growth rate before the crisis and
a slight drop after 2008. The last panel plots the time varying exchange rates.
We can observe that there was an depreciation of Pounds around year 2008 and
appreciations in 2006 and 2012. The identification is from the industry-time varying
import weighted exchange rates at the industry level, which can not be directly
shown in figures, therefore, I randomly select 10 industries from the 188 industries
in my sample and report the import penetration and exchange rate index in Table
3.2 to show some variation of this index across. Moving from the top to the bottom
of the table, there is a variation of import penetration and the import weighted
exchange rates across industries. The bottom row in the table that the average of
import penetration in analysis sample is 0.34 and the exchange rate index average
is 0.90. The standard deviations of 0.18 and 0.15 are large compared to the mean.
3.2 Hypothesis
In theory, product market competition has an ambiguous effect on the managerial
incentives in a principal agent setting (Schmidt, 1997). On the one hand, competi-
tion reduces the firm’s markup, meaning that managers have less incentives to exert
efforts. On the other hand, greater competition leads to a higher marginal return to
managerial effort when the product demand function is more elastic. In addition,
firms are more likely to be liquidated in face of more competition, and thus generates
costs to managers of losing their jobs. Therefore, the product market competition
disciplines managerial behavior. Overall, the net effects of these two countering
effects are ambiguous. Raith (2003) allows for free firm entry into the market with
substitutable products, and the profits of surviving firms do not change as more
firms exit the market with lower profitability, so the prediction of competition and
effort is unambiguously positive.
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Competition may also change the market transparency—the managers actions
are more closely tied to the other managers’ in the rest of the same market. There-
fore, increased competition reduces managerial slacks and results in lower intensity
of agency problems (see Hart (1983); Hermalin (1992)).
It is also worth noting that a firm can improve its performance by either induc-
ing more managerial efforts or replacing managers with higher skilled ones; similar
theoretical predictions apply to the relationship between the product market compe-
tition and managerial skills. Higher skilled managers are more capable of managing
firms though hard times and the marginal return to higher skill is also higher when
competition is high. However, the absolute change of profits may be lower to relative
higher managerial talents.
How would product market competition change the relative advantage of family
managers versus unrelated managers? Holding product market competition un-
changed, hiring family managers brings advantages to firms: 1) aligned ownership
and control reduces agency problem; 2) less myopic investment decisions; 3) lower
cost of borrowing for family firms; 4) firm-specific knowledge. However, disadvan-
tages also exist: 1) private benefits of control does not necessary maximizing firm’s
profits; 2) poor managerial skills relative to professional unrelated managers. If the
net effect of competition on effort/skill is zero, then competition favours the family
manager as lower cost of capital and long-run business relationships are important,
especially during hard times. However, long term investment strategies may not as
important as in normal times as the priority is the short run survival. If there is
a positive relationship between competition and effort/skill, then competition in-
centivize the unrelated managers to exert effort, mitigate the agency problem. It
is also rewarding to hire a manager with higher managerial skills, thus favouring
the choice of an unrelated manager. If there is a negative correlation of competi-
tion and managerial effort/skill, meaning that lower rent reduces the incentive to
exert managerial effort, then hiring more capable unrelated managers brings less
advantage.
In sum, the theoretical implication of competition on number of family managers
departure and appointments is ambiguous, and it is ultimately an empirical question.
However, differentiating the reward to skill channel from the reward to effort channel
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through which the competition works is not straightforward and out of the scope
of this paper. The joint hypotheses that this paper tests are: 1) family managers




To estimate the baseline correlation between competition and the change of senior
managerial positions, I run the following OLS regression:
yf,t+2 = β0 + β1 Import Peni,t + xf,t−1β2 + Y ear FEt + Ind FEi + ft (3.1)
where f denotes a firm, i denotes an industry and t denotes time. yf,t+2 is the
outcome variable in two years window from year t + 1 to year t + 2.10 I denote by
Import Peni,t the import penetration for industry i at time t. In all regressions, firm
characteristics xf,t−1 controls for lagged firm age and size.11
To investigate the effect of foreign competition on senior executive managerial
position changes, I examine two sets of outcomes. In the first set of regressions, I look
at the total number of senior manager departures (Number of departures). Then
I examine the number of family manager departures (Number of fam departures)
and the unrelated manager departures (Number of unrel departures) separate-
ly. In the second set of regressions, I focus on the outcomes of vacant managerial
positions. For both family and non-family manager departures, there are three
different outcomes: 1) the departing manager is not replaced (managerial posi-
tion is left vacant); 2) the departing manager is replaced by a family manager;
and 3) the departing manager is replaced by an unrelated manager. I run regres-
sions on 6 scenarios with outcome variables including: Family no replacement
Family succession and Fam − unrelated replacement for the family manager
10The real effect on firm performance and managerial changes takes time to observe in response
to the intensified product market competition.
11Alternatively, unobservable firm level characteristics can be controlled for by adding firm fixed
effects. I show that all results are robust with firm fixed effects in Session 3.5.
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departures; Unrelated noreplacement, Unrelated replacement and Unrelated −
fam replacement for the unrelated manager departures respectively.
3.3.2 Endogeneity problem and instrument variables
Equation 3.1 estimates the impact of the foreign competition measured by import
penetration on senior executive managerial position changes. However, a common
concern with the OLS specification is that the omitted variables may be correlated
with the independent variable of interest—Import Peni,t. The endogeneity can be
attributed to several reasons. The import penetration may be reversely determined
by executive manager position changes through a shift in managers’ operating s-
trategies. Furthermore, the import penetration for each industry is calculated as
the ratio of imports over the total value of imports and domestic production, thus
generating the measurement error.12 In addition, the concerns of endogeneity arise
when family firms anticipate import penetration fluctuations, especially in post-
recession periods when governments have carried out stimulus packages both in the
UK and within Europe. All of these factors tend to bias the estimates down towards
zero.
To address these concerns of endogeneity, I follow Bertrand (2004), and Cun˜at
and Guadalupe (2009) to implement import weighted exchange rates as instrumental
variables. For each industry in each year, I construct an industry specific exchange
rates index, calculated as bilateral exchange rates between the UK and other coun-
tries (measured as foreign currency against 1 £), weighted by the import share of
total imports in each industry in the base year of the sample period.
Specifically, I include both the current and lagged exchange rate indices as our
instruments considering that it usually takes time for import penetration to have
an impact. The regression at firm-year level is as follows
Import Peni,t = α0 + α1Exch Rateit + α2Exch Ratei,t−1 + xf,t−1α3
+ Y ear FEt + Ind FEi + ξft
(3.2)
where Import Peni,t is the import penetration for industry i in year t. Exch Ratei,t
12For some of our industries, due to privacy policies or data collection restrictions, the domestic
production at NACE 4-digit level is missing for some years.
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and Exch Ratei,t−1 are industry specific exchange rate indices in the current and
lagged year. xf,t−1 controls for firm level characteristics and is defined similarly as
in Equation 3.1. Year and industry fixed effects are controlled for and error terms
are clustered at the industry level.
The first stage regression results are presented in Table 3.3 in detail. Columns
(1) to (3) report the first stage regression results over the full sample, sub-sample
with and without non-founder family senior managers in firms respectively. Starting
with the full sample, we observe that a 1 unit of appreciation in the pound against
trading partner currencies is associated with a 0.79 decrease in contemporary import
penetration and a 0.61 increase in import penetration one year later. The delayed
positive reaction of import penetration to the appreciation of a local currency is
a reflection of the “J- curve” effect in the related trade literature.13 The import
weighted exchange rate index becomes higher with an appreciation of the pound,
and the import penetration will also becomes higher as it is cheaper to import from
other countries, and foreign goods are competitive to domestic products. Year fixed
effects and the industry fixed effect control for industry specific and time varying
unobservable shocks. The identification of the outcome variable comes from the
industry-time level exchange rates fluctuation. First stage F-test results are all
significant at a 1% level. A Hansen J-test confirms that the over identification
problem is not a concern.
The second stage regression is:
yi,t+2 = β0 + β1 ̂Import Peni,t + xf,t−1β2 + +Y ear FEt + Ind FEi + ξft (3.3)
where ̂Import Peni,t is the fitted value from Equation 3.2, xf,t−1 is the same
set of control variables as before. The coefficient β1 is of our main interest; it
captures the change in the characteristics of senior managerial positions as foreign
competition increases through the appreciation of the pound. A positive estimates
of β1 indicates that increased competition results in an increase in outcome variables
in the subsequent two years.
The coefficients in Columns (2) and (3) show similar results as those in the first
column. In unreported tables, the first stage results including the lagged two period
13See Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2004) for a literature review.
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exchange rates yields higher F-test statistics. The results are similar and robust
under both specifications, but for the brevity, I present all results based on the
current and lagged exchange rates for all the analysis in this paper.
The exclusion restriction assumption for the identification strategy is that the
import weighted exchange rates only affect the senior manager changes in family
firms through changes in industry level import penetration. Import weighted ex-
change rates, which is not only dependent on domestic prices, but exchanges rates
with all trading partners at the industry level, are less likely to be predicted by com-
panies. Moreover, using the static import weights in 2002 and the nominal exchange
rates reduce the impact of time-varying import demand from different countries, and
reduces the explanatory power for potential confounding factors such as exports. In
fact, following Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2009), I find that the current and lagged in-
dustry level exchange rates are not significantly correlated with the export openness
(see Table 3.3), which lends support to the exclusion restriction assumption.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Senior executive manager departure
In this section, I provide the baseline OLS and IV-2SLS regression results of product
market competition on the senior executive manager departures.
Table 3.4 presents the estimates of the impact of foreign competition on the num-
ber of management departures. The regressions are estimated over the full sample
with three sets of dependent outcome variables: total number of departures, the
number of family departures and the number of unrelated departures. We observe
that the association between the number of senior executive manager resignations
and import penetration in Column (1) is weak. In contrast, once the import penetra-
tion is instrumented with the industry specific exchange rate indices, the estimates
are significant at 1% level: one unit increase in import penetration leads to 0.29
more senior manager departures. The economic effect is also sizeable, one standard
deviation increase in import penetration causes a jump in number of departures by
0.052 (0.287*0.182) in the future two years, approximately 44% (0.052/(2*0.059))
of the sample average.
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Next, I move to the different outcomes after the different types of manager
departures, i.e. the number of family departures and unrelated departures. The
results are presented in Columns (3) to (6). OLS regressions in Columns (3) ((5))
implies a positive (negative) correlation between family (unrelated) departures and
foreign competition, but the estimates are not statistically significant. The IV-2SLS
regression in Column (4) shows that one unit increase in import penetration causes a
0.21 increase in the number of family manager departures, significant at the 5% level.
The coefficient is also economically significant, as one standard deviation increase in
import penetration leads to 0.04 (0.207*0.182) more family managers leaving firms
in the following two years, 50% (0.038/(0.038*2)) of the sample average. However,
the 0.08 increase in the number of unrelated manager departures is not significant
as a result of intensified competition from foreign markets.
As we can see from Table 3.4, the OLS estimates are substantially biased toward-
s zero, which could be because of the correlation between the import penetration
measurement of competition and/or the omitted variables. In addition, firm char-
acteristics are also strongly correlated with the managerial position changes. Larger
and older firms appear to increase the decisions to fire managers compared to the
smaller or younger firms, given the import penetration level. But the magnitude
of coefficients are much smaller than the competition measure, import penetration
(0.015 and 0.001 in Column (2), Table 3.4).
Overall, Table 3.4 shows that higher level of competition from foreign markets
reduces the private benefit of family control and leads to more senior managers, in
particular family managers, leave their positions (no matter if the outgoing manager
is replaced by a new manager or not). These results suggest that more significant
increase in family managers departing is consistent with the notion that they are
less qualified compared to the unrelated professional managers.
3.4.2 Outcomes of family manager departures
Table 3.5 presents the regressions results of the outcomes after family manager de-
partures. There are three outcomes after a family manager departure: the departing
manager is not replaced by any new managers/ replaced by a family manager/ re-
placed by an unrelated manager. Similarly, OLS and IV-2SLS regression results are
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shown for each outcome variable in Table 3.5.
We observe that the correlation between the product market competition from
foreign markets and the family departures without replacement is not significan-
t from zero (Column (1)). However, the IV results show that greater competi-
tion causes more managers departing the firm without anyone to replace them.
Specifically, one standard deviation increase in import penetration results in a 0.037
(0.206*0.182) increase in the unrelated succession of unrelated managers in the fu-
ture two years. This accounts for about 89% (0.037/(0.021*2)) of the sample average.
The combined results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that increased import pen-
etration leads to more resignations of family managers. Furthermore, departing
managers are not replaced by either another family manager or unrelated manager.
Instead, previous positions held by family managers are left vacant. This is con-
sistent with the notion that positions that family managers held are likely to be
redundant. When the competition is high, the benefits of private control of families
are smaller because the mark-up is lower. To cut costs, the vacancies will not be
therefore filled in with any new managers.
3.4.3 Outcomes of unrelated manager departures
Table 3.6 presents the regression results for different outcomes of unrelated manager
departures. Similar to the case when a family manager leaves a firm, there are three
outcomes after the unrelated manager leaves: he or she is not replaced by any new
managers, replaced by an unrelated manager or replaced by a family manager.
The first two columns show that intense competition results in an increasing
number of no replacement after unrelated senior executive manager departures in
the coming two years, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. The next
two columns report that there is a significant increase in the number of unrelated
manager successions at the 5% level. Specifically, one standard deviation increase
in import penetration results in a 0.01 (0.0475*0.182) increase in the number of
unrelated managers being replaced by another unrelated manager in the future. This
accounts for about 108% (0.0086/(0.004*2)) of the sample average. For the unrelated
to family manager replacement, the estimates are positive, but not significant.
In sum, foreign competition causes an increase in the departures of unrelated
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managers, who are thereafter replaced by other unrelated managers in the future
two years. Combining the findings in Table 3.6 with the results from Table 3.5, the
preferred interpretation is that greater foreign competition leads to more departures
of redundant family managers, and the replacement of important unrelated man-
agers with other outside managers. The fact that more family managers are kicked
out while the estimates on the number of unrelated manager departures is insignifi-
cant is supportive of the first hypothesis that family control brings private benefits
of control to the families, which is less valuable when the competition is higher.
Moreover, family firms replace unrelated managers with other unrelated manager-
s, indicates that unrelated mangers have relative advantage over family managers,
either because they are more capable or because the disciplinary role of product
market competition—unrelated managers exert more effort and generates a higher
marginal return. In addition, competition disciplines unrelated managers since they
have to work hard to prevent the firm from going bankrupt. Altogether, this finding
provides evidence that is consistent with the second hypothesis that the product
market competition changes the correlation between effort/skill and firm profits and
can serve as an external corporate governance discipline.
3.4.4 Founder v.s non-founder managed family firms
Previous literature provides mixed evidence of the performance of firms run by
founder-CEOs versus non-founder-CEOs. For instance, Fahlenbrach (2009) shows
that founder-CEO firms spend more in Research and Develpopment, investments,
and have higher market valuations based on a sample of large US public firms.
Adams et al. (2009) use the propotion of dead founder-CEOs as instrument of
founder-CEO status and provide causal evidence that the control of founder-CEOs
adds to the positive firm performance. However, using survey data for 13,345 firms
across 32 countries, Bennett et al. (2016) show that founder-CEO-managed firms
have lower management scores and the firm’s performance improve once the owner-
ship is changed. Villalonga and Amit (2006) show that although family firms under
perform compared with other firms, founder-CEOs firms have higher valuation, the
descent family CEOs destroy family firm value. The empirical evidence indicates
that the conflicts between family shareholders and non-family shareholders are more
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costly for non-founder-managed family firms than the founder-managed family firms.
In my analysis sample, 10,788 family firms are run by the founder family man-
agers in the base year, and 2,690 firms are not managed by founders. From Table
3.2, we observe that the number of departures, manager replacements are similar
for founder and non-founder managed firms. However, the change of managers team
may not be the same in response to the intense competition.
I repeat the previous analysis on two sub-samples of family firms run by founders
and non-founders. The results are presented in Tables 3.7 to 3.9. The dependent
variable in the first two columns of Table 3.7 is the total number of senior manager
departures in a forward two-year window. The next two columns show the impact
of competition on the number of family manager departures, and the estimates on
the number of unrelated departures are reported in the last two columns. For the
founder-CEO managed firms, the significant increases in both the total number of
manager departures and family manager departures, with 0.05 (0.2698*0.182) and
0.04 (0.2130*0.182) increases respectively due to a one standard deviation increase
in the import penetration (Columns (1) and (3)). In contrast, for the non-founder
run family firms, we only observe a significant increase in the total number of man-
ager departures. However, when I decompose the total number of departures to
family manager departures and unrelated manager departures, the estimates are
not significant.
Similarly, Table 3.8 presents the regression results with dependent variables in-
cluding: the number of no replacements, the number of family successions, and
the number of unrelated successions after family manager departures. Most of the
results for the sub-sample within founder run family firms carry what we already
known for the full sample. In particular, we observe that a one standard deviation
increase in import penetration causes 0.04 (0.221*0.182) more family manager de-
partures without replacement. The result is significant at the 5% level. Columns
(4) and (6) report a decrease in family replacements and an increase in unrelated
replacements after a family manager departure respectively. However, the estimates
are insignificant and the magnitude is smaller than the coefficient in the first column.
Table 3.9 includes the IV regression results for dependent variables of no replace-
ment, unrelated replacement, and unrelated to family replacement after unrelated
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managers respectively. Column (3) shows a significant increase in the number of
unrelated replacements following unrelated manager departures caused by increased
competition. However, we observe insignificant estimators in the rest of regressions
for non-founder family firms.
To sum up, the main results presented in the previous section remains in the
sub-sample of founder-managed family firms, however, the non-founder family firms
seem to be quieter and reluctant to change the current manager team structure. One
explanation of these results is that founder-run family firms are more vulnerable than
the successor-run family firms in face of the intense competition, so they need to
change the management team accordingly (the necessary management skills to set up
a firm may not fit the skills needed when competition is high.). Another possibility
is that non-founder managed family firms are already at the best manger-firm match
stage, so no changes can improve the performance. It can also be the case that the
non-founder managed firms implement worse corporate governance policies, which
makes difficult to change the senior management teams.
3.5 Robustness Check
The identification strategy in this paper is to include both the current and lagged
exchange rate indices as the instrumental variables of import penetration. However,
the current and lagged exchange rates may be autocorrelated and bring up potential
concerns. Therefore, it is worth checking the reduced form regressions. The results
in Tables A3.2 to Table A3.4 are similar to the findings in the IV-2SLS specification-
s. We observe that the appreciation in lagged exchange rates causes more family
managers to be replaced by unrelated managers or be without replacement after
they leave a firm. Unrelated managers are more likely to be replaced by unrelated
managers. However, the current exchange rate works in the opposite way, as the
coefficients are mostly negatively significant. When I only include the sub-sample
with founder running family firms, we observe similar patterns in estimated coeffi-
cients, shown in Table A3.3. And for non-founder run family firms, the estimates
are not significant any longer, consistent with the heterogeneity findings in Section
3.4.4.
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For all the regressions in this paper, I control for the firm level heterogeneity by
adding firm level control variables: firm age and size. Alternatively, I can add firm
fixed effect to better control for more unobservable firm characteristics. I examine
all analysis by adding firm fixed effects. Table A3.5 presents the results on manager
departures, and Table A3.6 and Table A3.7 display the different consequences of
family manager departures and non-family departures respectively. All the results
are similar compared to the main tables in the paper. Coefficients of estimates are
at same significance levels and the magnitudes of coefficients are very close.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I use detailed senior manager information on UK family firms in the
manufacturing sector to examine the impact of foreign competition on family firm
executive managerial position changes. I look at the specific channel, the foreign
competition through which the market competition works. I measure foreign com-
petition using import penetration at the industry level and instrumented it with
current and lagged import weighted exchange rates. I find that increasing product
market competition from foreign countries causes a significant increase in the num-
ber of senior manager resignations in family firms, especially the number of family
senior manager resignations. I then examine the outcomes after a manager departs
and show that foreign competition also leads to an increase number of family manger
departures without a replacement and an higher number of unrelated replacements
after an unrelated manager leaves a firm.
This paper is build on the notion that family managers add less value to the firm
than the unrelated managers. Previous studies found that family related managers
work less hours (Bandiera et al., 2017), and the family successions causes worse firm
performance (Bennedsen et al., 2007). In the chapter 1, I show a negative impact
of manager departures on young firm’s growth induced by exogenous changes of
managers’ outside options, suggesting costly frictions to replace managers in those
firms. In comparison, family firms in my analysis sample are larger and more estab-
lished compared to the young and small firm sample in the first chapter. Even when
the manager is not replaced after departure, there is not necessary harmful for the
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firm as previous positions may be redundant if the managerial skill/effort provid-
ed was low. Therefore, replacing family related managers with unrelated managers
represents an improvement of corporate governance.
Overall, the findings in this paper suggest that we cannot reject the joint hy-
potheses that 1) within family transitions provide private benefits of family control
and 2) product market competition changes the rewards for managerial effort (or)
skill, and can serve as an external discipline of corporate governance. While this
paper has not fully distinguished the effort from the skill channel, it is of interest for
future research. In the sub-sample tests, I show that family firms without founders
are quieter in the face of foreign competition. My results highlight that foreign com-
petition has a statistically significant and sizeable causal effect on senior manager
position changes in family firms. This paper adds an important economic force,
foreign competition, to prior known factors, such as firm characteristics, institution-
al environments and tax policies, that affect family firm succession plans. Future
work is needed to investigate the mechanisms through which family firm succession
decisions are driven.
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Figure 3.1: Industry Distribution, Import Penetration and Exchange Rate Index
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Independent Variable
In this table, 10 industries are randomly selected out of 177 industries in the analysis sample in the
manufacturing sector with non-missing trade data. Import penetration and the exchange rates are
both measured at the industry level. For each industry, the average and the standard deviation of
the import penetration and corresponding exchange rate indices are displayed. Import penetration
is defined as the ratio of import value over the sum of import and domestic production.Industry
specific exchange rates is the bilateral exchange rates between UK and its main trade partners,
weighted by the import share from each country in the base year.
Selected Industries Import Penetration Exchange Rate
Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
2042 0.4530 0.0740 0.8754 0.0963
2052 0.1991 0.0250 0.8770 0.0991
2053 0.4936 0.0160 0.8691 0.0935
2059 0.4366 0.0380 0.9096 0.1054
2060 0.5016 0.1081 0.8777 0.0894
2110 0.5763 0.1893 0.8679 0.1184
2120 0.4618 0.1278 0.8753 0.0962
2211 0.4678 0.0494 0.8517 0.1054
2219 0.3814 0.0473 0.8894 0.1135
2221 0.3157 0.0277 0.8477 0.0970
Aggregated 0.3415 0.1815 0.9027 0.1531
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Table 3.3: First Stage Regressions
The table shows the first stage regression results of equation 3.2. The dependent
variable is Import Penetration. Column (1), (2) and (3) present the results across
full sample, the sub-sample with and without founder family managers respectively.
Import Penetration is import divided by import plus domestic production at
4-digit NACE code industry level. Column (4) to (6) show the exclusion restriction
tests over different samples, where the dependent variable is the export openness.
Export openness is defined as export value divided by the domestic production
value. Industry specific exchange rates is the bilateral exchange rates between UK
and its main trade partners, weighted by the import share from each country in the
base year. Total Assets is the total assets (in £M) in the balance sheet each year.
Firm age, year and industry fixed effects are also controlled for in all regressions. *
significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered
at industry level for all the regressions.
Import Penetration Export Openness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Exch.Rates 0.6110** 0.6140** 0.5955** 1.5291 1.3852 2.1409
(0.2485) (0.2466) (0.2600) (1.5267) (1.4634) (1.8861)
Exch.Rates -0.7895*** -0.7834*** -0.8135*** -2.1379* -2.0326* -2.5791*
(0.1713) (0.1664) (0.1961) (1.1814) (1.1271) (1.4485)
Total Assets 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0010)
Age -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Num. of Obs 117,051 93,598 23,453 116,138 92,901 23,237
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.0699 0.0692 0.0724 0.0102 0.0099 0.0119
F test 11.0583*** 11.5811*** 8.8138*** 2.0563 2.1087 1.8453





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definitions
Dependent Variable
Leave Leave is a dummy variable defined at firm level. This variable takes the value
of 1 if the firm have at least one manager leave the firm, and takes the value
of 0 otherwise.
Transition Transition is a dummy variable defined at firm level. This variable takes the
value of 1 if the firm have at least one resigned manager matched to a new
coming manager within 1 year gap, 0 otherwise.
Family Succession Family transition is a dummy variable defined at firm level. This variable
takes the value of 1 if the Transition is 1 and the new manager has the same
family name as the leaving manager.
Competition Measurement
Import Penetration Import penetration is defined as Import value/(Import value+Domestic
production value) at each industry level. Import value comes from Eurostat’s
Comext database and it is measured as the aggregate import (in thousands
EUR) from all partner countries around the world. Domestic production
value is obtained from Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics database
(SBS) (in thousands EUR) .
Export Open. Export Openness is defined as Export value / (Export value +Domestic
production value) for each industry. Export value comes from Eurostat’s
Comext database and it is is measured as the aggregate import (EUR
thousands) from all partner countries around the world. Domestic production
value is obtained from Eurostat’s SBS database.
Exch. Rate The exchange rate is measured at industry level. It is the weighted average of
bilateral exchange rates between UK and its main trading partners. The
weight is the import share of total import value.
Control Variables
Age Firm age is measured in years since incorporation.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3.5: Robustness Tests: Competition and Manager Departures with Firm
Fixed Effects
The table shows the IV-2SLS regression results on manager departures. The
dependent variables include the total number of manager departures, the number of
family manager departures, and the number of unrelated manager departures. All
the dependent variable numbers are calculated in forward two years window. The
independent variable Import Penetration is the value of import divided by the
sum of import and the domestic production. Import Penetration is instrumented
by current and lagged industry specific exchange indices. Industry exchange rate is
the weighted average of exchange rates at the industry level, where the weight is the
import share from each country in 2002. Total Assets (in £M) is the total assets in
the balance sheet. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects and are
estimated at firm-year level. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. Standard
errors (in brackets) are clustered at industry level for all the regressions.
Number of Number of Number of
departures fam departures unrel departures
(1) (2) (3)
Import Penetration 0.2781*** 0.2076** 0.0705
(0.1010) (0.1057) (0.0547)
Num. of Observations 117,032 117,032 117,032
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.000
Year FE YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Acs, Z., A˚stebro, T., Audretsch, D., and Robinson, D. T. (2016). Public policy to promote
entrepreneurship: a call to arms. Small Business Economics, 47(1):35–51.
Adams, R., Almeida, H., and Ferreira, D. (2009). Understanding the relationship between founder-
cceos and firm performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 16(1):136 – 150.
Adelino, M., Schoar, A., and Severino, F. (2015). House prices, collateral, and self-employment.
Journal of Financial Economics, 117(2):288 – 306.
Adrian, T., Colla, P., and Song Shin, H. (2013). Which financial frictions? parsing the evidence
from the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 27(1):159–214.
Agarwal, R. and Kolev, J. (2017). Strategic corporate layoffs. International Monetary Fund.
Agrawal, A. K. and Matsa, D. A. (2013). Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing
decisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(2):449 – 470.
Almeida, H., Campello, M., and Weisbach, M. S. (2011). Corporate financial and investment
policies when future financing is not frictionless. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(3):675 – 693.
Financial Flexibility and Corporate Liquidity.
Alti, A. (2003). How sensitive is investment to cash flow when financing is frictionless? The
Journal of Finance.
Anderson, R. C. and Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance:
Evidence from the s&p 500. The Journal of Finance, 58(3):pp. 1301–1328.
Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion.
Princeton university press.
Bach, L. (2013). Are small businesses worthy of financial aid? evidence from a french targeted
credit program. Review of Finance, 18(3):877–919.
Bahaj, S., Foulis, A., Pinter, G., Surico, P., et al. (2018). Employment and the collateral channel
of monetary policy. Technical report.
173
Bahmani-Oskooee, M. and Ratha, A. (2004). The j-curve: a literature review. Applied Economics,
36(13):1377–1398.
Bakke, T. and Whited, T. M. (2012). Threshold events and identification: A study of cash
shortfalls. The Journal of Finance.
Bandiera, O., Lemos, R., Prat, A., and Sadun, R. (2017). Managing the Family Firm: Evidence
from CEOs at Work. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(5):1605–1653.
Banerjee, A. V. and Duflo, E. (2014). Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints
Using a Directed Lending Program. The Review of Economic Studies, 81(2):572–607.
Barnes, L. B. and Hershon, S. A. (1994). Transferring power in the family business. Family
Business Review.
BBB (2014). British Business Bank (BBB). Enterprise Finance Guarantee: Application process and
list of lenders. Avalabile at: https://british-business-bank.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2014/11/BBB-011114-42-Application-process-and-list-of-lenders.pdf.
BBB (2016). British Business Bank (BBB). Small business finance markets. Aval-
abile at: http://british-business-bank.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
British-Business-Bank-Small-Business-Finance-Markets-Report-2015-16.pdf.
BBB (2017a). British Business Bank (BBB). 2016. Business Finance Survey. Sheffield.
BBB (2017b). British Business Bank (BBB). Enterprise Finance Guarantee Quarterly Statistics
for Q2 FY 2018-19. Available at:https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2018/12/2018-09-GWS-EFG-Quarterly-Website-Charts-v2.pdf.
Beck, T., Demirguc-kun, A., and Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and legal constraints to growth:
Does firm size matter? The Journal of Finance.
Beck, T., Klapper, L. F., and Mendoza, J. C. (2008). The typology of partial credit guarantee funds
around the world. The World Bank.
Beckman, C. M. (2006). The influence of founding team company affiliations on firm behavior.
Academy of Management Journal, 49(4):741–758.
Bena, J. and Xu, T. (2017). Competition and ownership structure of closely held firms. The Review
of Financial Studies, 30(5):1583–1626.
Benmelech, E. and Bergman, N. K. (2009). Collateral pricing. Journal of Financial Economics,
91(3):339–360.
Benmelech, E., Bergman, N. K., and Seru, A. (2015). Financing labor. Working Paper 17144,
NBER.
174
Benmelech, E., Frydman, C., and Papanikolaou, D. (2019). Financial frictions and employment
during the great depression. Journal of Financial Economics.
Bennedsen, M. and Nielsen, K. M. (2010). Incentive and entrenchment effects in european owner-
ship. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(9):2212 – 2229.
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K. M., Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, F., and Wolfenzon, D. (2007). Inside the family
firm: The role of families in succession decisions and performance. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122(2):647–691.
Bennedsen, M., Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, F., and Wolfenzon, D. (2010). Do CEOs Matter? Working Paper,
Columbia Business School.
Bennedsen, M., Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, F., and Wolfenzon, D. (2011). Estimating the value of the boss:
Evidence from ceo hospitalization events. Working Paper, Columbia Business School.
Bennett, V. and Chatterji, A. (2017). The entrepreneurial process: Evidence from a nationally
representative survey. Working paper.
Bennett, V. M., Lawrence, M., and Sadun, R. (2016). Are founder ceos good managers? In Mea-
suring Entrepreneurial Businesses: Current Knowledge and Challenges, pages 153–185. National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Berger, A. and Udell, G. (1998). The economics of small business finance: The roles of private
equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(6-
8):613–673.
Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1932). Modern corporation and private property.
Bertrand, M. (2004). From the invisible handshake to the invisible hand? how import competition
changes the employment relationship. Journal of Labor Economics, 22(4):723–765.
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust differences-in-
differences estimates? The Quarterly journal of economics, 119(1):249–275.
Besanko, D. and Thakor, A. V. (1987). Collateral and rationing: Sorting equilibria in monopolistic
and competitive credit markets. International Economic Review, 28(3):671–689.
BIS (2012). SME access to external finance. January, 2012. Department for Busi-
ness,Innovation,and Skills. BIS Economic Paper No.16. Avalabile at: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/32263/12-539-sme-access-external-finance.pdf.
BIS (2013). Economic evaluation of the enterprise finance guarantee (EFG) scheme.




Blanchard, O. J., de Silanes, F. L., and Shleifer, A. (1994). What do firms do with cash windfalls?
Journal of Financial Economics, 36(3):337 – 360.
Bloom, N., Draca, M., and Van Reenen, J. (2016). Trade induced technical change? the impact of
chinese imports on innovation, it and productivity. The Review of Economic Studies, 83(1):87–
117.
Bloom, N., Propper, C., Seiler, S., and Van Reenen, J. (2015a). The impact of competition on
management quality: evidence from public hospitals. The Review of Economic Studies, page
rdu045.
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and Van Reenen, J. (2010). Does product market competition lead firms to
decentralize? American Economic Review, 100(2):434–38.
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and Van Reenen, J. (2015b). Do private equity owned firms have better
management practices? American Economic Review, 105(5):442–46.
Bolton, P. and Von Thadden, E.-L. (1998). Blocks, liquidity, and corporate control. The Journal
of Finance.
Boot, A. W. A., Thakor, A. V., and Udell, G. F. (1991). Secured lending and default risk: Equilib-
rium analysis, policy implications and empirical results. The Economic Journal, 101(406):458–
472.
Borio, C., Kharroubi, E., Upper, C., and Zampolli, F. (2016). Labour reallocation and productivity
dynamics: financial causes, real consequences. BIS Working Papers 534, Bank for International
Settlements.
Brav, O. (2009). Access to capital, capital structure, and the funding of the firm. The Journal of
Finance.
Brown, J. D. and Earle, J. S. (2017). Finance and growth at the firm level: Evidence from sba
loans. The Journal of Finance, 72(3):1039–1080.
Bunn, P. and Rostom, M. (2015). Household debt and spending in the United Kingdom. Bank of
England working papers 554, Bank of England.
Burcu, D.-B., Levkov, A., and Judit, M.-G. (2015). Financing constraints and unemployment:
Evidence from the great recession. Journal of Monetary Economics, 75(C):89–105.
Burkart, M., Panunzi, F., and Shleifer, A. (2003). Family firms. The Journal of Finance,
58(5):2167–2201.
Cadbury, A. (2000). Family firms and their governance: Creating tomorrow’s company from
today’s. London: Egon Zehnder Internation.
176
Campello, M., Graham, J. R., and Harvey, C. (2010). The real effects of financial constraints:
Evidence from a financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(3):470–487.
Cantor, R. (1990). Effects of leverage on corporate investment and hiring decisions. Quarterly
Review, (Sum):31–41.
Caselli, F. and Gennaioli, N. (2013). Dynastic management. Economic Inquiry, 51(1):971–996.
Chan, Y.-s. and Thakor, A. V. (1987). Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard
and private information. The Journal of Finance.
Chaney, T., Sraer, D., and Thesmar, D. (2012). The collateral channel: How real estate shocks
affect corporate investment. American Economic Review, 102(6):2381–2409.
Charles, K. K., Hurst, E., and Notowidigdo, M. J. (2016). The masking of the decline in manufac-
turing employment by the housing bubble. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(2):179–200.
Charles, K. K., Hurst, E., and Notowidigdo, M. J. (2018). Housing booms and busts, labor market
opportunities, and college attendance. American Economic Review, 108(10):2947–94.
Chen, J. and Thompson, P. (2015). New firm performance and the replacement of founder-ceos.
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 9(3):243–262.
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., Grullon, G., and Michaely, R. (2017). Product market compe-
tition and internal governance: Evidence from the sarbanes oxley act. Management Science,
63(5):1405–1424.
Chodorow-Reich, G. (2013). The employment effects of credit market disruptions: Firm-level
evidence from the 2008c9 financial crisis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1):1–59.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L. H., Claessens, S., Djankov, S., and Lang, L. H. (2000). The
separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics,
58(1):81 – 112. Special Issue on International Corporate Governance.
Corradin, S. and Popov, A. (2015). House Prices, Home Equity Borrowing, and Entrepreneurship.
The Review of Financial Studies, 28(8):2399–2428.
Cun˜at, V. and Guadalupe, M. (2005). How does product market competition shape incentive
contracts? Journal of the European Economic Association, pages 1058–1082.
Cun˜at, V. and Guadalupe, M. (2009). Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm:
The effect of foreign competition. Journal of Labor Economics, 27(2):179–212.
Custo´dio, C., Ferreira, M. A., and Matos, P. (2013). Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work
experience and chief executive officer pay. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(2):471 – 492.
Custo´dio, C., Ferreira, M. A., and Matos, P. (2017). Do general managerial skills spur innovation?
Management Science, 0(0):null.
177
D’Acunto, F., Tate, G., and Yang, L. (2017). Correcting market failures in entrepreneurial finance.
Working paper.
Dalton, D. R. and Kesner, I. F. (1983). Inside/outside succession and organizational size: The
pragmatics of executive replacement. The Academy of Management Journal, 26(4):736–742.
Davis, S. J. and Haltiwanger, J. (1992). Gross job creation, gross job destruction, and employment
reallocation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3):819–863.
Davydenko, S. A. and Franks, J. R. (2008). Do bankruptcy codes matter? A study of defaults in
France, Germany, and the U.K. Journal of Finance, 63(2):565–608.
DCLG (2010). National evaluation of the local enterprise growth initiative programme - final
report.
De Blasio, G., De Mitri, S., D’Ignazio, A., Finaldi Russo, P., and Stoppani, L. (2015). Public
guarantees to sme borrowing in italy. an rdd evaluation. Working paper.
de Mel, S., McKenzie, D., and Woodruff, C. (2008). Returns to capital in microenterprises: Evi-
dence from a field experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(4):1329–1372.
DETR (2000). Indices of deprivation 2000. department of the environment. Transport and the
Regions , London.
Dobrev, S. D. and Barnett, W. P. (2005). Organizational roles and transition to entrepreneurship.
Academy of Management Journal, 48(3):433–449.
Donnelley, R. G. (1988). The family business. Family Business Review, 1(4):427–445.
Efraim Benmelech, Nittai K. Bergman, R. J. E. (2012). Negotiating with labor under financial
distress. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 1.
Einio, E. and Overman, H. G. (2016). The (displacement) effects of spatially targeted enterprise
initiatives: evidence from uk legi. SERC discussion papers, Spatial Economics Research Centre,
London, UK.
Ellul, A., Pagano, M., and Panunzi, F. (2010). Inheritance law and investment in family firms.
The American Economic Review, pages 2414–2450.
Ewens, M. and Marx, M. (2018). Founder replacement and startup performance. The Review of
Financial Studies, 31(4):1532–1565.
Faccio, M. and Lang, L. H. (2002). The ultimate ownership of western european corporations.
Journal of financial economics, 65(3):365–395.
Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Founder-ceos, investment decisions, and stock market performance. The
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(2):439–466.
178
Folger, R. and Skarlicki, D. P. (1998). When tough times make tough bosses: Managerial distancing
as a function of layoff blame. Academy of Management Journal, 41(1):79–87.
G20/OECD (2015). G20/OECD. 2015. high level principles on SME fi-
nancing. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/
G20-OECD-High-level-Principles-on-SME-Financing-Progress-Report.pdf.
Gao, H., Harford, J., and Li, L. (2017). Ceo turnovercperformance sensitivity in private firms.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(2):583C611.
Gilchrist, S., Schoenle, R., Sim, J., and Zakrajsek, E. (2017). Inflation dynamics during the
financial crisis. American Economic Review, 107(3):785–823.
Giroud, X. and Mueller, H. M. (2010). Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?
Journal of Financial Economics, 95(3):312–331.
Giroud, X. and Mueller, H. M. (2011). Corporate governance, product market competition, and
equity prices. The Journal of Finance, 66(2):563–600.
Giroud, X. and Mueller, H. M. (2016). Firm leverage, consumer demand, and employment losses
during the great recession. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(1):271–316.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):107–156.
Gompers, P., Kovner, A., Lerner, J., and Scharfstein, D. (2010). Performance persistence in
entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(1):18 – 32.
Gonza´lez-Uribe, J. and Paravisini, D. (2019). How sensitive is young firm investment to the cost
of outside equity? evidence from a uk tax relief. Working paper.
Gopinath, G., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Karabarbounis, L., and Villegas-Sanchez, C. (2017). Capital
allocation and productivity in south europe. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4):1915–
1967.
Gozzi, J. C. and Schmukler, S. (2016). Public credit guarantees and access to finance. Economic
Research Papers 269324, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
Greenwald, B. C. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1993). Financial market imperfections and business cycles.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1):77–114.
Guadalupe, M. and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, F. (2010). Competition and private benefits of control. In
AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper.
Guadalupe, M. and Wulf, J. (2010). The flattening firm and product market competition: The
effect of trade liberalization on corporate hierarchies. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 2(4):105–27.
179
Hamilton, B. H. (2000). Does entrepreneurship pay? An empirical analysis of the returns to self
employment. Journal of Political Economy, 108(3):604–631.
Hart, O. D. (1983). The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. The Bell Journal of Economics,
pages 366–382.
Hellmann, T. and Puri, M. (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms:
Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 57(1):169–197.
Helmich, D. (1977). Executive succession in the corporate organization: A current integration.
The Academy of Management Review, 2(2):252–266.
Hennessy, C. A., Whited, T. M., Hennessy, C. A., and Whited, T. M. (2005). Debt dynamics. The
Journal of Finance, 60(3):1129–1165.
Hermalin, B. (1992). The effects of competition on executive behavior. RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 23(3):350–365.
Hurst, E. and Pugsley, B. W. (2011). What do small businesses do? Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity. Fall 2011:73-118.
IFF (2016). Research. qualitative research into the delivery and operation of EFG loan-
s. Available at:https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/
04/Qualitative-Research-Delivery-and-Operation-of-EFG-Loans-final.pdf.
Ioannides, Y. M. and Loury, L. D. (2004). Job information networks, neighborhood effects, and
inequality. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4):1056–1093.
Ivashina, V. and Scharfstein, D. (2010). Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008. Journal
of Financial Economics, 97(3):319 – 338. The 2007-8 financial crisis: Lessons from corporate
finance.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4):305 – 360.
Jensen, T., Leth-Petersen, S., and Nanda, R. (2014). Housing collateral, credit constraints and
entrepreneurship - evidence from a mortgage reform. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Working Paper Series.
Jenter, D., Matveyev, E., and Roth, L. (2016). Good and bad ceos. Working paper, London School
of Economics.
Kaplan, S. N., Sensoy, B. A., and Stromberg, P. (2009). Should investors bet on the jockey or the
horse? evidence from the evolution of firms from early business plans to public companies. The
Journal of Finance, 64(1):75–115.
180
Kaplan, S. N. and Zingales, L. (1997). Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures
of financing constraints? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1):169–215.
Kerr, S., Kerr, W. R., and Nanda, R. (2015). House money and entrepreneurship. Working Paper
21458, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kerr, W. and Nanda, R. (2009). Financing constraints and entrepreneurship. Working Paper
15498, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997). Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 105(2):211–248.
Lafontaine, F. and Shaw, K. (2016). Serial entrepreneurship: Learning by doing? Journal of Labor
Economics, 34(S2):S217–S254.
Lagaras, S. and Tsoutsoura, M. (2015). Family control and the cost of debt: Evidence from the
great recession. Fama-Miller Working Paper, pages 15–14.
Lamont, O. (1997). Cash flow and investment: Evidence from internal capital markets. The
Journal of Finance.
Lelarge, C., Sraer, D., and Thesmar, D. (2010). Entrepreneurship and credit constraints: Evidence
from a french loan guarantee program. In International differences in entrepreneurship, pages
243–273. University of Chicago Press.
Liberti, J. M. and Sturgess, J. (2014). Uncovering collateral constraints. Workingpaper.
London Economics (2017). Economic impact evaluation of the Enterprise Finance Guarantee (E-
FG) scheme. Available at:https://londoneconomics.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
Economic-impact-evaluation-of-the-Enterprise-Finance-Guarantee-scheme-November-2017-s.
pdf.
Matsa, D. A. (2010). Capital structure as a strategic variable: Evidence from collective bargaining.
The Journal of Finance.
McKenzie, D. and Woodruff, C. (2008). Experimental evidence on returns to capital and access to
finance in mexico. The World Bank Economic Review, 22(3):457–482.
Mian, A. and Sufi, A. (2010). Household leverage and the recession of 2007-09. IMF Economic
Review, 58(1):74–117.
Mian, A. and Sufi, A. (2014). What explains the 2007-2009 drop in employment? Econometrica.
Mian, A. and Sufi, A. (2018). Finance and business cycles: The credit-driven household demand
channel. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32(3):31–58.
Michaels, R., Beau Page, T., and Whited, T. M. (2018). Labor and capital dynamics under
financing frictions. Review of Finance, 23(2):279–323.
181
Michaely, R. and Roberts, M. R. (2012). Corporate dividend policies: Lessons from private firms.
The Review of Financial Studies, 25(3):711–746.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation:
An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20:293 – 315. The Distribution of Power
Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors.
Morck, R., Stangeland, D., and Yeung, B. (2000). Inherited wealth, corporate control, and economic
growth the canadian disease? National Bureau of Economic Research, pages 319–372.
Moskowitz, T. J. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2002). The returns to entrepreneurial investment: A
private equity premium puzzle? American Economic Review, 92(4):745–778.
Moyen, N. (2004). Investmentccash flow sensitivities: Constrained versus unconstrained firms. The
Journal of Finance, 59(5):2061–2092.
Mullins, W. and Schoar, A. (2016). How do ceos see their roles? management philosophies and
styles in family and non-family firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 119(1):24 – 43.
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics,
5(2):147 – 175.
OECD (2018). Financing SMEs and entrepreneurs 2018: An OECD Score-
board. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at:http://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/
financing-smes-and-entrepreneurs-23065265.html.
Oi, W. Y. (1962). Labor as a quasi-fixed factor. Journal of Political Economy, 70(6):538–555.
Oliner, S. and Rudebusch, G. (1992). Sources of the financing hierarchy for business investment.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(4):643–54.
O’Reilly, C. A. and Chatman, J. (1986). Organizational commitment and psychological attachment:
The effects of compliance, identification, and internalization on prosocial behavior. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 71(3):492–499.
Oxford Economics (2017-2018). The state of the nation: The uk family business sector
2017-18, ifb research foundation report. Available at: https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/
recent-releases/f060a8ac-a09d-4175-867e-fab8b368931a.
Paravisini, D. (2008). Local bank financial constraints and firm access to external finance. The
Journal of Finance, 63(5):2161–2193.
Park, C. (2000). Monitoring and structure of debt contracts. The Journal of Finance, 55(5):2157–
2195.
Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, F. (2006). Inherited control and firm performance. American Economic Review,
96(5):1559–1588.
182
Pica, G. and Pagano, M. (2014). Finance and employment. Economic Policy, 27(69):5–55.
Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world.
The Journal of finance, 54(2):471–517.
Raith, M. (2003). Competition, risk, and managerial incentives. American Economic Review,
93(4):1425–1436.
Rajan, R. and Winton, A. (1995). Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor. The Journal
of Finance, 50(4):1113–1146.
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. American Economic Review,
88(3):559–86.
Rajan, R. G. (2012). Presidential address: The corporation in finance. The Journal of Finance,
67(4):1173–1217.
Rauh, J. D. (2006). Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of corporate
pension plans. The Journal of Finance.
Rhodes, C. (2018). Business statistics, parliament uk. Available at: file:///C:/Users/susu2/
Downloads/SN06152.pdf.
Robb, A. M. and Robinson, D. T. (2014). The capital structure decisions of new firms. The Review
of Financial Studies, 27(1):153–179.
Schmalensee, R. L. (1989). Handbook of industrial organization. Ed by Richard L. Schmalensee and
Robert D. Willig, chapter vol. 2. Interindustry studies of structure and performance. Elsevier.
Schmalz, M. C., Sraer, D. A., and Thesmar, D. (2017). Housing collateral and entrepreneurship.
The Journal of Finance.
Schmidt, K. M. (1997). Managerial incentives and product market competition. The Review of
Economic Studies, 64(2):191–213.
Sharpe, S. A. (1994). Financial market imperfections, firm leverage, and the cyclicality of employ-
ment. The American Economic Review, 84(4):1060–1074.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of
Political Economy, 94(3):461–488.
Smith, C. W. and Warner, J. B. (1979). On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants.
Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2):117 – 161.
Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A. (1987). Macro-economic equilibrium and credit rationing. Working
Paper 2164, National Bureau of Economic Research.
183
Stulz, R. (1988). Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for
corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20:25 – 54. The Distribution of Power
Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors.
Stulz, R. and Johnson, H. (1985). An analysis of secured debt. Journal of Financial Economics,
14(4):501 – 521.
Sufi, A., Mian, A., and Rao, K. (2013). Household balance sheets, consumption, and the economic
slump. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(4):1687–1726.
Topa, G. (2001). Social interactions, local spillovers and unemployment. The Review of Economic
Studies, 68(2):261–295.
Tsoutsoura, M. (2015). The effect of succession taxes on family firm investment: Evidence from a
natural experiment. The Journal of Finance, 70(2):649–688.
Udry, C. and Anagol, S. (2006). The return to capital in ghana. American Economic Review,
96(2):388–393.
Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm
value? Journal of financial Economics, 80(2):385–417.
Wasserman, N. (2003). Founder-ceo succession and the paradox of entrepreneurial success. Orga-
nization Science, 14(2):149–172.
Whited, T. (1992). Debt, liquidity constraints, and corporate investment: Evidence from panel
data. Journal of Finance, 47(4):1425–60.
William, M. and Toro, P. (2018). Credit guarantees and new bank relationships. Working Papers
Central Bank of Chile 820, Central Bank of Chile.
World Bank (2015). Principles for public credit guarantee schemes for SMEs (english). Wash-
ington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/576961468197998372/Principles-for-public-credit-guarantee-schemes-for-SMEs.
Zia, B. H. (2008). Export incentives, financial constraints, and the (mis)allocation of credit: Micro-
level evidence from subsidized export loans. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2):498 – 527.
184
